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In April 2006 the New Economics Foundation released a report on UK ‘inter-
dependence’. It attracted media attention because it identified a date when the
average UK citizen begins to live off the rest of the world.
The moment we begin living beyond our natural means is what we
call our ecological debt day. At current levels of natural resource
use in the UK, the average person goes into ecological debt on 16
April. As our total consumption grows, it moves ever earlier in the
year. In 1961 it was 9 July, advancing to 14 May in 1981. (Simms
et al, 2006, p2)
Using reports like this one, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others
are increasingly trying to make consumption and lifestyles in the richest coun-
tries a core concern for sustainable development.
There can be little doubt that lifestyles in the richest countries represent a
profound challenge for sustainability, but after making this observation we
encounter different ways of defining the problem. For example, are we consum-
ing too much or just producing it in a wasteful and inefficient way? If the
answer is ‘both’, what is the relative importance of each problem? Questions
like this are important because different ways of defining problems imply differ-
ent solutions and ways of allocating scarce resources in an effort to bring about
change. Winners and losers will also emerge in relation to different strategies
and policy agendas.
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The environmental social sciences can make two valuable contributions to
the sustainable development debate in this context. Scholars can help society to
understand and define problems and, in doing so, influence what constitutes
solutions. They can also critique the ways in which other stakeholders, such as
NGOs, businesses and governments, seek to do the same, perhaps to support
policy agendas other than (or in addition to) sustainable development. The
accounts that will emerge from the social sciences are likely to be more complex
and nuanced but this should be understood as their strength and not as a weak-
ness.
This book makes a contribution along these lines by focusing on people,
technology and governance in the richest countries. It is important to focus on
these aspects because they are regularly simplified and caricatured in sustain-
able development debates, often in a way that co-opts them to other policy
agendas. For example, people are regularly reduced to being only self-centred
consumers, and technology is cast simplistically as a solution to environmental
and social problems. Governance is naively portrayed as multi-stakeholder
cooperation to solve problems based on an unlikely consensus over how they
should be understood and addressed.
In this chapter I explore more complex and accurate accounts and map out
the terrain for the following chapters. The first section draws on sustainable
consumption, environmental justice and environmental decision-making
research to understand people in relation to sustainable development. The
second section focuses on technology and draws on ideas from the alternative
technology movement, social shaping of technology and socio-technical transi-
tions. The third section explores governance through research on environmental
governance, ecological modernization and new environmental policy instru-
ments. I conclude by outlining the book’s aim and the chapters that follow.
People and sustainability: 
Motivation, justice and participation
Policy documents and public debates regularly simplify and caricature people in
relation to sustainable development. They are often, for example, cast as heavy
consumers of unsustainable products, or as a barrier that needs to be overcome
so that technology can run efficiently. It is widely accepted that such representa-
tions reflect the power and application of the economic/market and
technological/engineering perspectives on society (Murphy and Cohen, 2001;
Shove, 2004a). This means that specific assumptions are in widespread use –
for example, people can act only as egoistic self-centred welfare maximizers –
and these assumptions underpin sustainable development policies (Murphy and
Cohen, 2001; Paavola, 2001). In this section I discuss different ways of think-
ing about people and sustainability, beginning with refinements to the
conventional consumer perspective.
4 Introduction
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 4
Sustainable consumption: Motivation and identity
Sustainable consumption researchers have taken up the challenge of contribut-
ing a more nuanced understanding of people and consumption to sustainable
development debates, particularly compared with the conventional
consumer/market perspective (Cohen and Murphy, 2001; Princen et al, 2002;
Jackson, 2006). This work has involved close examination and questioning of
widely accepted ideas, such as: 
• people are self-centred and motivated only by increases in personal welfare; 
• increases in consumption lead to increases in happiness; 
• people have their own preferences and they are unaffected by what others
consume. 
Research in areas as diverse as ethics, psychology, anthropology, sociology and
cultural studies has been drawn together to produce alternative or additional
insights.
The values and motivations that underpin consumption in practice are a
useful starting point. The standard model of the consumer is based on a view of
people that has been described as ‘self-centred welfarism’. This suggests that
consumers are rational actors interested only in maximizing personal welfare
within the constraints of a fixed budget. However, as Paavola (2001) argues,
consumption in practice involves other value positions as well. People may
indeed be concerned about the future implications of consumption but not
necessarily in relation to their own welfare. Outcomes other than improvements
in personal welfare may be important. In addition, consumers can put personal
welfare and other future consequences to one side, to some extent, in order to
consume in a way that is consistent with their beliefs.
Psychologists and social psychologists have contributed to this debate by
exploring identity and lifestyle choices. In research on the voluntary simplicity
movement, Zavestoski (2001) makes an important distinction between environ-
mental and quality of life motivations behind changing consumption. Although
it is sometimes the case that voluntary simplicity is motivated by a desire to
‘save the planet’, this research shows that the majority of people are actually
motivated by a desire to improve their quality of life. The choice to adopt a
simpler lifestyle, and to consume less, happens as people begin to question the
positive relationship between consumption and happiness, and in fact begin to
see a negative one. This might be linked to the overburdening of the individual
by modern lifestyles and existential crisis.1
Disciplines like anthropology, sociology and cultural studies emphasize that
material goods are important in all societies because of the role they play in
identity and communication. Perhaps the most famous phrase to capture this is
‘conspicuous consumption’ (Veblen, 1899) – consumption that confirms and
communicates status. Such research reaches beyond the welfare aspects of
consumption, with important implications. It suggests, for example, that envi-
ronmental policy proposals that ignore the role of material goods in satisfying
Sustainability: Understanding People, Technology and Governance 5
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non-material human needs, such as status and group membership, should be
viewed with at least as much scepticism as those policies that assume that
consumers are only self-centred welfare maximizers.
The sustainable consumption debate, therefore, has done a great deal to
refine the understanding of the relationship between consumption and sustain-
able development. Perhaps the most significant problem, however, is that it
continues to engage with people primarily as consumers, although in more
sophisticated ways. If it is a problem that people are only understood as
consumers, as is the case in a consumer society, a limited amount is achieved by
trying to inform debates with a better understanding of consumers. To avoid
this trap I will discuss other perspectives on the relationship between people
and sustainability – as sufferers of injustice and bearers of useful knowledge.
Environmental justice and intergenerational equity
The environmental justice debate takes us beyond consumption and offers an
alternative way of linking people and sustainability. In doing so it draws atten-
tion to issues that are often marginalized or lost entirely. The origins of
environmental justice research are found in the backlash against landfill sites
and polluting industries in the US in the 1980s. In 1987 the landmark report
Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States (United Church of Christ
Commission for Racial Justice, 1987) drew attention to the fact that many
sources of pollution tend to be located in poor black neighbourhoods. This led
some to raise the spectre of ‘environmental racism’ and a public and political
debate followed.
In the 1990s the environmental justice agenda spread beyond the US. Social
scientists and policy actors in the UK, amongst others, contributed to the
debate. This wider adoption was accompanied by more critical reflection on
causal claims. Been (1994), for example, suggested that in the US poorer people
migrate to areas where land and property prices are depressed by industrial and
waste facilities. This argument challenges the view that city planners and others
impose polluting facilities on poor communities. Weinberg (1998) acknowl-
edged the value of documenting injustice whilst arguing that if researchers want
to make causal claims they must study social processes and not outcomes.
What are the links between environmental justice and sustainability?
Agyeman et al (2002) argues that there are at least two. First, justice is a desir-
able characteristic of any future society, particularly a developed and sustainable
one. Second, and more practically, environmental injustice is often associated
with environmental degradation. As Agyeman et al state:
Our interpretation of… [sustainable development] places great
emphasis upon the need to ensure a better quality of life for all, in
a just and equitable manner, whilst living within the limits of
supporting ecosystems. Sustainability, we argue, cannot be simply
a ‘green’ or ‘environmental’ concern, important though ‘environ-
mental’ aspects of sustainability are. (Agyeman et al, 2002, p1)
6 Introduction
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This research, therefore, makes justice and equity, at individual and community
levels, a central concern for how people and sustainable development are linked.
Environmental decision-making: Knowledge, 
participation and power
A third perspective on the relationship between people and sustainability is
provided by environmental decision-making research. Much of the work in this
area has been done in the UK, where at least two developments in the 1990s
drew attention to processes of inclusion and exclusion in policy making. The
first was the implementation of Local Agenda 21 (LA21) with LA21 plans being
seen as an opportunity to include people in planning for sustainability at the
local level. The second was conflict and protest around various infrastructure
projects, particularly roads, which highlighted tensions between national policy-
making processes and local or alternative perspectives.
At the centre of much environmental decision-making research is the
problem of knowledge and participation in decision-making processes (Evans,
2004). This concern has led researchers to draw on a wide range of social theo-
rists, particularly Jurgen Habermas and his work on deliberative democracy
(Doganay, 2004). Implicitly and explicitly, scholars have explored participation
in politics as a way of extending the public sphere, and deliberation as the desir-
able normative basis of democracy. There is critical reflection on the practical
and theoretical problems associated with the ideal of deliberative democracy,
but there is also a broad consensus that democracy can be renewed by trans-
forming existing institutions along more deliberative lines (e.g. Barrett and Usui,
2002).
Perhaps the most difficult challenge that scholars have taken up in this area
is analysing and critiquing decision making that is based on scientific (and other
technical) knowledge. Researchers have identified a process they refer to as the
‘scientization of politics’, which involves political choices being represented as
scientific and technical ones. As Bäckstrand (2004, p4) has argued, it ‘implies
that political and social issues are better resolved through technical expertise
than democratic deliberation’. As Beck (1992, p159) has argued, when politi-
cians effectively evade responsibility in this way, experts ‘maintain their
monopoly claim to rationality against the non-specialised public sphere’.
Strategies of this kind, which lead away from democracy and deliberation
to technocracy, can and do have unforeseen consequences. Not least of these is
public protest that targets new technologies and infrastructure developments,
including those that might increasingly be justified in relation to the policy
agenda of sustainable development. But as Nelkin (1979, p11) argued in the
1970s, in a technological controversy protest may be aimed ‘less against specific
technological decisions than against the declining capacity of citizens to shape
policies that affect their interests; less against science than against the use of
scientific rationality to mask political choices’.
Environmental decision-making research, therefore, gives us a third perspec-
tive on people and sustainability. It suggests that sustainability in practice is
Sustainability: Understanding People, Technology and Governance 7
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intimately associated with processes of decision making and how such processes
treat knowledge of different kinds. At the practical level this research reveals
just how difficult it is to achieve widespread participation in decision making
and this raises questions about the ‘renewal of democracy’ agenda. More gener-
ally this research sensitizes us to the way in which the imperative of sustainable
development might be exploited in various ways, particularly using scientific
and technical data to justify decisions, thereby masking the political choices
involved.
Technology and sustainability: 
Alternatives, shaping and transitions
The relationship between technology and sustainability attracts great deal of
attention. In most debates technology is understood to mediate between
resources and our goals and objectives. This leads us to a focus on energy and
material efficiency. The concept of ‘eco-efficiency’ is a good example
(Schmidheiny, 1992; De Simone and Popoff, 1997).2 There is no doubt that
more efficient technology will make an important contribution to sustainable
development, but this perspective has many limitations. The emphasis on effi-
ciency, for example, prevents questions being raised about goals and objectives
and aggregate impacts. The replacement of old and inefficient technologies can
also be presented as an apolitical process that leaves society largely untouched.
This is attractive but not realistic. In this section I outline more accurate and
subtle accounts of technology and sustainability.
The alternative technology movement
The idea of alternative or appropriate technology (AT) is a useful starting point.
It was popularized by Ernst Schumacher in Small is Beautiful and it remains
central to environment and development debates. Indeed, the tension between
mega-technologies and appropriate technologies is one of the most profound in
research and practice. In his classic book Schumacher argues that AT is some-
thing that fits the context. In a developing country it is labour intensive, small
scale, context specific and affordable. It is also developed, to a significant
extent, bottom-up. This can be contrasted with what Schumacher refers to as
‘grandiose projects’ and ‘large scale projects on the level of the most modern
technology’ (see particularly Schumacher, 1974, pp143–159).
The AT tradition has also influenced debates in developed countries. Smith
(2003, p129) outlines some of its focus and history:
The AT movement supports a system of needs provision tailored
to local circumstances, and which fulfils social and environmental
dimensions as well as purely economic ones … in this respect, the
AT movement has been concerned with sustainable technologies
for nearly 30 years and provides a rich seam of empirical mate-
8 Introduction
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 8
rial… An orientation to meeting needs through local production,
using low inputs and local resources, in closed cycles, and with
high social inclusion … positions AT at the ‘local stewardship’ …
or ‘deep green’ end of sustainable development…
As a social movement and as a research area AT has experienced a renaissance
in recent years. This is associated with the backlash against globalization,
amongst other things, and the search for radical socio-technical solutions to
sustainability problems.
From this discussion it is clear that the vision and practice of AT challenge
mainstream technologies in different ways. There is an emphasis on local and
decentralized approaches, rather than centralized and hierarchical ones. One of
the intended outcomes of this is that technological change becomes a more
participatory and democratic process, rather than one imposed from above with
the help of experts. There is also an emphasis on consciously linking progres-
sive social and environmental agendas. This contrasts with conventional
eco-efficient technological interventions, which can carry a model of society
with them but leave it implicit.
Sustainability and the social shaping of technology
Scholars in sociology have been examining the social construction and shaping
of technology since the 1970s (see Bijker and Law, 1992; MacKenzie and
Wajcman, 1999).3 The fight against technological determinism underpins this
research effort. According to Mackenzie and Wajcman (1999, p3) this is the
view that ‘Technologies change, either because of scientific advance or follow-
ing a logic of their own; and they then have effects on society’.4 Scholars in
technology studies are interested instead in the relationship between technology
and society and how these shape each other.
By focusing on the adoption of technology we begin to see the contribution
that this research effort can make. Studies of adoption confirm that this is a
political process. It is not explained by the technology being ‘better’ or ‘cheaper’
in a simple sense, although retrospectively it is often explained in this way. In
practice, new technologies have an ‘interpretive flexibility’, which allows them
to mean different things to different social groups (Kline and Pinch, 1999,
p113). Adoption, therefore, involves the framing of a technology as a solution
(Bijker, 1992, p98).
In the context of environment and sustainability, interpretive flexibility is
clear in the case of genetically modified (GM) crops. Some claim this technol-
ogy is a threat to sustainable agriculture, and others argue it is a route to it.
Researchers in technology studies have identified a process of ‘closure’ through
which the meaning and role of a technology becomes stable and widely
accepted. When closure occurs the technology is taken for granted and its
contested origin is forgotten. That said, interpretive flexibility can return.
Nuclear power technology, for example, shows how some technologies fail to
reach the point of ‘closure’, or become contentious once again if they do.
Sustainability: Understanding People, Technology and Governance 9
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Moving beyond adoption, the work of Shove (1997, 2004a and b) shows
how sociological research on the use of technology informs the sustainability
debate. Shove’s work has focused mainly on technologies in the domestic
setting and particularly on the way that social norms and technologies shape
each other. She shows how assumptions about warmth and cleanliness, for
example, are shaped by interactions between people and technology. In the
case of room heating, although physiologists use the idea of an ‘optimum’
temperature, in practice room temperature is determined by social norms and
interactions between technology and people. An important feature of this
research is that social practices, such as clothes washing, are the link between
norms and technology.5
Innovation and the transition to sustainability
In the 1990s, innovation studies informed a great deal of research on envi-
ronment and sustainability. Much of this examined the regulation-
innovation-competitiveness nexus at micro- and macro-economic levels (see,
for example, Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Wallace, 1995; Kemp, 1997;
Gouldson and Murphy, 1998; Murphy and Gouldson, 2000). This research
informed the argument that environmental regulation could be used to shape
and drive industrial innovation to the benefit of the environment and
competitiveness. More recently, perhaps because of the realization that
product and process innovations alone will not deliver environmental
sustainability, the research effort has moved on to innovations in whole
socio-technical systems.
In their introduction to System Innovation and the Transition to
Sustainability: Theory, Evidence and Policy (Elzen et al, 2004) the editors argue
that optimizing an existing socio-technical system might produce a factor 2
improvement in the efficiency with which resources are used. Environmental
sustainability, however, implies much greater improvements, and this underpins
the interest in system innovation (also known as transitions) (Geels, 2004 and
2005a and b):
… transitions to sustainability require changes from, for example,
one transport system to another and from one energy system to
another. Such system innovations not only involve new technolog-
ical artefacts, but also new markets, user practices, regulations,
infrastructures and cultural meanings. (Geels et al, 2004, p1)
The socio-technical system as a unit of analysis is central to the sustainable
transitions debate for a number of reasons. From a theoretical standpoint it is
useful because it can accommodate and integrate research which is focused in
other ways, and often at the micro level. Industrial ecology research, for
example, tends to focus at the material level and only on production.
Sustainable consumption, on the other hand, tries to link material and cultural
dimensions but it focuses on ‘the demand side’. The focus on socio-technical
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systems is a way of overcoming such divisions and making use of the insights
that the research provides. One risk, however, is that the origins of the transi-
tions concept means that it will tend to privilege some perspectives over others,
for example, production or the development of technologies over consumption
and the meaning of artefacts (Shove, 2004).
More practically, the focus on socio-technical systems helps to explain why
superior technologies with better environmental performance are not being
adopted. In broad terms this is explained by a wide range of factors, usually
operating together – regulatory frameworks, cultural values, market impera-
tives, infrastructural constraints and so on. This implies that a systemic view is
important but, as Geels et al (2004, p8) point out: ‘Although the importance of
system innovation is increasingly emphasized in sustainability debates, there is
not yet much known about how system innovations occur and how policy
makers may influence them.’ The more fundamental question, however, is not
‘how’ policy makers can influence system innovation but ‘if’ it is possible for
any group to steer a system in a particular direction.
Much of the practical work associated with the transition to sustainability
debate revolves around the idea of ‘transition management’. Kemp and
Rotmans (2004), for example, emphasize the need for policy interventions that
try to shape beliefs and expectations as well as industrial production and market
activity – production being the traditional focus for policy. They argue that the
transition to sustainability will be an iterative process – ‘goal oriented incre-
mentalism’ – involving the articulation of visions and ‘learning-by-doing’,
amongst other things. Not surprisingly, Teisman and Edelenbos (2004) argue
that this requires a new form of politics because existing ways of governing are
not well placed to manage the process of transition.
Governance and sustainability: 
Framing, institutions and instruments
In recent years governance has emerged as one of the most important concepts
in international relations, political science and policy studies.6 Hajer and
Wagenaar (2003, p1) argue that this reflects actual changes in politics and
policy making from the late 1980s onwards. As part of this trend, environmen-
tal governance and governance for sustainability are increasingly being
discussed (e.g. Adger et al, 2003; Davidson and Frickel, 2004; Evans, 2004;
Jasanoff and Martello, 2004). Indeed, Hajer and Wagenaar (2003, p3) go on to
argue that environment and sustainability have played a role in the emergence
of governance more generally by raising questions about the relationship
between the state and society. In this section I discuss environmental gover-
nance and explore issue framing, institutional change and new environmental
policy instruments.
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Environmental governance: functionalist and 
critical perspectives
Many scholars agree that politics has been transformed since the late 1980s by
a shift from government to governance. Or, more modestly, that governance
has emerged as a more important feature of government over this period. In
these debates government is understood as centralized, hierarchical and perhaps
technocratic, whereas governance involves power moving away from the centre,
and policy making through complex networks. Bache and Flinders (2004)
suggest that governance refers to the increased role of NGOs in public policy
making and delivery. It captures a more complex relationship between state and
society where the state’s role is coordination rather than control.
Governance is particularly clear in the area of environment and sustainabil-
ity. From a functionalist perspective this can be explained as the state’s response
to the complexity of problems and its own limited resources (Raman, 2003). A
related view suggests that the driving force behind environmental governance is
the poor performance of public policy in this area. Functionalist accounts
suggest that environmental governance draws more actors into the policy
process because their knowledge and commitment is likely to produce more
successful policies. These accounts tend to assume a consensus on problems and
how they can be solved and it is this which underpins cooperation between
stakeholders.
There are, of course, more critical accounts. These take the legitimacy prob-
lems that governments are experiencing in relation to environment and
sustainability as their starting point and they focus on efforts to manage these.
In some cases they highlight tensions across policy agendas being pursued by
governments, such as conflict between economic growth and environmental
protection (Jonas and Gibbs, 2003; Murphy and Levidow, 2006). Evidence of
legitimacy problems is found in new social movements at the global level, such
as those that are labelled anti-capitalist or anti-globalization, as well as in more
local protests against controversial developments and technologies.
From a critical perspective, environmental governance can be understood as
a way of managing legitimacy problems by drawing some critics into a relation-
ship with the state whilst at the same time marginalizing others. This is achieved
through ‘participation’ and ‘partnership’. Arguments along these lines raise
doubts about the existence of a convenient consensus regarding environmental
problems and how they might be solved. They examine instead how problems
are defined or framed, and solutions identified, in ways that include some policy
actors in a hegemonic policy coalition whilst at the same time excluding others
(Murphy and Levidow, 2006).
The environmental transformation of institutions
Ecological modernization research has examined the institutional changes that
accompany a shift from government to environmental governance. In an early
contribution Weale (1992) referred to ‘the new politics of pollution’, and subse-
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quent work has explored the transformation of a wide range of institutions in
the face of environmental challenges. Formal and informal institutions associ-
ated with regulation, production and consumption have been examined,
particularly to see what happens as the environment moves from being a periph-
eral to a core concern.
For the purposes of this discussion it is useful to focus on government and
regulation from the ecological modernization perspective. Discussions concern-
ing the role of governments in the process of ecological modernization have
been profoundly influenced by political modernization debates (see Jänicke,
1990). Drawing on these influences, Mol (1995, pp46–47) identified two strate-
gies that might be used to overcome the deficiencies of the traditional
bureaucratic state in environmental policy making:
First, a transformation of state environmental policy is necessary:
from curative and reactive to preventive, from exclusive to partici-
patory policy-making, from centralized to decentralized wherever
possible, and from domineering, over-regulated environmental
policy to policy which creates favourable conditions and contexts
for environmentally sound practices and behaviour on the part of
producers and consumers. The state will have to … focus more on
steering via economic mechanisms and change its management
strategy by introducing collective self-obligations for economic
sectors via discursive interest mediation. The second, related,
option includes a transfer of responsibilities, incentives and tasks
from the state to the market. This will advance and accelerate the
ecological transformation process, mainly because the market is
considered to be a more efficient and effective mechanism for coor-
dinating and tackling environmental problems than the state …
the central idea is not a withering away of the state in environ-
mental management, but rather a transformation of the relation
between state and society and different accents on the steering role
of the state. The state provides the conditions and stimulates social
‘self-regulation’, either via economic mechanisms and dynamics or
via the public sphere of citizen groups, environmental NGOs and
consumer organizations.
This view of the changing role of the state resonates with recent work on
metagovernance. Jessop (1998, 2002, 2004) has used this concept to explore
how central governments might operate in complex multi-actor and multi-level
contexts. It is ‘the organization of the conditions for governance in its broadest
sense’ (Jessop, 2004, p240). This involves efforts to manage complexity and
interactions, possibly by creating visions and agreeing targets in more delibera-
tive ways, whilst at the same time choosing when implementation should be
pursued through mandatory, market or more participatory mechanisms.
The concept of metagovernance implies that subtle steering mechanisms
will become increasingly important. If this is the case then in the future we are
likely to see institutional innovations of various kinds. In the case of GM crops
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in the UK we recently had the ‘GM nation’ debate, although it is unclear what
role this experiment was supposed to play. In a paper on risk and new tech-
nologies, Walls et al (2005) argued that rather than witnessing a shift from
government to governance, we might be witnessing a shift to governance and
the state’s response to this, the governance of governance – metagovernance.
New environmental policy instruments: 
from technical reason to political reason?
We can usefully explore the design and implementation of specific policies in
this context. The transition from government to (meta)governance has been
accompanied by the emergence of a wide range of new or novel environmental
policy instruments (NEPIs) and practices. Examples include eco-taxes, eco-
labels, voluntary agreements (covenants) between government and business,
environmental management systems, public information/education campaigns
and citizens’ juries. A great deal of research has examined how these are justi-
fied, used and linked.
The use of command and control regulatory instruments is closely associ-
ated with government in its traditional form (Pierre, 2000). As Jordan et al
(2005, pp478–479) argue, however, new policy instruments ‘… are assumed to
allow social actors freedom to coordinate amongst themselves in pursuit of soci-
etal goals, with far less (or even no) central government involvement’. These
authors argue that environmental policy is a particularly interesting test case
for the broader shift to new policy instruments because the strong legacy of
command and control environmental regulation from the late 1960s would
suggest that such a shift is unlikely (see also Jordan et al, 2003).
After examining the use of NEPIs in eight countries in the European Union
(EU) the authors draw out a number of interesting conclusions. Overall they
find plenty of evidence of NEPIs being used but this varies a lot across jurisdic-
tions, sectors and instrument types. In many cases the new instruments are being
used to plug gaps or to deal with new problems, rather than replace traditional
approaches. Significantly, many of the new policy instruments also require state
involvement. The authors argue that ‘Far from eclipsing government, gover-
nance therefore often complements and, on some occasions, even competes with
it…’ (Jordan et al 2005, p477).
Other work has drawn the same conclusion regarding the use of traditional
approaches alongside newer ones. In a study of environmental regulation and
industrial innovation in the UK and the Netherlands, Gouldson and Murphy
(1998) explored the relationship between command-and-control approaches
(statutory environmental targets or technology standards) and more novel
voluntary ones (covenants and environmental management systems). These
authors emphasize the role of traditional instruments in establishing environ-
mental imperatives, and their use alongside newer instruments that try to build
the capacity of business to respond.
The research discussed here indicates that there is need for caution regard-
ing the shift from government to governance in the area of environment and
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sustainability in general and specifically regarding NEPIs. The cautious
approach is clear when Jordan et al (2005, p492) say:
Broadly speaking, our nine jurisdictions have, on balance, shifted
from a position of ‘government’ to one of ‘governance’ with
respect to their use of (environmental) policy instruments.
However, the total distance travelled along the continuum by the
nine jurisdictions has been surprisingly modest… [also] in spite of
the rhetorical commitment to find less direct and hierarchical
forms of state involvement (that is, more governance), govern-
ments (and the EU) find themselves inexorably drawn into the
detailed process of designing, adopting and overseeing the imple-
mentation of all (environmental) policy instruments… (emphasis
original)
To conclude, it is worth reflecting more broadly on the environmental policy
process in the context of government and governance. Raman (2003) has
explored this by distinguishing between technical and political reason. If envi-
ronmental problems are understood to speak for themselves at the empirical
level, and the policy process is understood as a series of more or less logical
stages, then technical reason will tend to hold sway. This might take the form
of foregrounding the evidence of problems using scientific models, followed by
the use of expert methodologies (e.g. cost–benefit analysis) to identify actions.
Alternatively, if environmental problems are understood as emerging in relation
to the way they are framed, and who participates in that process, and the policy
process itself is understood as one involving argument, deliberation and power,
then political reason becomes more important. Policy making in this context
would place more emphasis on critical reflection on the way problems are being
understood, and institutional opportunities to debate and argue.
Purpose and outline of the book
I have discussed people, technology and governance in relation to environment
and sustainability. The accounts I have given are more complex and subtle than
those that dominate popular and policy debates. I have introduced concepts
and arguments from a wide range of social sciences but I have not tried to link
them. The main purpose of this book is to do this, and I argue in the final
chapter that there is a people-technology-governance nexus that is profoundly
important to environment and sustainability. If this is true then it should become
a focus for multidisciplinary research and policy making. The chapters that
follow contribute a great deal to our understanding of this nexus and to the
process of linking social science perspectives. They are organized into the same
three sections as this chapter – people, technology and governance – but in prac-
tice they overlap.
Section II focuses on people and sustainability. In Chapter 2 Seonaidh
McDonald and her colleagues use the ‘circuit of culture’ theoretical framework
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from cultural studies. Through this they examine how consumers ‘decode’ the
governance aspects of sustainable technology products, after their ‘encoding’ by
public, private and civil society organizations. The chapter focuses on actual
purchases of products, such as energy-efficient fridges, water-conserving
washing machines and low-energy light bulbs. It also compares purchases of
such technologies with more everyday purchases like food and household clean-
ing products. The chapter draws on data from around 100 semi-structured
interviews with people who have consciously tried to buy more sustainable tech-
nologies, and it includes fascinating extracts from them.
In Chapter 3 Robin Roy and his colleagues explore the adoption and use of
low and zero carbon technologies. These technologies, such as solar water
heaters and micro combined heat and power systems, have an important role to
play in UK and EU climate change strategies. That said, consumer adoption is
slow and, even when they are adopted, such technologies are not always used
effectively. This chapter examines the factors that influence consumer adoption
and use, drawing on existing literature and an exploratory empirical survey. It
introduces a model of the adoption process that shows that these technologies
are often designed without taking sufficient account of consumer requirements.
This leads the authors to argue for a people-centred approach to eco-design and
they identify ‘hotspots’ that might be used to encourage adoption and effective
use.
In Chapter 4 Patrick Devine-Wright presents a social-psychological analy-
sis of energy technologies and systems and how they change over time.
Different ways of understanding energy are identified and linked to different
ways of understanding and representing people as users of energy. Devine-
Wright argues that representations of people that circulate in policy play an
important role in determining how energy technologies and systems evolve.
Despite playing this role, however, such representations are left implicit in
energy policy and they are rarely reflected upon or exposed to critical debate.
Towards the end of the chapter it is argued that ‘energy citizenship’, in contrast
to the currently dominant ‘consumer/deficit’ view of people, offers a more suit-
able basis for the development and widespread adoption of sustainable energy
technologies.
Section III focuses on technology and sustainability. In Chapter 5 Adrian
Smith examines the alternative technology movement and eco-housing in the
UK since the early 1970s. He describes how this socio-technical context
produced a range of technologies that are getting more attention now in rela-
tion to sustainable housing and communities. Smith argues that the eco-housing
movement can be understood as a ‘green niche’ and he examines ‘intermediary
developments’, such as Beddington Zero Emission Development (BedZED), as
places where technologies and practices are translated from niche to main-
stream. Towards the end of the chapter he explores the governance of a
sustainable technology across this divide and he outlines two possibilities:
adapting lessons and practices from the niche so that they can be adopted by
the mainstream; altering the socio-technical context of the mainstream so that
it is more receptive to niche ideas and practices.
16 Introduction
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 16
In Chapter 6 Raphael Sauter and Jim Watson examine the possible impact
of domestic micro-generation technologies on the electricity supply system.
Domestic micro-generation is often described as radical or disruptive because it
blurs the boundary between energy supply and demand and could change
consumer-provider relationships, leading to fundamental changes in electricity
system architecture, operation and governance. Sauter and Watson examine the
case using the large technical systems (LTS) framework. This allows them to
consider the electricity system as a whole, including its technologies, institu-
tions, regulations and actors. The authors argue that micro-generation is not
inherently disruptive. Its impact will depend on the model of deployment and
related ownership, financing, operating and technology arrangements, produc-
ing different ‘patterns of disruptiveness’.
In Chapter 7 Tim Foxon discusses innovation systems research and the
concept of ‘systems failure’. He argues that this concept might underpin policy
interventions that aim to encourage the development of more sustainable tech-
nologies. The concept of ‘systems failure’ encompasses, but goes beyond, the
traditional idea of ‘market failure’. This concept is based on mainstream
neoclassical economic thinking and it is widely used (implicitly and in some
cases explicitly) by policy makers. The chapter draws mainly on innovation
studies literature but it also explores ideas from governance and social shaping
of technology research. Towards the end of the chapter Foxon discusses lessons
that can be drawn from the transition approach to innovation that is being
applied by the Dutch government.
Section IV focuses on governance and sustainability. In Chapter 8 Rachel
Slater examines the role of partnerships in the delivery of local government
waste management services in the UK. Sustainable waste management in prac-
tice will require a shift away from waste disposal at landfill to waste
minimization, re-use and recycling. Bringing about this change is one of the
UK’s most pressing environmental challenges, but achieving it has been compli-
cated by the shift from government to governance in the planning and delivery
of public services at the local level. The UK government is increasingly calling
for local services that respond to local needs, with more power being passed to
local communities and non-state actors, and emphasis is being placed on service
delivery through partnerships. This chapter analyses the Somerset Waste
Partnership (SWP) and Hackney Waste Partnership (HWP) and uses them to
draw out wider implications for the relationship between local governance and
technologies of waste management.
In Chapter 9 David Toke examines the governance of wind power in the
EU. To explain the installation of generating capacity, the existing debate
focuses on financial procurement mechanisms and/or the land planning.
Although adequate financial support and planning consent are necessary for
wind power, arguments over the relative merits of different financial mecha-
nisms and barriers associated with planning process can be misleading. Chapter
9 takes a broader view of wind power by exploring related networks of policy
actors and their ontological and epistemological aspects. Toke uses the idea of
ontology to discuss the structure and relationships of wind power networks,
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and epistemology is used to explore the role of knowledge within them. The
chapter discusses and compares five European countries – UK, the Netherlands,
Germany, Spain and Denmark – and it provides a rich account of wind power
in these contexts.
In Chapter 10 Mark Winskel examines multi-level governance (MLG) and
innovation in marine energy technology – wave and tidal flow devices. Scottish
devolution in the late-1990s resulted in energy policy in Scotland being shared
between the Scottish and UK executives. Devolution also coincided with a
number of significant changes in the UK energy system, including an extensive
policy review, and the growing importance of European and international level
decision making on climate change. A distinctive energy policy arena has
emerged in Scotland and differences of emphasis and intent compared with the
UK level have become clearer. Winskel argues that while MLG is a challenge
from the perspective of policy integration, it opens up new possibilities for
reform and experimentation that might benefit the marine energy technology
sector in Scotland.
Section VII is the Conclusion. In Chapter 11 I explore ways of linking
people, technology and governance in relation to the imperative and challenge
of sustainable development. I begin by exploring the challenge of sustainable
development by linking its ecological/material and social/cultural aspects. I
move on to draw out initial key insights that should underpin discussion of
people and technology, and governance in relation to technology – the multiple
identities of people, contextualized accounts of technology, critical and func-
tionalist accounts of governance. The rest of the chapter explores the
people-technology-governance nexus and illustrates how insights from different
social sciences can be combined to produce new insights.
Notes
1 The importance of research like this becomes clear as evidence of the psychologi-
cal cost of modern life grows. Towards the end of April 2006 Richard Layard,
emeritus professor at the Centre for Economic Performance of the London School
of Economics, argued that depression, anxiety and other forms of mental illness
have overtaken unemployment as the greatest social problem in the UK (The
Guardian, Friday 28 April, p9).
2 In relation to production there are close links to policy concepts like ‘waste mini-
mization’, ‘clean technologies’ and ‘clean production’. In relation to society more
broadly, similar ideas have been pursued in the so-called ‘Factor 4’ and ‘Factor 10’
debates (von Weizäcker et al, 1997) – these phrases indicate the improvement in
resource efficiency that is needed to achieve environmental sustainability.
3 Defining technology has been a challenge for scholars in Technology Studies.
Consumers and people in industry might hold the view that technology is a ‘gadget’
or bit of ‘kit’, but for scholars this is a fragile perspective; the knowledge of how
to use the ‘gadget’ must be part of the technology because otherwise it is useless.
Proceeding along these lines Bijker (1995, p231) identifies the following as aspects
of technology:
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… physical artifacts (such as dikes), human activities (such as making
dikes), and knowledge (such as the know-how to build dikes and the
fluid dynamics used to model them in the laboratory). Additionally, I
will consider the word technology to apply not only to hardware tech-
nology (such as fascine mattresses) but also to ‘social’ technology (such
as the traditional dike-management system used in the Netherlands).
Bijker acknowledges that this is a broad definition, and that it cuts across some
existing distinctions, but it is defended on the grounds that such distinctions are
fragile anyway.
4 Bijker (1995, p238) argues slightly differently. The argument that technology deter-
mines society is a theory of society and as a result it should be referred to as
technological determinism. The argument that technology is autonomous,
however, is a theory of technology and not of society, and consequently this should
not be labelled technological determinism.
5 Chappells et al (2001) have extended this approach to examine how technology
constructs not only social norms but also the meaning of ‘natural resources’. These
authors point out that technical and policy debates assume that water is homoge-
nous or something that can be described adequately using a small number of
categories defined in physical terms – for example, grey water or clean water. From
a consumer perspective, however, it has multiple identities that are constructed in
relation to three genres of technology – barriers, containers and purifiers.
6 The discussion here focuses on governance in relation to policy and its implemen-
tation. The concept is used in other ways. The most common is ‘good governance’
in business, particularly following the collapse of ENRON. In this context it
usually refers to financial control. Good governance is also used in relation to
developing countries and financial assistance from the World Bank and similar
institutions. In this context it also refers to financial control, but it can be extended
to cover democracy and human rights.
References
Adger, N., Brown, K., Fairbrass, J., Jordan, A., Paavola, J., Rosendo, S. and Seyfang, G.
(2003) ‘Governance for sustainability: Towards a ‘thick’ analysis of environmental
decisionmaking’, Environment and Planning A, vol 35, pp1095–1110
Agyeman, J., Bullard, R. and Evans, B. (2002) ‘Exploring the nexus: Bringing together
sustainability, environmental justice and equity’, Space & Polity, vol 6, no 1, pp77–90
Bache, I. and Flinders, M. (2004) ‘Multi-level governance and British politics’, in Bache,
I. and Flinders, M. (eds) Multi-level Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp93–106
Bäckstrand, K. (2004) ‘Civic science for sustainability’, Global Environmental Politics,
vol 3, no 4, pp24–41
Barrett, B. and Usui, M. (2002) ‘Local agenda 21 in Japan: Transforming local environ-
mental governance’, Local Environment, vol 7, no 1, pp49–67
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Sage, London
Been, V. (1994) ‘Locally undesirable land uses in minority neighbourhoods’, Yale Law
Review, vol 103, p1383
Bijker, W. (1995) ‘Sociohistorical technology studies’, in Jasanoff, S., Markle, G.,
Petersen, J. and Pinch, T. (eds) Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Sage,
London, pp229–256
Sustainability: Understanding People, Technology and Governance 19
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 19
Bijker, W. and Law, J. (eds) (1992) Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in
Sociotechnical Change, MIT Press, London
Chappells, H., Selby, J. and Shove, E. (2001) ‘Control and flow: Rethinking the sociol-
ogy, technology and politics of water consumption’, in Cohen, M. and Murphy, J.
(eds) Exploring Sustainable Consumption: Environmental Policy and the Social
Sciences, Elsevier, Oxford, pp157–170
Cohen, M. and Murphy, J. (eds) (2001) Exploring Sustainable Consumption:
Environmental Policy and the Social Sciences, Elsevier, Oxford
Davidson, D. and Frickel, S. (2004) ‘Building environmental states: legitimacy and
rationalization in sustainability governance’, International Sociology, vol 19, no 1,
pp89–110
De Simone, L. and Popoff, F. (1997) Eco-Efficiency: The Business of Sustainable
Development, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Doganay, U. (2004) ‘Rethinking democratic procedures: Democracy and deliberative
experiences in Turkey’s LA21 process’, Political Studies, vol 52, pp728–744
Elzen, B., Geels, F. and Green, K. (2004) System Innovation and the Transition to
Sustainability: Theory, Evidence and Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Evans, J. (2004) ‘What is local about local environmental governance? Observations
from the local biodiversity action planning process’, Area, vol 36, no 3, pp270–279
Geels, F. (2004) ‘From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems:
Insights about dynamics and change from sociology and institutional theory’,
Research Policy, vol 33, pp897–920
Geels, F. (2005a) ‘The dynamics of transitions in socio-technical systems: A multi-level
analysis of the transition pathway from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles
(1860–1930)’, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, vol 17, no 4,
pp445–476
Geels, F. (2005b) Technological Transitions and System Innovation: A Co-Evolutionary
and Socio-Technical Analysis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Geels, F., Elzen, B. and Green, K. (2004) ‘General introduction: system innovation and
transitions to sustainability’, in Elzen, B., Geels, F. and Green, K. (eds) System
Innovation and the Transition to Sustainability: Theory, Evidence and Policy,
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp1–16
Gouldson, A. and Murphy, J. (1998) Regulatory Realities: The Implementation and
Impact of Industrial Environmental Regulation, Earthscan, London
Hajer, M. and Wagenaar, H. (2003) Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding
Governance in the Network Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Jackson, T. (2006) Reader in Sustainable Consumption, Earthscan, London
Jänicke, M. (1990) State Failure: The Impotence of Politics in Industrial Society, Polity
Press, Cambridge
Jasanoff, S. and Martello, M. (2004) Earthly Politics: Local and Global in
Environmental Governance, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Jessop, B. (1998) ‘The rise of governance and the risk of failure’, International Social
Science Journal, vol 50, issue 155, pp29–45
Jessop, B. (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State, Polity Press, Cambridge
Jessop, B. (2004) ‘Multi-level governance and multi-level meta-governance’, in Bache, I.
and Flinders, M. (eds) Multi-level Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp49–74
Jonas, A. and Gibbs, D. (2003) ‘Changing local modes of economic and environmental
governance in England: A tale of two areas’, Social Science Quarterly, vol 84, no 4,
pp1018–1036
20 verso
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 20
Jordan, A., Wurzel, R. and Zito, A. (2003) ‘‘New’ instruments of environmental gover-
nance: Patterns and pathways of change’, Environmental Politics, vol 12, no 1,
pp3–25
Jordan, A., Wurzel, R. and Zito, A. (2005) ‘The rise of ‘new’ policy instruments in
comparative perspective: Has governance eclipsed government?’, Political Studies,
vol 53, pp477–496
Kemp, R. (1997) Environmental Policy and Technical Change: A Comparison of the
Technological Impact of Policy Instruments, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Kemp, R. and Rotmans, J. (2004) ‘Managing the transition to sustainable mobility’, in
Elzen, B., Geels, F. and Green, K. (eds) System Innovation and the Transition to
Sustainability: Theory, Evidence and Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp19–47
Kline, R. and Pinch, T. (1999) ‘The social construction of technology’, in MacKenzie,
D. and Wajcman, J. (eds) The Social Shaping of Technology (2nd Edition), Open
University Press, Maidenhead, pp113–115
MacKenzie, D. and Wajcman, J. (eds) (1999) The Social Shaping of Technology (2nd
Edition), Open University Press, Maidenhead
Mol, A. (1995) The Refinement of Production: Ecological Modernization Theory and
the Chemicals Industry, CIP-Data Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Haag
Murphy, J. and Gouldson, A. (2000) ‘Environmental policy and industrial innovation:
integrating environment and economy through ecological modernisation’,
Geoforum, vol 31, no 1, pp33–44
Murphy, J. and Cohen, M. (2001) ‘Consumption, environment and public policy’, in
Cohen, M. and Murphy, J. (eds) Exploring Sustainable Consumption:
Environmental Policy and the Social Sciences, Elsevier, Oxford, pp3–20
Murphy, J. and Levidow, L. (2006) Governing the Transatlantic Conflict over
Agricultural Biotechnology, Routledge, London
Nelkin, D. (1979) ‘Science, technology and political conflict’, in Nelkin, D. (ed)
Controversy: Politics of Technical Decisions, Sage, London, pp9–24
Paavola, J. (2001) ‘Economics, ethics and green consumerism’, in Cohen, M. and
Murphy, J. (eds) Exploring Sustainable Consumption: Environmental Policy and the
Social Sciences, Elsevier, Oxford, pp79–94
Pierre, J. (2000) ‘Conclusions: Governance beyond state strength’, in Pierre, J. (ed)
Debating Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp241–246
Porter, M. and van der Linde, C. (1995) ‘Green and competitive: ending the stalemate’,
Harvard Business Review, vol 73, no 5, pp120–133
Princen, T., Maniates, M. and Conca, K. (eds) (2002) Confronting Consumption, MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA
Raman, S. (2003) ‘The significance of political rationality in governance: Assessing the
energizing of UK building regulation 1990–2002’, PhD thesis, University of
Pittsburgh
Schmidheiny, S. (1992) Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on
Environment and Development, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Schumacher, E. (1974) Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered,
Abacus, London
Shove, E. (1997) ‘Revealing the invisible: sociology, energy and the environment’, in
Redclift, M. and Woodgate, G. (eds) The International Handbook of Environmental
Sociology, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp261–273
Shove, E. (2004a) ‘Efficiency and consumption: technology and practice’, Energy and
Environment, vol 15, no 6, pp1053–1065
Sustainability: Understanding People, Technology and Governance 21
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 21
Shove, E. (2004b) ‘Sustainability, system innovation and the laundry’, in Elzen, B.,
Geels, F. and Green, K. (eds) System Innovation and the Transition to Sustainability:
Theory, Evidence and Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp76–94
Simms, A., Moran, D. and Chowla, P. (2006) The UK Interdependence Report: How
the World Sustains the Nation’s Lifestyles and the Price it Pays, The New Economics
Foundation with The Open University, London
Smith, A. (2003) ‘Transforming technological regimes for sustainable development: a
role for Appropriate Technology niches?’, Science and Public Policy, vol 30, no 2,
pp127–135
Teisman, G. and Edelenbos, J. (2004) ‘Getting through the “twilight zone”: Managing
transitions through process-based, horizontal and interactive governance’, in Elzen,
B., Geels, F. and Green, K. (eds) System Innovation and the Transition to
Sustainability: Theory, Evidence and Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp19–47
United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice (1987) Toxic Wastes and Race
in the United States, UCCCRJ, New York
Veblen, T. (1899) The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions,
Macmillan, London
Weale, A. (1992) New Politics of Pollution, Manchester University Press, Manchester
von Weizäcker, E., Lovins, A. and Lovins, H (1997) Factor Four: Doubling Wealth,
Halving Resource Use, Earthscan, London
Wallace, D. (1995) Environmental Policy and Industrial Innovation: Strategies in
Europe, the US and Japan, Earthscan, London
Walls, J., O’Riordan, T., Horlick-Jones, T. and Niewöhner, J. (2005) ‘The meta-gover-
nance of risk and new technologies: GM crops and mobile telephones’, Journal of
Risk Research, vol 8, pp635-661
Weinberg, A. (1998) ‘The environmental justice debate: A commentary on methodolog-
ical issues and practical concerns’, Sociological Forum, vol 13, no 1, pp25–32
Zavestoski, S. (2001) ‘Environmental concern and anti-consumerism in the self-
concept: Do they share the same basis?’ in Cohen, M. and Murphy, J. (eds)
Exploring Sustainable Consumption: Environmental Policy and the Social Sciences,
Elsevier, Oxford pp173–190
22 Introduction





ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 23
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 24
Chapter 2
Decoding Governance: A Study of
Purchase Processes for Sustainable
Technologies
Seonaidh McDonald, Panayiota Alevizou, 
Caroline Oates, Kumju Hwang and William Young
Introduction: The individual and sustainable
technologies
In this chapter we will examine the relationships between sustainable technolo-
gies and the governance structures in which they are embedded. These structures
and relationships involve government, business and civil society groups. We
present data gathered through 81 semi-structured interviews with a wide range
of green consumers about their purchase processes for technology-based prod-
ucts, such as fridges, washing machines and light bulbs. We will examine the
data in order to uncover to what extent the governance practices of public insti-
tutions, private companies and civil society groups are evident in the purchase
(or non purchase) process. In other words we aim to discover how governance
is being decoded by the end user (Du Gay et al, 1997).
Like the consumers cast as obstacles in energy efficiency research (Shove,
1997), consumers are often drawn in the governance debate as invisible, auto-
matic in their responses, or passive in their acceptance of information and
products. Our work seeks to question this view of the consumer by problema-
tizing the relationship between production and consumption and examining the
purchase process in minute detail. In this study we will therefore focus on indi-
vidual members of the public. We do not, however, view the public as a
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homogenous mass, or as a group of ‘market segments’ that are more or less
disposed to ‘green products’ such as might be presented in traditional market-
ing (e.g. Solomon, 2002). Rather we follow Peattie (1999) and view each
individual as the author of a range of separate purchase decisions. These will
add up to a portfolio of purchase verdicts which characterize that individual’s
consumption patterns. Within that portfolio there will be decisions that seem to
be incompatible with other purchases or lifestyle choices. There could also be a
heterogeneity of purchase processes and influences within the set of choices
made by any one individual. 
From this perspective, the link between sustainable technologies and
sustainable consumption is a series of individual purchases. If people do not
purchase products that incorporate sustainable technologies, then any reduced
environmental impact or other innovation that designers and manufacturers
intended can never be achieved. Individual purchases lie at the heart of the
problem of sustainable development because they are at the crossover point
between production and consumption practices. That is not to say that we view
this relationship as a simple one. We see purchase processes as complex, socially
embedded, situated acts. We believe that they are informed by (competing
and/or paradoxical) lifestyle values, which an individual develops (implicitly
and explicitly) and lives out (implicitly and explicitly) over time.
The individual and governance structures
From our individual-centric point of view, governance (and technology) can be
seen as part of the social infrastructure and context of purchasing. As such, it
impacts on individual purchases through a wide range of factors such as avail-
ability, variety and price. Private and public institutions and civil society groups
all influence, directly and indirectly, the types, specifications and numbers of
products that are manufactured and therefore available on the high street. If
innovations are not subsidized (in the widest sense of the term) by government
or championed by companies, then they will not be part of the spectrum of
products that individuals can choose between. In this way, governance struc-
tures (private, public and societal) act as a sort of filter, which pre-selects a
range of products that the consumer can then consider. 
Furthermore, governance structures and relationships clearly have a signifi-
cant impact on the ways in which social, ethical or environmental problems are
framed, and therefore on the ways that they are understood by individual
consumers. However, the multilayered and interdependent effects of governance
also have a profound and implicit effect on the ways that consumers ‘read’ and
understand technology products. That is not to say that we would regard the
public as a group of individuals who are the passive recipients of government
policy, corporate advertising or civil society group lobbying. The ways in which
individuals engage with, and make sense of, the potential relationship between
technology-based products, the purchase processes they might take part in and
the global issues that concern them will be endlessly complex, changing and
essentially unpredictable.
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Individuals do have a degree of power within these governance structures.
For example, their voting and purchasing acts may effect gradual changes in the
operation of public and private institutions over time. Equally, they can use
their membership of civil society groups to signal their views to public and
private sector bodies in order to hasten change. This is not a uniform process,
as green consumers may use their consumer power to back fair trade, or any
number of other issues, whilst grey consumers are simultaneously trying to use
theirs to influence price, for example. However, our units of analysis are real
purchase processes that are located in the near past, and so this incremental
process of change lies outside the scope of our problematic. 
In terms of the perspectives on sustainability outlined at the start of this
book (Murphy, this volume), our approach clearly fits within the environmen-
tal decision-making approach. However, our concern is not with inclusivity or
participation in the explicit democratic processes of government, but with the
implicit democratic processes of governance through consumption. Ours is a
practical focus, which deals with the sub-structure, or wide end of democracy.
Method
This study is part of a wider project that aims to uncover a detailed picture of
the consumer decision-making processes involved in the purchase of sustainable
technologies. The work has taken a grounded approach to researching actual
purchases of a wide range of products with a technological component, such as
domestic white goods, energy tariffs, cars and light bulbs. For this study we
conducted 81 semi-structured interviews with individuals who had recently
purchased these products. Most of our sample were green consumers, although
we also interviewed a number of grey consumers in order to compare and
contrast the purchase experiences of these groups. Interviewees were recruited
through a process of snowball sampling. This process was initiated by inter-
viewing individuals contacted through a wide range of publications and
organizations, including The Ethical Consumer, wholefood shops, Friends of
the Earth, UK Quakers sustainability self help group, Buddhist centres, organic
vegetable box schemes and Pure magazine. The final sample contained a
balanced mix of age, gender and socio-economic groups. In order to help
consumers to articulate the relevant level of detail, laddering techniques were
used (Gutman, 1982, 1987; Reynolds and Gutman, 1988). Each interview
lasted around an hour and covered the purchase of two or more products, as
well as a commentary on the individual’s more routine weekly shopping habits. 
There are two features of this micro focus that we view as particularly
important for our research. The first is the level of detail that we elicit about
the purchase process itself as well as its social context. This means that we do
not view the purchase at the moment of sale, but see it as an indefinite process
that may begin with the explicit search for information or the implicit echoing
of family values, political views or advertising claims. We see the purchase act
itself as socially situated and part of a developing lifestyle.
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The other strength of this micro approach is that it deals with specific
purchases. Hence we are not interested in asking participants to talk about
future, hypothetical purchases, but rather about actual purchases they have
been involved in. Thus we would like to signal the contrast between the some-
times conceptual and abstract view of ‘technology’ and ‘sustainability’ with our
research into concrete and specific purchase decisions about those technologies,
which play out as more or less sustainable patterns of consumption.
Based on the data, a number of different, inter-related analyses have been
undertaken. For example, we have looked at how decision criteria are involved
and evolved in the purchase process (Young et al, 2005), and how different
kinds of information sources are used by consumers (Oates et al, 2005). In this
chapter we present the results of an analysis of how different aspects of gover-
nance are manifest in the consumer practices and conceptualizations of
purchases processes. 
In line with our grounded approach we have examined the purchase narra-
tives for evidence of governance concepts. Examples of this would include, for
instance, where people discuss the effects of regulation (such as the European
Union (EU) Energy Label), or aspects of corporate social responsibility (such as
good or bad working conditions), or the influence of consumer groups (such as
Soil Association labels). We have not asked our interviewees to reflect on gover-
nance issues, but simply asked them to tell us in detail about their (non)purchase
processes. Therefore, if issues relating to significant governance debates are not
present in the data, we might assume that either these notions are too deeply
implicit to articulate, or that the artefacts discussed are silent on such matters.
In this way, the research can be seen to be taking a grounded approach to the
problem of whether or not governance is being decoded by green consumers.
The outcome of this process is presented below.
Theoretical framework: Circuit of culture
The circuit of culture model has its roots in the work of Stuart Hall (1980) and
his colleagues at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Johnson,
1986). His encoding/decoding model was part of a movement towards post-
structuralism in cultural studies. Hall used this model to conceptualize the
processes that were encapsulated by watching television. The model is based on
his insight that meaning is jointly socially constructed by both the ‘author’ and
the ‘reader’ in a continuous circuit of moments of production, distribution and
consumption of cultural objects (Du Gay et al, 1997). What this means is that
an unread ‘text’ or object does not have a complete meaning until it has been
consumed; that its meaning cannot be determined by its author alone. Meaning
is not fixed in the sense that it remains the same over time, nor will it necessar-
ily be understood in similar ways by different readers.
This approach has resonance with the notion of ‘interpretive flexibility’ that
has been developed in the Technology Studies literature (Kline and Pinch, 1999).
This raises the idea that an artefact can be ‘read’ differently by different social
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groups. However, a cultural analysis would extend this insight and contend
that, due to the context dependent nature of the purchase process, the same
artefact can be ‘read’ in different ways by the same consumer at different times.
In fact, a green consumer may read an artefact in different ways at the same
time as they struggle to make sense of competing cultural frames such as fair
trade, resource use and anti-consumption values. That is not to say that no
cultural consensus is ever reached about the meaning of an artefact, just that
this process is never viewed as complete, apolitical or unproblematic. As
Baudrillard (1998, p27) states, ‘Few objects today are offered alone, without a
context of objects which “speaks” them [emphasis in original].’ What we are
investigating then is not a single, fixed or uncontested ‘meaning’ of governance
activities. Rather, we hope to uncover some of the layers of interdependent influ-
ences that are gathered in the ‘symbolism’ (Murphy and Cohen, 2001) of
technology products and the purchase processes that consumers engage with.
The circuit of culture model is interesting for our analysis of governance in
the discourse of green consumers about their purchase of sustainable technolo-
gies. It allows us to separate the notion of the production (both physically and,
more significantly, culturally) of an object (like a low-energy light bulb) in a
cultural sense from the ‘moment’ of consumption of the meaning of that object
(Burgess, 1989). In the analysis that follows, we will focus on the process of
decoding and ‘allow ourselves to be practically preoccupied with one moment’
in the circuit of culture (Johnson, 1986, p284). We will analyse the detailed
accounts of purchasing sustainable technologies that have surfaced in our work
with green consumers in order to discover how (and whether) they are decod-
ing the information relating to the governance for sustainability that is encoded
in their (non)purchases. 
In this analysis we are going to highlight the formal institutions (Neale,
1987), such as governments, companies and civil society groups. Elsewhere we
consider more informal institutions (Oates et al, 2005) such as kinship groups,
habits, routines, cultural values and social norms (Parto, 2005). Our analysis
seeks evidence of several different scales of governance in the data and consid-
ers different levels of interrelation (Parto, 2005). In particular, we look for data
that help us understand the decoding of:
• Business – Examples of corporate-level governance activities might include
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives like greener production,
including energy and waste reduction or use of recycled materials, ethical
labour conditions and other forms of social justice. These issues could be
linked to the company as a whole, or to an individual product. As well as
focusing on the production of the product, information may be decoded
about the way that the product can be used (e.g. the Wash Right campaign)
or disposed of (e.g. design for recyclability). There may also be evidence of
industry-level governance initiatives that are being implemented across
whole sectors like Fair Trade or Soil Association accreditation. 
• Government – Here we may uncover local government actions such as waste
systems or community education programmes. This category would also
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include all the national government and EU policies, guidelines and regula-
tions that target sustainability in some way. In the case of sustainable
technologies, the EU Energy Label is a good example.
• Civil Society Groups – This might include evidence of ways in which differ-
ent groups are trying to frame environmental or social issues and/or link
them with the use of specific technologies (e.g. carbon emissions and car
usage). Equally interesting is the information that civil society groups
provide in the hope of mediating the relationship between the consumer
and the marketplace (such as Which? magazine and the Ethical Consumer
magazine).
There are a number of issues which cut across these three. For example, the EU
Energy Label is at the same time a regulation that is imposed by supra-national
government, an industry-wide scheme for white goods, a measure that the
company uses to communicate the energy usage of a particular product and a
measure advocated by Which? magazine for determining running costs. What
we are trying to discover is whether there is any evidence of governance activi-
ties having an impact on the consumers’ decision-making processes. Every
product purchased (or not) can be viewed as the culmination of a variety of
different governance processes. When people engage with the end products, do
they ‘read’ the evidence of any of the governance processes, or do these remain
invisible to the consumer? 
Findings
In the following sections we shall consider how governance concepts are being
decoded by consumers in relation to the three main stakeholder groups:
Business, Government and Civil Society.
Business and governance
Perhaps the most interesting pattern that has surfaced in our data is the very
different ways that consumers treat the purchase of technology-based products
compared with their approach to weekly shopping. This is perhaps not surpris-
ing in itself: the marketing literature would characterize these as high- and
low-involvement purchases, respectively (Hansen, 2005). However, what is very
interesting for our research is that while consumers are quite discerning about
the companies that they buy coffee or chocolate from, they do not take the same
approach to decoding meanings about either the companies or the retailers that
they purchase technology-based products from. 
This is articulated in several ways. First, there is a group of individuals who
treat these products groups in different ways but who do not see their behav-
iour as inconsistent, or in fact see it at all. For example, there are a number of
consumers who are very concerned about the use of supermarkets because of
the effect that they are having on supply chains and local producers. These
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concerns have led them to boycott supermarkets in favour of other outlets such
as wholefood shops or local independent stores for their weekly food shopping.
However, the same consumers make use of the large white-goods supermarket
chains such as Comet and Curry’s and do not apply the same level of social or
ethical critique to these retail outlets when they are making purchases of tech-
nology-based products.
There is, however, a second group who treat the two product groups as
‘legitimately’ different. This group see, for example, that all white goods are
produced overseas, by large multinationals in unknown but probably poor
working conditions, and therefore any product and/or company is as bad as the
next. Once they have made the decision to purchase a fridge they see themselves
as helplessly bound to making an unethical purchase and simply make a deci-
sion based on another criterion, such as energy efficiency, instead. 
...most cookers are made out of metal and glass so there is not a
huge choice of materials... (Interview 22)
…but from what I understand most electronic equipment is as bad
as each other anyway… (Interview 4)
I assumed, probably wrongly, that all manufacturers of consumer
electrical goods are probably as bad as one another... (Interview
64)
I don’t think any of these electrical firms are ethical… (Interview
80)
Electronic and electrical goods, very difficult I think partly because
there is not a huge amount to choose between different manufac-
tures… (Interview 74)
…there seems to be so little ethical difference in a way between
the suppliers…that’s why I made the decision on reliability and
facilities… (Interview 65)
These views are consistent with current thinking in the sustainable development
literature, where people judge themselves, not on individual acts, but on a holis-
tic picture of their lifestyle. Thus they do not worry about individual
unsustainable products, as long as, on the whole, they are following the princi-
ples of sustainability in most aspects of their lives (Gilg, Barr and Ford, 2005).
This also has resonance with Peattie’s (1999) understanding of consumers as
making a portfolio of purchase decisions that are highly context dependent and
not necessarily consistent with each other.
The final group try to implement the green or ethical approaches that they
take in buying fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG), such as foodstuffs, house-
hold cleaning products or toiletries, in their purchase processes for technology
products. This group encounter enormous difficulties and are forced to make
Decoding Governance 31
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 31
compromises due to the huge amount of research time, the availability of prod-
ucts, the cost of products or the non-existence of what they see as reliable
information. For example, some of these consumers wish to buy second-hand
appliances but then do not have information about the energy efficiency of the
appliance and cannot select from a full range of brands, limiting their ability to
select a more ethical manufacturer. This sort of compromise often sits heavily
with the consumers, who are ‘troubled’ by the purchase process. 
Well I am ashamed, I am a bit ashamed to say I bought a Creda so
that didn’t rate highest in Ethical Consumers’ environmental list
but the Consumer Association recommended it for various reasons
in terms of efficiency and so on… (Interview 69)
…although it is very difficult because you know every day you
hear some bad news about some firms that you previously thought
was ok and people who you shopped with for years or bought
from and thought were alright and suddenly it seems they are the
baddies and I think it is hard.  Some firms seem to be good in one
area and bad in another and I think if you are trying to do the
right thing it is very confusing and takes up an awful lot of time
and at the end of it you think well I am just one small person but
I do think about it, well yes definitely… (Interview 71)
Yes to an extent I suppose there are loads of different filters I
would apply to purchasing and if I apply them all too strictly then
I am not going to find anything at all. (Interview 74)
Most of the bicycles are made in far eastern sweatshops and it’s
very hard to find a bicycle that’s got any recycled parts to it. The
only thing I have found so far is second hand again, and that’s
probably what I’ll do, but I was trying to buy a new bicycle. It
seemed impossible to find an environmentally and socially accept-
able bicycle. Which is quite odd because it’s a ‘green, cycling to
work’ thing. (Interview 4) 
Corporate social responsibility initiatives
In the purchase processes of the consumers we interviewed some brands were
seen as safeguards against unethical practices and were used as shortcuts to
dealing with complex global issues. The most frequent example of this in our
data is the Co-operative Bank. In sustainable technologies there were percep-
tions of some German brands as environmentally superior. Sometimes this
decoding was done on the basis of a national stereotype without any specific
information about the company or whether the product was actually made in
Germany.
I would imagine a German company would be as good as any
because I know that the legal system in Germany is much tougher
than ours on pollution… (Interview 64)
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Bosch probably have a better and more developed environmental
policy as do most of the German manufacturers as compared to
the American ones or the Italian ones… (Interview 74)
These sorts of associations with country-of-origin are not uncommon and have
been discussed in the marketing literature (Liefield, 2004).
Lack of corporate social responsibility
Where concrete ideas about CSR were being decoded, we found that these were,
more often than not, negative messages. Often the company name was used as
a ‘brand’ to dismiss products. For example,
…if someone is in a car and I’m in the car with them I won’t let
them fill up in ‘Esso’… (Interview 6)
I don’t buy named brands like I would never buy Nike or
anything; I would kill myself first… (Interview 72)
However, sometimes consumers had decoded specific meanings from brands:
…Coca-cola particularly recently hearing about their issues like
water use in India and also links to death squads in Columbia so I
have recently you know I have more recently found out about that
we avoid Coca-cola products… (Interview 70)
…avoid Marks & Spencers because at the moment they are it is
not because they are…it is not that they are bad alone but that
they support the Israeli invasion of Palestine so until that ends
even though I actually really like Marks & Spencers products and
things I won’t shop there just from a personal and political
perspective… (Interview 72)
Still other consumers identify an issue and then evaluate all brands on a single
criterion. For example, 
I would certainly boycott companies or corporations which I
know for example might fund animal experimentation...
(Interview 78) 
…but I try to avoid companies that I know have supported
President Bush and I try to avoid things that I know come from
Israel… (Interview 80)
Where we did find evidence that CSR activities were being decoded in the
purchase process for technology products or FMCGs, we found that it was the
company that was being judged to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and not the individual
products. This has interesting implications for companies who seek to launch
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‘green’ products alongside their more established ‘grey’ counterparts (e.g.
Nestlé’s launch of a fair trade coffee).
Lack of information on CSR activity
The most common response in our data pertaining to CSR was about how little
information is available on the firms involved in producing technology prod-
ucts. Several of our respondents described looking for this kind of information
but not being able to find any, or not knowing how to go about finding it.
…for example with cleaning products it’s very easy to find envi-
ronmental alternatives to the main brands that aren’t
environmental. But obviously with technological products it’s not
so easy to find… (Interview 14)
…[I] would like to do things like get a green or environmentally
friendly energy and perhaps furniture that used you know that
were good green companies as well.  I don’t know how I would
find those or source those kind of companies… (Interview 77)
…bigger purchases like for the house as well such as furniture,
kitchens, bathrooms things like that there is very little information
you can make a judgement on the ethics of the company that
supply those things… (Interview 73)
…so we asked the staff and they weren’t aware in B&Q whether
it was FSC (Forest Stewardship Council) or not and in the end we
didn’t buy anything… (Interview 41)
I have been interested in ethical consumerism for as long as I can
remember really but I wasn’t aware that there were any ethical
ratings for things like that for appliances. (Interview 23)
Civil society groups and governance
For many consumers, the most reliable guide to help them make sense of which
companies are ‘good’ is the Ethical Consumer, which is a magazine produced
by the consumer group the Ethical Consumer Research Association. Another
trusted source of reference for consumers is Which? magazine, published by the
Consumers’ Association, which is an independent charity. A number of
consumers reported using either or both of these sources:
…according to the Ethical Consumer magazine Nokia have a
better ethical record than others and I bought a Nokia mobile
phone. (Interview 79)
…and we actually went for a Bosch which was one of the less bad
choices from Ethical Consumer… (Interview 74)
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…but it was Ethical Consumer that I would rely on in making my
decisions… (Interview 45)
One of the starting points was that we have the Which magazine
and my wife likes to read that so we use that as a sort of the start-
ing point. (Interview 12)
Just because I trust them (referring to the Which Magazine) to be
independent and to look at various aspects of for example with
the washing machine, the noise level, the durability, the energy
usage and the performance. If they’ve tested it against other
machine they will give an impartial view, which is the best…
(Interview 14)
I think largely…it is hard to remember I think largely based on
the Which magazine report which narrowed it down to only a
couple of models and then I was looking at the price on those
models and the factors we talked about before their reliability and
efficiency and everything… (Interview 75)
Well we started basically from an Ethical Consumer point of view
and we had gone around to a few shops like the big superstores
and asked questions and then we kind of checked online at a few
sites, we did look at Which magazine kind of to see comments
from them as well so we kind of got going from that and kind of
went from there so it was kind of accumulating a lot of things…
(Interview 72)
Although both of these associations have made many of their reports available
online, the consumers that we interviewed still seemed to be using the physical
versions of these publications available through friends, family or local libraries.
This reliance on print-based media is perhaps surprising in this electronic age. 
A number of other civil society groups also represent a trustworthy source
of information for green consumers:
I think it may well have been Friends of the Earth, who provided
the information, probably set out a schedule of the companies and
which were the best and which were the most satisfactory and I
probably just went ahead from there.  In fact I’m pretty sure that’s
what happened… (Interview 35)
Well again we get The Ecologist, we get The Green Party’s infor-
mation, we get newsletters from Greenpeace and Friends of the
Earth and you know yeah just and talking to friends, yeah…
(Interview 49)
I suppose Friends of the Earth is a source of information that I
would well recommend I think it would be quite trustworthy…
(Interview 48)
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I did consult Friends of the Earth to ask them if I should consider
diesel and they told me that as far as second hand cars went it
wasn’t really going to make much difference to the environment…
(Interview 55)
I would normally go to Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace.  I go
to the website usually and if I couldn’t find what I was after I
would ring them up… (Interview 55)
Government and governance
The only really visible element of this stakeholder group is at EU level. The EU
Energy Label indicates the power consumption of an appliance (in kilowatt
hours) under standard running conditions. The EU Energy Label rates appli-
ances from A (most efficient) to G (least efficient) and provides additional
appliance-performance information. The energy efficiency label must, by law,
be shown on all fridges, freezers, fridge freezers, washer driers and dishwashers,
and on light-bulb packaging.
I suppose with a washing machine you do look at the star rating
don’t you, you do look at the efficiency rating… (Interview 16)
Looking at a fridge for example I would first eliminate anything
that was not an A rated… (Interview 74)
So I used the EU rating [for buying a washing machine]. Yes so I
just went looking at all the panels stuck to the front and that was
part of my basis for a decision.  It was a big part of my basis for a
decision… (Interview 32)
Of all the information about sustainability, the EU Energy Label was the most
consistently and universally decoded. This rating scheme is unquestioned by
even the most cynical of our respondents. It is widely noticed, and it is ‘under-
stood’ as apolitical and unproblematic. It has made a significant impact on the
purchase of technology-based products for a wide range of different kinds of
green consumers. The success of this scheme can be likened to the levels of trust
that people equate with the Fair Trade and Soil Association labels on food-
stuffs. In contrast, schemes such as the EU Eco-label (which often appears
within the EU Energy Label) go completely undecoded by consumers.
On the other hand, the success of the EU Energy Label, and the way in
which it is decoded, could be argued to lead to an overly simplistic framing of
energy use as an issue. Since most consumers seem to get no further in their
decoding of the label than ‘A=good’, it could be seen as obscuring the complex-
ity (and politics) of measuring energy use for appliances. So although consumers
using the label to guide their choices will select appliances that consume less
energy in their day-to-day use, they do not know how much energy the appli-
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ance uses, how much was used in its manufacture or how much was used in its
distribution, or even which of these aspects the A rating actually refers to. 
Further, it is interesting to note that although the use of the EU Energy Label
is enshrined in law, it is not being decoded by consumers as an EU regulation.
Instead, it is being read in terms of CSR as either the result of the manufac-
turer’s efforts to produce a better, more efficient product, or as an information
source that has been provided by the retailer.
Discussion and conclusions
Shortcuts to making sense of sustainability
What our research shows is that sustainable technologies are products that are
embedded in multilevel, inter-related, and sometimes paradoxical, social
complexities. Consumers appear to deal with this by tackling the decoding
through a number of different strategies.
Many of the individuals in our study sought to simplify the problem by
relying on a third party that they trust to unpick the issues on their behalf. In
this case, the most common third parties were the Ethical Consumer or Which?
magazines. Others approached the task of simplification by privileging particu-
lar brands (such as Bosch or Míele) or groups of brands (such as German
manufacturers). A third strategy was to identify the most important sustainabil-
ity issue for them personally and then make their choices based on a single
criterion. As discussed above, a common choice is energy efficiency, based on
the very successful EU Energy Label. A slightly more sophisticated version of
this response was where consumers did not confine their searches to one issue
but explicitly prioritized one aspect of sustainability. We also found that some
consumers employ a mixture of these approaches.
What is interesting here is that, on the whole, the consumer reaction to the
complexity of the problem of sustainable consumption is to try one or more
methods of (conceptual) simplification. This is a natural response, but a cultural
analysis highlights the fact that these solutions are themselves framed by gover-
nance activities. Some of the examples discussed above show consumers trying
to extend the familiar recipes for short cuts developed by the grey consumer
(e.g. brand) to a more complex, important and dynamic problem. Of course
brand (as a concept) can be understood to be a culturally constructed designa-
tor in itself. What is missing here is an appreciation of the relationship between
the ways in which governance structures and relationships have influenced the
framing of the ‘problems’ and ‘issues’ that the consumers see in the first place.
The EU Energy Label, for example, is a product of inter-related and media-
brokered governance activities which have, over time, identified domestic
energy use as: a) problematic; b) addressable; c) the responsibility of the indi-
vidual household. The governance structures are doing more than generating
policy to address issues. Here we can see how they are influencing the issues,
the terminology, the tools and approaches as well as the possibilities of how,
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why and by whom they might be solved. Our research shows that the consumers
who grapple with this level of governance influence are few and far between.
Contrast with FMCG behaviour
By far the most common response to the difficulty of making sense of sustain-
ability, even amongst consumers who were actively engaging with the problems
of sustainability in other product groups, such as FMCG, was to apply different
criteria to the purchase of sustainable technologies. These findings confirm
Peattie’s (1999) conception of green purchase processes as inconsistent and
context specific. Our research certainly suggests that consumers’ approaches to
purchase processes vary significantly according to product type. This kind of
behaviour has also been observed in studies of tourism consumption, where
green consumers do not necessarily become green travellers (Watkins, 1994;
Wearing et al, 2002). As indicated above, sometimes a different approach is
taken knowingly by green consumers, but it was equally likely that consumers
subconsciously chose different purchase criteria. 
This curious situation can in part be explained by the lack of information
that can be readily decoded that is perceived to be available to consumers. The
decoding process has broken down because of two competing information
problems. The first decoding problem is that in fact there is an endless amount
of information about a huge range of competing or even conflicting sustainabil-
ity issues. However, the second problem is that consumers do not know how to
begin to decode this information for technology-based products. In other words,
even if consumers do know how and where to obtain information on all the
aspects of sustainability that they feel are pertinent, they do not know how to
go about evaluating this information.
The success of the EU Energy Label is particularly interesting. This is infor-
mation which is presented as ‘fact’ in a ‘standardized’ format and reduced to a
single scale that is displayed on every product. This information has been
decoded in very similar ways by all our interviewees. Further, it remains unques-
tioned even by the most cynical green consumers. As such, it has been decoded
in a way that is similar to the decoding of the Fair Trade or the Soil Association
symbols for FMCG. More research is needed to understand whether the success
of the EU Energy Label is due to its simplicity, its authoritativeness or just the
fact that it is ubiquitous for white goods.
Implications for governance
On the whole, we have found that the governance activities of public and
private sector institutions are not really having an impact on the purchase of
sustainable technologies. Representations of civil society groups such as the
Ethical Consumer magazine seem to be better trusted by the public than either
of these two groups. However, the same consumers who regularly seek out
information about working conditions for the production of the food and cloth-
ing products that they buy are apt to ignore the production processes,
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distribution networks and retailers of their white good purchases. The ways in
which other goods and services are ‘read’ by green consumers, and the success
of the EU Energy Label, both suggest that consumers are willing and able to
tackle the complex problems of sustainability as part of their purchasing deci-
sions. This points to the relative invisibility of governance issues uncovered here
being the result of a lack of encoding by the formal institutions rather than a
lack of decoding by individuals.
Whilst some positive messages about CSR are being decoded during the
purchase process, much of what we have found is about bad practices, actual
or political. Even less represented in the discourses of green consumers about
their technology purchases are the governance activities of local authorities,
national government or retailers.
What we can see, however, is that governance structures are certainly having
an effect on how sustainability is being framed by members of the public. The
problems that are being privileged by many of our respondents are concerned
with energy consumption. For white goods, this means an A rating on the EU
Energy Label is preferred, and for cars this translates into fuel efficiency. This is
interesting as this is a measure that for some equates to reduced financial
running costs rather than increased environmental benefits per se. In our inter-
views we also found discourse about the ethical and social elements of
sustainability, although this was mostly in the context of FMCGs rather than
sustainable technologies. On the other hand, we found hardly any mention of
production waste, distribution resources or disposal practices for any product
type. It seems that the issues that the public are attracted to for sustainable tech-
nologies are the ones that are a matter of individual (rather than corporate)
responsibility; they can be reduced to an ‘objective’ measure and addressed
through technological solutions.
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Chapter 3
People Centred Eco-Design: 
Consumer Adoption and Use of 
Low and Zero Carbon Products 
and Systems
Robin Roy, Sally Caird and Stephen Potter
Background
In order to address the problem of climate change, and meet its sustainable
development objectives, the UK government set a challenging long-term target
of reducing the UK’s carbon emissions by 60 per cent from their 1990 levels by
2050 (Royal Commision on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), 2000;
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 2003). Although the government is
struggling to meet its interim target of a 20 per cent reduction in emissions by
2010, it is committed at least to satisfy its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol
of a 12.5 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions between 2008 and
2012.
The development and rapid adoption of ‘low and zero carbon’ (LZC)
consumer products and systems, together with improving the energy efficiency
of the existing housing stock and the construction of energy-efficient new
homes, including those with household-level micro energy-generation technolo-
gies, are key elements of the government’s carbon reduction strategy. Given that
homes account for 30 per cent of the energy consumption and 28 per cent of
total UK carbon dioxide emissions, a focus on the domestic sector is hardly
surprising (DTI, 2004).
Many energy-efficient, low-carbon and some renewable energy zero-carbon
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products and systems are available for domestic use. They range from products
based on established technologies, such as cavity wall insulation, compact fluo-
rescent lamps (CFLs), condensing boilers and solar water heating, to more
innovative technologies such as light-emitting-diode (LED) lamps, micro CHP
(combined heat and power), micro wind turbines and domestic photovoltaic
systems. However, consumer adoption of most LZC products/systems has been
slow. The improvements in the energy efficiency of products, buildings and
systems that have taken place during the past decade have been driven mainly
by regulation, such as EU energy labelling of domestic appliances and tighten-
ing UK building regulations. The design and construction of LZC eco-housing,
such as the Beddington Zero Emission Development (BedZED) scheme in South
London and the Hockerton Housing Project in Nottinghamshire, while showing
what can be achieved, remain as largely experimental ‘green niches’ created by
highly committed individuals and organizations (see Smith in this volume).
One factor in the slow take-up of LZC products/systems by mainstream
consumers is that often they have been designed without taking sufficient
account of user requirements – that is without a people-centred approach to
design. They tend to be viewed by designers and policy-makers as purely func-
tional, technical devices, without sufficient regard for their aesthetic and
ergonomic design, which can have a crucial role in adoption and effective use.
More generally, as Jackson (2005, p6) says, ‘… material goods are important to
us, not just for their functional uses, but because they play vital symbolic roles
in our lives’.
This narrow view of LZC products/systems is partially explained by the
dominance of a techno-centric model of innovation that assumes that consumers
are rational decision makers who will adopt these goods once they become
aware of their environmental and money saving benefits. For example, replac-
ing a 100-watt light bulb with a 20-watt CFL costing £6 should save over £40
in electricity bills and replacement light bulbs over its life, as well as offering
environmental benefits. Rational consumers would therefore be expected to
adopt CFLs in large numbers. Nevertheless, CFLs have taken many years to
achieve only limited penetration into UK homes, even when subsidized to reduce
their purchase price. This appears to be because of issues such as their size and
shape, incompatibility with existing light fittings, warm-up time and the quality
of their light compared to incandescent light bulbs. Even though manufacturers
have addressed some of these issues by introducing smaller, conventionally
shaped electronically controlled CFLs, consumers are taking a long time to
become aware of the new designs, partly because of poor communications and
retail availability (Environmental Change Institute (ECI), 2001).
Factors influencing adoption of LZC products 
and systems
In-depth studies of purchase decisions reveal that green consumers attempt to
consider a web of technical, financial, practical, environmental and, occasion-
ally, ethical criteria when deciding to buy an energy consuming product, such as
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a refrigerator or washing machine. However, because of the difficulty of balanc-
ing and trading off the criteria, such consumers are often forced to decide on
the basis of their own functional and symbolic requirements, aided by the most
easily understood indicator of environmental performance – the EU Energy
Label (see McDonald et al in this volume). Likewise, green pioneers apply a
combination of practical requirements and environmental criteria when decid-
ing whether to adopt innovative low-carbon products or systems. A German
study of pioneer adopters of fuel-cell micro CHP systems for home heating and
electricity generation found that although motivated by technical interest, some
environmental consciousness (though not in any radical sense) and the pioneer-
ing aspect of testing a new technology, they were also concerned with
cost-effectiveness, reliability and user friendliness (Fischer, 2004, p13). On the
other hand, surveys of consumers who had adopted simple energy-saving meas-
ures such as loft and cavity wall insulation gave the main reason as saving
money, with only 3 per cent citing the environment as their main motivation
(Central Office of Information (COI), 2001, p7).
The factors influencing adoption thus differ for different LZC products and
systems. Cavity wall insulation, for instance, is a purely functional product for
reducing heat loss and thus saving money, whereas double glazing fulfils several
other functions such as adding comfort and improving the visual appearance
and value of a home. For yet other products (e.g. refrigerators or cars), energy
efficiency is one of a variety of features that different people may value.
Designers and manufacturers of such products fully recognize that environmen-
tal factors generally only enter consumer purchasing decisions after product
performance, quality, reliability and value for money criteria are satisfied (Roy
et al 1998, pp268–269). As Volvo’s environmental advisor pithily observed,
customers for its cars ‘tend to rate environmental impact one below the CD
player’ (Stathers, 2004, p49).
The income and socio-economic status of potential adopters are also impor-
tant factors. For example, the study of fuel-cell micro CHP adoption found that
the pioneer adopters of this experimental technology were mainly older, techni-
cally educated males with their own homes, from middle class populations and
with a good income. Likewise, most German adopters of solar water heating
and domestic photovoltaic (PV) systems were well-educated professionals inter-
ested in technology (Fischer, 2004, p7). Adopters of loft or cavity wall
insulation, on the other hand, include families or pensioners on low incomes,
benefiting from a subsidized energy-saving scheme.
A third factor influencing adoption is the communication sources people
are exposed to. The UK has a network of Energy Efficiency Advice Centres
(EEACs) that provide official information and advice to the public on home
insulation, and energy-efficient heating and lighting. Surveys show that people
who have contacted the EEACs install nearly double the number of energy-
saving measures as the general UK population (COI, 2001, pp7, 21). People
who contacted the Building Research Establishment for information on, and
grants for, solar water heating under the government’s ‘Clear Skies’ renewable
energy support programme were likely to proceed to installation (Solar Trade
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Association (STA), 2005). Interpersonal communications are also important.
For example, adopters of solar water heating in the US are often found in clus-
ters, since neighbours observe and discuss the costs and benefits of installing
this technology (Rogers, 2003, p16).
What all this indicates is that consumer adoption of LZC products/systems
is not a straightforward, rational matter of saving money or the environment,
but is influenced by a complex network of factors that vary for different product
types, socio-economic groups and communication sources.
Factors influencing use of LZC products and systems
However, even if people are persuaded to adopt LZC products/systems, this is
not enough. To actually reduce carbon emissions, consumers have both to
choose products that use less energy than the ones they replace and use them
effectively. There are three aspects of consumer behaviour that can reduce the
energy- and carbon-saving potential of LZC products.
First, it is recognized that for many products, people are continually trading
up. The savings from greater energy efficiency are partly or fully cancelled out
by consumers buying more goods (e.g. several television sets per household)
and choosing larger, more powerful, more feature-laden models. Thus,
Boardman (2004, p14) makes the following comment on the outcome of several
years experience of energy labelling and minimum efficiency standards for
refrigerators and freezers:
The substantial improvements in energy efficiency have been
absorbed into more and larger products. At some stage, society
needs to recognise that ever-higher standards of living are threat-
ening our ability to limit climate change and, therefore, reducing
our future quality of life.
So, while regulations such as the EU’s energy labelling of domestic appliances
have stimulated manufacturers to produce, and consumers to buy, energy-effi-
cient models, they fail to address the ‘rebound’ or ‘take-back’ effect from the
increased consumption of such goods.
Second, even if adopted, these supposedly LZC products/systems may not
be used as intended. For example, many people fail to understand, or could not
be bothered with, controls such as thermostatic radiator valves or central
heating programmers. This is estimated to forego large amounts of energy
savings per year (Market Transformation Programme, 2005, p36). In the case
of gas-powered micro CHP, although laboratory tests indicate that the units
should reduce carbon emissions compared to a condensing boiler and grid-
supplied electricity, a programme of field trials is underway to see if the
efficiencies are realized in actual domestic use. Early results from 31 households
indicate micro CHP performance is not as encouraging as had been hoped.
About a third of the installations appear to reduce emissions and about a third
increase them, with the remainder showing no discernable difference. It seems
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likely that this is due to the intermittent heat demand of real households, which
reduces efficiency of the units (Carbon Trust, 2005, pp1, 6). And even if low-
carbon products are used correctly there may be further rebound effects, such
as people leaving energy-efficient heating and lighting on for longer, because
running cost are lower.
Third, some consumers may reject LZC products or systems after trying
them out. Rejection is more likely if LZC products or systems are imposed
rather than actively chosen by the householders concerned (Chappells et al,
2000), or if items are low-cost, such as CFLs.
Rebound effects, inappropriate or sub-optimal use, and rejection of energy-
efficient products/systems means that merely getting people initially to adopt
LZC products or systems does not guarantee a reduction in energy use or
carbon emissions. Boardman (2004, p3) comments:
In reality, many consumers choose … a mixture of a higher stan-
dard of living and energy conservation. That is why the level of
energy that will be conserved as a result of an energy efficiency
improvement requires careful analysis if it is to be successfully
predicted.
Such predictions, however, are very difficult to make given that, as Boardman
admits, little is known about how people actually use low-carbon products after
they have adopted them.
Those who have investigated consumer behaviour towards the environment
generally do not view people’s actions as deliberately obstructive of attempts to
save energy. Indeed, the behaviour often arises for quite practical reasons; for
example, tenants of passive solar housing schemes closing curtains over their
large south-facing windows to prevent their carpets fading or the neighbours
looking in, and people leaving lights on for safety or security. More fundamen-
tally, sociologists have pointed out that the behaviour is often the result of
practices that have become ‘normal’ or embedded for particular social groups
given prevailing values, available technology and institutional arrangements.
For example, Hand et al (2003, pp13, 17) discuss the emergence in Britain of
the habitual practice of daily, or twice daily, (power) showering, using more
energy and water than the traditional once or twice weekly bath, as the result
of a mix of technical change, practical, social, cultural and psychological
factors. People may also be ‘locked’ into particular patterns of consumption
because of the demands of, for example, family or job (Jackson, 2005, p6). The
desire for, and expectation of, ever improving comfort and convenience, coupled
with demands of an increasing pace of life, are very powerful drivers of increas-
ing energy use (Shove, 2003).
Within this social context of rising demands and ‘lock-in’ are the practical
attempts to understand and change energy consumption behaviour. The
Association for the Conservation of Energy (ACE), for instance, studied tenant
behaviour in housing association homes that had recently been subject to energy
efficiency improvements. A quarter of the households used their heating system
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in an optimally efficient manner, a half used their systems reasonably efficiently
given their household circumstances, while another quarter, especially the unem-
ployed and those suffering from ill-health, used their heating inefficiently. An
indicator of energy-efficient behaviour was general energy awareness, such as
knowing whether their appliances had energy labels, while a specific influence
was the location of thermostat, which was more likely to result in energy-effi-
cient behaviour when positioned in the living room rather than elsewhere (ACE,
2004, pp38–40). A major survey for the UK network of EEACs showed that
giving consumers energy-saving advice changed behaviour in over 40 per cent
of households, resulting in reduced energy consumption and carbon emissions.
This was mainly because, when given advice, many consumers use heating and
lighting more economically to save money. The amounts of energy and carbon
saved, however, were only small (COI, 2001, pp33–35).
The often relatively limited effect of energy saving programmes is at least
partly due to their dependence on the rational techno-economic model of
consumer behaviour. Some qualitative research for the Sustainable Development
Commission and the National Consumer Council with several groups of
consumers reveals a potentially more promising approach in which the symbolic
role of the LZC experience is recognized. This found that actively adopting - or
as a housing association tenant being provided with – well-designed, innovative
LZC technologies, such as solar water heating, mini wind turbines and heat
pumps helped to positively change attitudes and behaviour towards the use of
energy.
It seems that micro-generation provides a tangible hook to engage
householders emotionally with the issue of energy use…
Householders described the sheer pleasure of creation and self-
sufficiency: ‘It’s like growing your own vegetables’ was one of the
often cited parallels.’ (Sustainable Consumption Roundtable
(SCR), 2005, p7)
People’s behaviour in choosing and using LZC products/systems thus depends
on a complex set of factors, including their circumstances and constraints,
embedded habits, desire for increasing levels of comfort and convenience,
awareness of information about saving energy, and the design of the products
and systems themselves.
Demand- or supply-led policies?
It is clear that persuading consumers to adopt LZC products/systems and use
them in a manner that saves energy faces considerable difficulties. UK (and EU)
household carbon reduction policy is therefore mainly supply led, with the
problem framed as one of technological change rather than that of consump-
tion. This is seen as posing far fewer governance problems than trying to change
consumer behaviour. Such supply-led policies focus on energy technology
research and development (R&D) support, regulation (e.g. tighter building
regulations), energy policies on fuel switching (e.g. to renewable energy or
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nuclear power), and encouraging manufacturers and suppliers to develop tech-
nical solutions.
On the demand side the main strategy is to provide consumers with infor-
mation and advice about LZC products and systems, via the UK network of
EEACs, for example, supported by targeted grants and subsidies for things like
loft and cavity wall insulation and domestic PV systems, and better training
(e.g. of heating engineers). However, there is an institutional reluctance to go
any further by investigating, let alone attempting to influence, how different
people’s needs, desires and wishes and lifestyles affect the adoption and use of
LZC products/systems, or to involve users in their design.
The people-centred eco-design research project
Our research aims to fill some of the gaps by providing information that could
help manufacturers design more user-friendly and attractive LZC
products/systems by identifying what people want from these goods and how
they choose and experience them, and to help governments to develop more
effective policies for household carbon reduction. Drawing on our strengths in
design and innovation, the research investigates key influencing factors on the
total process of adoption and subsequent experience of using LZC
products/systems. This includes established products, such as home insulation,
which the UK government’s 2003 Energy White Paper identifies as having a
significant role in reducing carbon emissions up to 2010, and new technologies
that are likely to have a significant role up to 2020, such as solar water heating
(DTI, 2003, p33).
In attempting to achieve actual reductions in carbon emissions, it is impor-
tant not to fall into the trap of viewing the task simply as one of stimulating
‘drivers’ and reducing ‘barriers’ to the widespread adoption and effective use of
LZC products/systems. Guy and Shove (2000, p64) regard a focus on drivers
and barriers as far too simplistic. As we have seen, the adoption and use of
LZC products does not just involve the autonomous decisions of individuals
and households, but is influenced by the social contexts of those decisions.
Nevertheless, in our research we are not attempting to identify LZC prod-
ucts or policies that depend on major changes in people’s lifestyles. While it is
recognized that such changes are needed in the longer term to move towards
environmental sustainability (Jackson and Michaelis, 2003, p4), in the short to
medium term more widespread adoption of LZC products/systems, and any
behavioural changes needed to choose and use them effectively, is a more realis-
tic aim. As Harper (2000, p2) says:
the deep green perspective is so much at variance with the main
thrust of modern culture that it would take rather a long time for
it to make a serious difference…We need technology as a short-
term holding operation to allow the more fundamental cultural
changes to take root and become effective.
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While it may be argued that a focus on technical solutions may delay or under-
mine attempts to address the more difficult issue of unsustainable consumption,
the two are related. The SCR research mentioned above showed that by adopt-
ing innovative technologies, such as solar water heating and micro wind power,
people’s general awareness of energy consumption improved and some behav-
ioural changes followed. This does not mean that technical solutions are
sufficient, but combined with regulation and other measures they can provide a
politically realistic bridge to more fundamental change.
Models of product adoption and diffusion
We have seen that in order to identify key factors influencing the adoption and
use of LZC products/systems it is necessary to consider the total decision-
making process, together with the social, economic and technical context in
which the process takes place. Rogers (2003) provides a useful model of the
total process of an individual’s or social group’s decisions to adopt, use, confirm
or reject an innovation. Figure 3.1 shows a modified version of the model.
In this project, we aim to identify and compare the key influencing factors
on the adoption and effective use of LZC products by grouping the products
and users according to their position along the stages of the innovation-decision
process. Our categories (and their relation to Rogers’ model) are as follows:
48 People and Sustainability: Appreciating Multiple Identities
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Figure 3.1 Rogers’ model of the innovation-decision process
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• Potential adopters: people who are seriously considering purchasing or
adopting a LZC product or system (Knowledge/Persuasion).
• Non-adopters: people who have seriously considered purchasing or adopt-
ing a LZC product or system, but have decided against (Decision/Rejection).
• Adopter-users: people who have purchased or acquired and continue to use
a LZC product or system (Decision/Adoption). Adopter-users can be subdi-
vided into engaged-users, who realize most or all of the environmental
benefits (not covered in Rogers’ model, but is related to Confirmation), and
non-engaged-users, who continue to be users but their behaviour reduces or
eliminates the environmental benefits. (Rebound effects are not covered in
Rogers’ model.)
• Reject-users: people who have purchased or acquired, but subsequently
stopped using a LZC product or system (Adoption/Discontinuance).
Rogers (2003, pp15–16) identifies five perceived characteristics of an innova-
tion that affects its rate of adoption: 
1 Relative advantage (over existing products, in terms of perceived economic
benefit, convenience, satisfaction and/or status giving).
2 Compatibility (with potential adopters’ values and needs and with existing
ideas and products).
3 Complexity (how difficult the innovation is to understand and use).
4 Trialability (whether the innovation can be tried out on a limited basis).
5 Observability (how visible adopting the innovation is to others). 
We could have used Rogers’ innovation characteristics to model the product-
related factors influencing the adoption and use of LZC products/systems.
However, Rogers’ model was developed largely to explain the rate of adoption
of agricultural and other innovations rather than consumer adoption of ecolog-
ical products. Also, Rogers mixes technical, economic, sociological and
psychological factors in his list of innovation characteristics that we wished to
disentangle.
Hence, we decided to use the properties of objects identified by Murphy
and Cohen (2001, pp230–231) to help explain consumer behaviour in relation
to the consumption of sustainable goods and services. Murphy and Cohen’s
properties of objects are: usefulness (assuming that in purchase decisions the
consumer will focus on utility factors such as performance, ease of use, safety,
reliability and energy efficiency of the object, relative to other products within a
given price bracket); interconnectedness (recognizing that in practice objects are
purchased and used in relation to a wide variety of other products and serv-
ices); and symbolism (including factors such as the image, brand, appearance
and novelty of the object, in turn dependent on peer group influences and the
goals, attitudes and values of individuals).
Both Rogers and Murphy and Cohen include a number of ‘non-price’
factors that affect adoption, but do not separate them from price factors. Since
much attention has been given to price in discussing the adoption of ecological
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products, Murphy and Cohen (2001) deliberately highlighted the non-price
factors. However, in economics a product’s purchase price and running costs
relative to competing products are considered as distinct from non-price factors
and of crucial significance for a product’s adoption and use. The degree of
investment involved is also a key factor in adoption decisions. The investments
involved in purchasing LZC products and systems range from a few pounds for
a CFL, to several hundreds of pounds for an A+ rated fridge-freezer, to tens of
thousands of pounds for a PV roof. In general, the larger the investment, the
less willing people are to take risks with innovative, untested goods and the
more people may be concerned with payback – the length of time it takes to
recover the initial outlay. The availability of grants and subsidies, as well as
guarantees and trusted brands, are often essential to reduce risk in major
purchase decisions. So, financial issues including price, running costs, payback
and the level of investment involved are likely to be key variables in any study
of the adoption and use of LZC products/systems.
Methodology
The Design Innovation Group’s research project is being conducted in two
phases: an exploratory phase, the method and some results of which are
outlined below, and a main phase, the aims of which are outlined towards the
end of the chapter and whose results will be discussed in future publications.
Exploratory phase studies
The exploratory phase involved three studies:
1 Semi-structured, face to face interviews with a small number of volunteer
consumers to develop the methodology for the main phase and to gain some
insights into the factors influencing the adoption and use of LZC
products/systems.
2 A literature review and discussions with professionals in the field of energy
efficiency and renewable energy, to identify which LZC products/systems to
focus on, issues affecting consumer adoption and use, plus ideas for improv-
ing those products/systems.
3 An internet survey of energy professionals to evaluate the improvement
ideas and generate further ideas that would facilitate consumer adoption
and effective use of LZC products/systems.
The research model
The exploratory study guided the development of a model of an individual
consumer’s or household’s decision to adopt and use ecological products and
systems. It builds on Rogers’ model of the innovation-decision process and
employs Murphy and Cohen’s classification of product properties. Our model
presents the process that people go through when deciding to adopt, use or
reject LZC products/systems and includes four sets of variables that influence
the process – namely, the socio-economic context, communication sources,
consumer variables and product/system properties (Figure 3.2).
50 People and Sustainability: Appreciating Multiple Identities
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 50
Exploratory interviews with consumers
In the exploratory study fourteen people who volunteered in response to inter-
nal intranet advertisements at the Open University were interviewed about a
range of ecological products they had adopted, were seriously considering, or
had rejected. Most of the volunteers had a professional or personal interest in
the environment and so were ‘greener’ than the general population. The inter-
views concerned the following LZC products/systems, involving different levels
of investment:
• Potential adopters of a condensing boiler, cavity wall insulation, green tariff
electricity.
• Non-adopters of solar water heating, a PV roof.
• Adopter-users (both engaged and non-engaged) of CFLs, energy-efficient
appliances, condensing and condensing/combination boilers, a hybrid
petrol-electric car, central heating controls and solar water heating.
• Reject-users of CFLs and rechargeable batteries.
Our preliminary findings suggest there could be ‘hotspots’, by which we mean
common factors that could affect many people and LZC carbon product/system
types at different stages of the adoption-use-consolidation or rejection process,
and that may be amenable to change by introducing technical/design improve-
ments, regulation, consumer information or financial measures. So while many
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influencing factors may be resistant to change, these hotspots might provide
points of leverage for the achievement of carbon reduction targets.
Russell and Williams (2002, pp145–146) make a similar general point
about the need to identify points and means of leverage in any transition to
sustainability:
The major weakness of many calls for sustainability however, is in
failing to … identify means of intervening in current patterns and
institutions, and to diagnose possible obstacles and sources of
resistance. There is a much greater chance of producing the desired
outcomes if we take as a starting point the dynamics of current
development, select points and means of leverage carefully, and
are prepared for continuing and flexible intervention as the
changes unfold.
Examples of hotspot influences
Below are some candidate examples of hotspot influences on the different
adopter categories from the exploratory study. They are classified according to
Murphy and Cohen’s (2001) product/system properties of utility, interconnect-
edness and symbolism, plus a separate category of price factors. This proved to
be a useful lens through which to view the other factors in the research model:
socio-economic context, consumer variables and communication sources.
INFLUENCES ON POTENTIAL ADOPTERS
Utility. People are more likely to adopt and use products designed for ease and
convenience of use. For example, products currently using removable recharge-
able batteries would be more acceptable if redesigned with a built-in
rechargeable battery/charger, like mobile phones.
Interconnectedness. Integration of related products/systems into packaged
systems should reduce costs, purchasing effort and complexity, and so encour-
age adoption. For example, if a condensing central heating boiler and solar
water heating system were provided as an integrated technical, financing and
installation package, adoption of the latter would be more likely. Sometimes
the desire to address an unrelated household problem can trigger interest in
adopting LZC technologies. For example, one potential adopter became inter-
ested in solar water heating as a result of a concern that her roof could do with
a reinforcing layer (of panels) to protect it from wind. This suggests that solar
water heating might be best promoted and installed as part of other changes to
the house.
Symbolism. Product aesthetics varies in importance for different consumers and
products. For example, one interviewee’s partner wanted the fashionable
colours and styling of some refrigerator models, while highly efficient refrigera-
tors were generally just a ‘white box’. Some people like to display their green
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credentials by installing an observable eco-innovation. For example, one house-
holder seriously considered solar water heating as one way of demonstrating
their ‘greenness’ and encouraging discourse with neighbours about environ-
mental issues. Another potential adopter of solar water heating described it as
offering a ‘spiritually pure’ experience of bathing unmediated by geopolitics,
adding that it was the green status symbol equivalent of a 4x4 car.
[d]Influences on non-adopters
Utility/symbolism. The poor reputation and image of some eco-products and
systems often deters adoption even if their performance and/or technology have
been improved in subsequent generations. For example, some interviewees
mentioned bad experience with products such as unreliable early condensing
boilers or large, slow to warm-up early CFLs, and the hazardous reputation of
initial types of foam cavity wall insulation, even though the latter two problems
have been dealt with (Guy and Shove, 2000).
Interconnectedness. Lack of systems integration often deters or prevents adop-
tion of LZC products and systems. For example, a crucial factor in the decision
of one household not to adopt solar water heating was because they discovered
it was incompatible with a combination (‘combi’) boiler they had installed,
partly to avoid the need for a hot water tank.
Utility/cost. Perception of complexity, poor durability and value for money
often acts as a deterrent to adoption. For example, one interviewee decided
against adopting a condensing boiler (before the 2005 building regulations that
require new boilers to be energy-efficient) because the installation is complex,
requiring a fanned flue and electrical wiring. He felt that the costs to maintain
it would outweigh the savings and expected it would last only 10–15 years.
Price/cost. Initial purchase price, and often anticipated payback, is a dominant
issue for many medium to high LZC investments. For example, several intervie-
wees mentioned that, despite the availability of government grants, the
installation cost of solar water heating was prohibitive and the payback period
was too long. Nor did solar water heating add significantly to the value or
saleability of a dwelling. Price/cost influences are particularly significant for
tenants living in rented accommodation. One non-adopter, greatly interested in
LZC technologies, mentioned (unaware that tax concessions for landlords were
introduced in the 2004 budget) that there need to be more incentives for land-
lords because tenants will only invest in low-cost energy-efficient measures.
INFLUENCES ON ADOPTER-USERS
Utility/interconnectedness. A key issue for technologies that require installation
such as condensing boilers and solar water heating is the effectiveness of the
installation process and follow-up service if any problems arise. One house-
holder had a bad experience following the installation of a condensing boiler,
resulting in every spare part needing replacement. Though continuing to use the
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system, this person lost faith in the reliability of condensing boilers. Another
issue is the requirement to interconnect new installations with existing house-
hold systems. For example, one solar water heating system adopter was
disappointed that her plumber had not connected the heater to the dishwasher,
reducing the utility of the solar energy system.
Symbolism. This aspect can work in complex ways. For example, the adopter
of a hybrid petrol-electric car, although he wanted the vehicle to demonstrate
his green credentials to himself and his peers, chose a model that was not too
conspicuous or unusual in design.
Price/cost. The availability of grants and subsidies can encourage purchase of
LZC products/systems, especially those involving high investment. For example,
an Energy Savings Trust grant was an important factor in the decision to buy
the hybrid petrol-electric car.
Communications. The provision of comprehensive product information, includ-
ing energy consumption data and easy to understand summaries, encourages
adoption. For example, the colour-coded energy label and good internet infor-
mation assisted purchasers of white goods in assessing best buys, prices, running
costs and payback. Interviewees also cited the importance of a trusted brand
and retailer when buying energy-efficient white goods. (This supports the find-
ings of McDonald et al in this volume.)
INFLUENCES ON ENGAGED ADOPTER-USERS
Utility/symbolism. Feedback to the user on the energy consumption and/or cost-
saving of a product or system can encourage energy-saving behaviour. For
example, the adopter of the hybrid petrol-electric car appreciated the feedback
on fuel consumption and costs provided by the vehicle’s electronic displays.
This encouraged fuel-efficient driving and also provided a ‘feel-good’ factor.
Nevertheless, he admitted that higher fuel economy made him less concerned
about driving long distances.
Interconnectedness. An infrastructure for servicing and maintenance is impor-
tant for the adoption of innovative LZC products/systems. For example, the
purchaser of the hybrid car observed he had to locate convenient, and not too
costly, trained servicing facilities, before deciding to buy the vehicle.
INFLUENCES ON NON-ENGAGED ADOPTER-USERS
Price/cost. Reduced running costs can lead to greater product use, thus reduc-
ing environmental benefits through rebound effects. For example, one
interviewee admitted that his family left low-energy lamps switched on longer,
thereby reducing the amount of energy saved. The rebound effect of the high
fuel economy of the hybrid car was noted above.
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Consumer variables/communications. Householders may have inefficient
energy-consumption practices due to poor understanding. For example, one
interviewee believed that it is better to leave heating on permanently during the
heating season because of the inconvenience of adjusting timer and thermostat
settings and the erroneous belief that it would be more costly to turn up the
heating to achieve the required temperature.
INFLUENCES ON REJECT-USERS
Utility. Dissatisfaction with adopted products/systems sometimes leads to non-
engagement or product rejection. Several users mentioned dissatisfaction with
CFL’s in terms of their size, appearance, and quality of light produced. Some
users who had decided against bulky early CFL’s were unaware of subsequent
technical and design improvements. One reject-user mentioned that the expen-
sive CFL she bought failed after a year, when a 12-year life was promised; she
would not buy CFLs again.
Utility/symbolism. Inconvenience can lead to rejection of eco-products by
people with busy lives. For example, several users rejected the use of recharge-
able batteries and battery chargers because the batteries had to be charged in
advance and the life of the recharged batteries was not consistently reliable. A
comment regarding rechargeable batteries was, ‘life’s too short’.
Exploratory survey of energy professionals
The exploratory interviews, though conducted with a relatively small number
of ‘greener’ consumers, suggested some important influences on the adoption
and use of LZC products and systems. The interviews, along with the literature
and our discussions with energy professionals, helped choose which LZC prod-
ucts/systems to focus on, and suggested some ideas for improving them to
facilitate their adoption and effective use. To assess the improvement ideas and
to generate further ones, as well as to obtain more information on the factors
influencing consumers, we conducted an on-line survey of subscribers to a
newsletter for energy efficiency professionals, including home-energy advisors,
architects and energy consultants.
Fifty responses were obtained concerning the energy professionals’ views on
the significant influences on the adoption and use of the following LZC prod-
ucts/systems: loft insulation of up to 250mm depth; CFLs; LED lighting; heating
controls; condensing central heating boilers; micro CHP units; and solar water
heating systems. They also responded with their views on technical, design and
other improvement ideas that could facilitate adoption and effective use.
What clearly emerged from the responses was that the influences on the
adoption and use of each of the LZC technologies were different, but all could
be classified within our research model (shown in Figure 3.2), thus giving us
confidence in its validity.
The following is a selection from the findings of this survey.
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Loft insulation
Interconnectedness was identified as the most significant influence on installing
loft insulation of up to 250mm thickness because installation often requires
clearing of cluttered lofts and/or removal of boarding and is likely to mean a
loss of storage space and/or the potential for a loft conversion.
Consumer variables are significant, as some consumers believe that (extra)
loft insulation is not worthwhile, especially since it is not ‘observable’ and if the
loft already has some insulation.
Improvement ideas (to utility/interconnectedness): these included low-cost
materials to give equivalent of 250mm mineral fibre insulation with thinner/less
bulky material; and new methods, other than raising the joists and boarding, to
create loft storage space above the insulation.
Compact fluorescent lamps
Utility. Some CFLs do not reach full brightness instantly or provide a suffi-
ciently bright or pleasant light.
Interconnectedness. CFLs often do not fit existing lamp shades and are incom-
patible with dimmers.
Symbolism. CFLs are considered too large and/or ugly when not hidden from
view.
Price/cost. CFLs are still expensive compared to incandescent lamps.
Improvement ideas (to utility/interconnectedness/socio-economic context).
These were that CFLs should be designed to be the same sizes and shapes as
incandescent lamps and provide a similar quality of light; and that incandescent
lamps could be taxed, thereby providing an incentive to buy energy-efficient
light-bulbs.
Light Emitting Diode Lighting
Utility. Although highly energy-efficient and long-lasting, LEDs are not bright
enough for general lighting and the quality or colour of light is not yet suitable
except for decorative applications.
Communications. A key influence on the adoption of LED lighting is the lack
of consumer awareness of their potential for lighting.
Improvement ideas (to utility/communications). These were that technical
improvements are needed to LED light quality and colour rendering, and to
fittings to distribute light adequately. An educational campaign is needed to
demonstrate the different ways this technology can be used.
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Heating controls
Utility. Controls, which are often non-standard and over-complex, are difficult
to understand and operate.
Interconnectedness. Controls are often used ineffectively as users do not under-
stand how programmer, thermostats and controlled radiators contribute to the
efficient operation of a heating system. Poor location for controls inhibits effec-
tive use; for example, programmers are often hidden in airing cupboards.
Improvement ideas (to utility/communications). Suggested improvements
included ergonomic/inclusive designs of controls that provide feedback to the
user on energy consumed and money saved; better instructions on effective use;
and location in prominent positions such as the kitchen.
Condensing central heating boilers
Utility/socio-economic context. The reputation of condensing boilers for unre-
liability, exacerbated by poor installation by untrained installers, many of whom
are negative in their attitudes to this technology. The 2005 Building Regulations
requiring new or replacement boilers to be energy-efficient should enforce
changes in attitudes and practices.
Consumer variables. Consumers do not understand how condensing boilers
work.
Improvement ideas (to utility). These included a boiler that displays its working
efficiency; and an easier to service condensing boiler.
Solar water heating
Price/cost. The high initial cost and a long payback time was the main deterrent
to installing solar water heating.
Utility. Inadequate reliability and durability, given the long payback time, added
to the deterrent effect.
Interconnectedness. Lack of compatibility between solar water heating and
systems without a hot water tank (e.g. combination central heating boiler). No
suitable site for the solar panels.
Socio-economic context. Inadequate control of ‘cowboy’ installers, which gives
solar water heating a reputation similar to that of double glazing in the past.
Also, some local authorities require planning permission for installations,which
acts as a constraint.
Improvement ideas (to interconnectedness/socio-economic context). These were
to design solar panels for integration with the roof or for installation from
inside the house; and to establish standards and publish performance data for
solar water heating systems.
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Micro combined heat and power
Utility/consumer variables. Micro CHP is a new technology with uncertain
performance, reliability and carbon savings.
Interconnectedness. Difficulty in finding a suitable location for the unit so that
it readily connects with household electrical and plumbing systems.
Price/cost. A costly new technology with unknown payback, partly dependent
on the price obtained for surplus electricity sold to the national grid.
Socio-economic context. The difficulty in finding a trained installer and servic-
ing.
Main phase consumer surveys
The exploratory studies provided the conceptual framework and enabled the
development of a set of semi-structured questionnaires for the main phase
consumer surveys, being carried out via telephone interviews and on-line ques-
tionnaires.
The main phase surveys aim to:
• Identify the influencing factors at each phase of consumers’ experience of
adopting and using a range of LZC products/systems, namely considera-
tion, adoption (or early rejection), use and consolidation (or later rejection).
• Identify hot spot influences, both generic and specific, on the widespread
adoption and effective use of these LZC products/systems that may be
amenable to change by technical or design improvements, regulatory and
fiscal measures, consumer information and education.
• Provide information to designers and manufacturers on how LZC prod-
ucts/systems might be (re)designed to be more user-friendly and attractive
to consumers.
The LZC products/systems chosen for investigation represent a range of tech-
nologies and levels of investment and include: products costing up to £50, such
as CFLs and LED lighting; products costing from £50 to £500, such as loft insu-
lation and heating controls; products/systems costing from £500 to £5000, such
as condensing boilers, solar water heating, and micro CHP units.
The consumers surveyed are members of the general public selected from
databases of enquirers about insulation and condensing boilers to local EEACs,
and enquiries concerning solar water heating to an organization that promotes
and provides information about alternative and renewable energy technologies.
This information is supplemented by on-line survey of people accessing a
website linked to a BBC/Open University television series on climate change,
broadcast in early 2006.
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Preliminary conclusions
There exists much research on UK household energy consumption, with policy
initiatives and practical action given impetus by the urgent need to reduce
carbon emissions. Until some recent official publications (e.g. HM Treasury,
2005; Oxera, 2006), much of this research, policy and practice is based on a
techno-economic model of rational consumer decision-making, which does not
fully recognize that consumer goods have both a functional and a symbolic role,
and assumes that people will readily adopt LZC products/systems when their
financial and environmental benefits are communicated. In practice, numerous
other factors often enter the adoption decision, including the socio-economic
context, the circumstances, disposable income, attitudes and values of the
adopters, and how well the products and systems are designed to meet their
functional and symbolic needs and wants. These needs and wants differ depend-
ing on the properties of the LZC product or system, ranging from a simple
energy-saving measure like cavity wall insulation to products with several func-
tions and interactions, like energy-efficient lighting or appliances. To ensure
rapid adoption of LZC products/systems, it is therefore necessary to consider
all the influences on consumer decision-making, including appropriate gover-
nance measures for technically sophisticated ‘pioneer’ adopters, mainstream
consumers and reluctant adopters; and to ensure that each product or system is
designed from a people-centred perspective.
Much existing research, policy and practice also assumes that getting people
to adopt LZC products is sufficient. However, merely persuading people to
adopt LZC products/systems does not guarantee reduced carbon emissions.
This is because of rebound or take-back effects in which consumers may reduce
or cancel out the environmental benefits by trading up or by increasing
consumption of the product. They may also bypass the energy-saving features
or even reject the LZC product or system they adopted. It is therefore necessary
to ensure the consumers not only adopt LZC products/systems, but also choose
appropriate ones and use them effectively.
It is clear from the above that persuading consumers to adopt LZC prod-
ucts/systems and use them in a manner that saves energy and reduces emissions
is a complex matter that faces considerable difficulties. UK (and EU) household
carbon reduction policy is therefore framed as a technological rather than a
consumption problem, and seen as posing far fewer difficulties in governance
than trying to change consumers’ behaviour. Such supply-led policies focus on
R&D support; regulation, fuel switching, and encouraging manufacturers to
develop technical solutions. On the consumption side the main policies involve
providing consumers with information and advice about LZC products/systems,
supported by targeted grants and subsidies.
To increase the effectiveness of both policy options, our exploratory studies
confirm the importance of examining the total process of consideration, adop-
tion, use, consolidation or rejection to identify the factors that may encourage
people first to adopt, and then use LZC products/systems effectively. This has
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led to the development of a model of consumer decision-making for LZC prod-
ucts/systems and the key factors that influence it – product/system properties,
socio-economic context, consumer variables and communication sources.
Our exploratory studies suggest there could be hotspots, or points of lever-
age, both generic and specific to each product or system, which if tackled should
facilitate consumer adoption and effective use. We found that hotspots could
usefully be categorized according to Murphy and Cohen’s (2001)
product/system properties of utility, interconnectedness and symbolism,
together with price/cost factors and the other key influencing factors.
If we take solar water heating, examples of hotspots that should facilitate
adoption include:
• The high initial cost and long payback time of solar water heating could be
tackled by designing systems that integrate with roofing and/or by extend-
ing available grants and subsides.
• Combination of related products/systems into packaged systems should
encourage adoption. For example, if a condensing central heating boiler
and solar water heating system were provided by energy suppliers as an
integrated package, with financing service support included, adoption of
the latter would be more likely.
• Since some people like to display their environmental credentials, solar
water heating might best be promoted as the ‘green’ equivalent of a desir-
able car.
• The urgent need to control ‘cowboy’ installers, through a system of
performance standards and/or energy labelling similar to that on appliances.
If we consider heating controls, examples of hotspots that should promote more
effective use include:
• Better ergonomic designs of heating controls, which are often difficult for
users to understand and to operate easily and conveniently.
• Standards and training for installers on designing for users, to ensure, for
example, that they locate programmers in a prominent position rather than
hiding them in airing cupboards.
• Controls that provide feedback to users on energy consumption, and money
spent or saved, to encourage energy-saving behaviour and user satisfaction.
• The need for better consumer information on the use of controls, since
many users do not understand how different controls function together to
operate a heating system effectively.
From the viewpoint of governance, it is notable that these hotspot influences
and suggested changes are a mixture of new or improved regulations and stan-
dards, financial measures, information for suppliers and consumers, and
effective marketing and technical and design improvements. In other words, to
promote the adoption and effective use of LZC products/systems it is necessary
to combine sustainable production and consumption strategies with a new
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emphasis on improving the design of the products and systems themselves from
a user viewpoint.
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Chapter 4
Energy Citizenship: 




The perspective on energy system evolution taken in this chapter involves two
inter-dependent levels of analysis: the socio-cultural level, where the main
concern is how issues are socially constructed (cf. Berger and Luckman, 1967),
and the psychological level, detailing the cognitive and affective processes
involved in shaping behaviour. Whilst there is an extant literature on energy at
each level (e.g. Guy and Shove (2000) at the socio-cultural level, embedded
within a wider literature on the sociology of technology; and Black et al (1985)
at the individual level, embedded within applied social and environmental
psychology), these are rarely integrated into a single perspective that situates
individual human experience and action within processes of socio-cultural
communication and contestation.
Social and psychological aspects of energy are typically neglected in analy-
ses that prioritize technical and economic issues (Lutzenhiser, 1993). Yet they
are important in discussing how an evolving technological system might
contribute to economic, environmental and social policy goals, that is to repre-
sent a ‘sustainable’ energy system (Tleubayeva and Devine-Wright,
forthcoming). This chapter will draw attention to multiple and conflicting social
representations of the public, currently embedded within different facets of UK
energy policy and practice, which suggest quite different pathways for the
governance of system evolution, and will situate such representations in the
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context of specific psychological processes that are implicated in shaping behav-
iours.
Social and psychological perspectives 
on technological change
Stern (2000) describes three spheres in which environmentally significant behav-
iour takes place: in private (e.g. at home), in public (e.g. activist political
behaviour) and in the corporate/institutional context (e.g. decisions made by
professionals about new technologies or policies). Whilst the private sphere is
most commonly researched in environmental psychology (e.g. determinants of
home recycling or energy conservation), the others are equally if not more
significant contexts to understand environmentally significant behaviour.
Technologies are normally viewed by environmental psychologists as aspects of
the context or situation that shapes human behaviour, borrowing from the
social psychologist Kurt Lewin the basic understanding that behaviour is a func-
tion of context by personal characteristics (B = P  C). Whilst environmental
psychologists typically presume the context as a ‘given’ in their study of human
behaviour, it is also useful to research how changes in the context take place,
for example, examining the psychological processes involved in the emergence
and development of new energy technologies, which in turn open up, or close
down, opportunities for behaviour. Such an agenda for research would extend
the remit of energy-focused psychological research to encompass not only the
private sphere (e.g. public beliefs or attitudes about new energy technologies;
behavioural adoption of energy technologies), but also the public sphere (e.g.
citizenship actions to influence technology policies) and corporate/institutional
sphere psychological processes (e.g. what kinds of beliefs are held by technical
designers and policy makers about the users of new energy technologies).
Social representations theory (Moscovici, 1984) is a useful framework to
apply to the study of ‘common sense’ beliefs about energy users since it is a
social-psychological theory of knowledge that aims to identify and account for
shared ways of thinking that are regarded as obvious or self-evident by individ-
uals within a particular social context. Social representations differ from the
more conventional concept of ‘attitudes’ in being more evidently shared within
groups or across society, influenced by socio-cultural communication (for
example the mass media), dynamic and influenced by power relations in being
hegemonic or contested. In this chapter, common sense ways of thinking about
energy or the public are assumed to be patterns of beliefs akin to social repre-
sentations that have become to a greater or lesser degree ‘common sense’.
Technological change has received attention from sociologists, political
scientists and geographers, who have critiqued a conceptualization of technol-
ogy that sets it apart from society; who stress the non-monolithic nature of ‘the
public’ (e.g. Walker, 1995); and emphasize how new technologies are embedded
within, and shaped by, beliefs about what users are like, what they desire and
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want, what they will tolerate and what they are interested in. In relation to
energy technologies, Marvin et al (1999) used the concept of ‘technical develop-
ment pathways’ to describe how the gas, electricity and water meter
technologies of the future could develop along markedly different paths. They
emphasized how technological outcomes were not inevitable and pre-ordained,
but shaped by the array of different ‘logics’ (implicitly suggesting different social
representations) shaping technological development. Most critically for this
chapter, they indicated how different pathways could result in metering devices
being marketed and installed which would provide very different technological
contexts for individual behaviour. Whilst some might be designed to foster
minimal user engagement, acting more or less on a ‘plug and forget’ basis,
others could be designed to foster regular interaction with users, thus providing
a quite different context for user response, awareness, motivation and action.
This chapter extends this literature through a social-psychological analysis of
pathways of energy, and specifically electricity, technology evolution at a super-
ordinate or ‘system’ level of analysis, encompassing generating plant, grid
supply and end-use technologies, drawing out different ways of representing
system evolution and identifying how such representations may open up, or
close down, opportunities for public engagement.
Energy systems and technologies in flux 
Despite Thomas Edison’s originally decentralized approach, across the 20th
century ‘large-scale technical systems’ of energy generation, with a national grid
of transmission and distribution networks of supply, were created in industrial-
ized nations in which decision-making was conducted centrally and at a remove
from the public (Hughes, 1983). Despite its evident success in providing reliable
electricity supply to all citizens, Amory Lovins (1977) characterized this system
as a ‘hard’ energy pathway, critiquing the wisdom of many of its facets: large-
scale generation plant sited at a spatial distance from points of use, centralized
top-down energy governance and a preference for nuclear power. Since the
1970s, Lovins has consistently advocated the evolution of a ‘soft’ energy path
with opposing facets: decentralized or distributed generation, greater levels of
public participation and control and the increased use of renewable energy tech-
nologies (e.g. Lovins and Lehman, 2002). The dichotomy between single ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ energy pathways is an oversimplification of a highly complex subject
with multiple dimensions and possible futures. Furthermore, the increased
deployment of renewable energy technologies does not necessarily imply the
adoption of other facets of the ‘soft’ energy pathway. Nevertheless, there are
increasing signs that ideas in favour of more renewable energy, more public
participation and smaller scale generation are circulating more widely in the UK
and elsewhere, being adopted by key stakeholders in industry and government,
and are likely to form an important part of a future ‘low carbon’ energy system.
Signs of this change include a UK government commitment to achieving a
60 per cent cut in carbon emissions by 2050, in comparison to 1990 levels,
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along with targets for electricity generation from renewable resources: 10 per
cent by 2010 and 20 per cent by 2020. Key reports have pointed to the dimin-
ished importance of centralized supply systems in a decarbonized energy future
(Anderson et al, 2005), as well as the likelihood of the ‘40 per cent house’
having around two low-carbon energy generating technologies by 2050, such
as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels or combined heat and power (CHP) plant,
and exporting electricity to the grid (Boardman et al, 2005). The White Paper
(Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 2003, p18) described this future
energy system as:
more diverse, where much of the energy is imported, but with
increased amounts of offshore marine plants, wave, tidal and
wind-farms… There is much more local generation, in part from
medium to small local/community power plant, fuelled by locally
grown biomass, from locally generated waste, from local wind
sources, or possibly from local wave and tidal generators. These
will feed local distributed networks, which can sell excess capacity
into the grid. Plant will also increasingly generate heat for local
use.
Given the conventional, highly centralized system using nuclear and hydrocar-
bon resources and a national grid of supply networks, these technological
visions, with a stronger emphasis upon ‘medium to small local/community’
generation and use, along with increased renewable energy, represent a signifi-
cant departure from the norm. In 2050, it may be a commonplace to find
smaller-scale, renewable energy technologies such as solar PV panels, solar hot
water panels, small-scale wind turbines and micro CHP plant on most homes
and buildings and in most communities in the UK. But while there is increasing
consensus that centralized (‘hard’) energy systems need to change in order to
effectively respond to environmental problems, there is far less awareness of,
and agreement about, concomitant social aspects of energy system evolution,
not least what role(s) the public holds as stakeholders in this process, and what
the determinants of public acceptance of system evolution might be (Ekins,
2004).
Technological systems: Ways of representing 
energy and energy users
One reason for this lack of awareness of social aspects of energy system evolu-
tion might be that energy is a subject that may always have been conceived in
multiple ways, with different groups or individuals approaching the subject
with very different social representations of the role of the public or energy
users. Stern and Aronson (1984, p15) asserted that ‘there is no single socially
shared concept of energy’. This is likely to be as true in the early 21st century as
it was in the early 1980s. They identified four principle ways of understanding
energy:
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• Energy as a commodity.
• Energy as an ecological resource.
• Energy as a social necessity.
• Energy as strategic material.
The essence of each of these is summarized in Table 4.1.
Whilst it is interesting to note the diversity of these various ways of framing
energy issues, I would argue that these do not carry equal weight in energy
policy making, and that the ‘energy as commodity’ has been, and continues to
be, the dominant or hegemonic social representation of energy held by policy
makers, most obviously indicated by the move to privatize and liberalize elec-
tricity and gas sectors in the UK. As a result of lobbying by various interest
groups over the past 25 years, issues of environment and social justice are
embedded within the policy mix, yet I would argue that they have not displaced
the dominant position of the commodity view of energy.
The emergence of sustainable development as a policy goal in the 1990s has
seen a new facet of the ‘energy as social necessity’ representation emerge, which
I describe as ‘energy citizenship’ (Devine-Wright, 2004). This approach argues
for the social necessity of public engagement and participation in processes of
policy-making and planning, driven by principles of local empowerment and
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Table 4.1 Summary of ways of representing energy
Energy as: Important Central values Interest groups
properties
Commodity Supply, demand, Choice, Energy producers, 
price individualism, consumers with
private sector sufficient resources 
provision of (fuel rich)
energy services
Ecological Resource Sustainability, Future generations, 
resource depletion, frugality, choice green movement




Social necessity Availability to Equity, justice The poor (fuel 
social groups, poverty) and other 
meeting essential vulnerable social 
needs groups
Strategic material Geopolitics, National military Military, energy 
availability of and economic suppliers
domestic security
substitutes
Source: Adapted from Stern and Aronson (1984)
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action derived from Local Agenda 21 (LA21). This aspect is absent from Stern
and Aronson’s (1984) typology. Current discussions in the UK about a ‘sustain-
able energy economy’ or ‘low carbon economy’ reflect attempts to manage
system evolution whilst invoking to greater or lesser degrees the different repre-
sentations of energy specified above. Controversies over the value of different
pathways (e.g. nuclear vs renewables; centralized vs decentralized) reflect the
difficulties inherent in attempting to hold or balance commodity, security,
ecological and social views simultaneously and the different interpretations of
each adopted. But each viewpoint also explicitly or implicitly reflects different
representations of energy users, and these are discussed in more detail below.
Centralized energy systems and representations
of the public as consumer/deficit
The four different ways of representing energy identified by Stern and Aronson
(1984) are embedded within, and have been shaped by, a particular kind of
technical system: the centralized approach to energy generation and supply.
Within this, it is possible to identify several ways of representing the public in
relation to energy generation, supply and use: 
• ‘customers’ or ‘consumers’;
• fuel ‘rich’ or ‘poor’;
• ‘environmentally concerned’.
These are implied by ‘energy as commodity’, ‘energy as social necessity’ and
‘energy as ecological resource’ representations of energy. Cross-cutting each
of these, the centralized system coexists with a commonly held ‘deficit’ view
of the public as energy users – separated from, and minimally engaged in,
energy systems over and above pressing a light switch. This has led to the
design and deployment of a range of energy technologies, services and
procedures, from meters to bills to regulatory institutions to power stations,
that foster minimal public engagement (see for example, recent work on
electricity bills: Boardman and Palmer, 2003; and on metering devices:
Devine-Wright and Devine-Wright, forthcoming).
This is backed up by a body of research that has consistently indicated
low levels of public awareness, understanding or interest in energy tech-
nologies. For example, social research has suggested that energy
consumption is largely invisible and taken for granted (Hedges, 1991; Egan,
2002); that low levels of public awareness exist about energy prices
(Kempton and Montgomery, 1982); there is deficient understanding of how
energy technologies work (Kempton, 1986); that, despite rising levels of
environmental concern, there is a general lack of awareness of the impacts
of domestic energy consumption for climate change (DEFRA, 2001). On
the supply side, the ‘out of sight and out of mind’ (Pasqualetti, 1999) siting
of power stations at distances from centres of population has left individu-
als poorly aware of where their electricity comes from and how the supply
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system works (Qualter, 1995), concerned about the health risks associated
with transmission pylons and wires (Priestly and Evans, 1996), and often
characterized as holding selfish and irrational ‘NIMBY’ (not in my back
yard) reactions to proposed new generation plant, notably onshore wind
turbines (Devine-Wright, 2005a).
In sum, it is suggested that the centralized energy system is embedded
within, and has helped produce, a social representation of the ‘energy
public’ that is overwhelmingly characterized by deficits: of interest, knowl-
edge, rationality and environmental and social responsibility. Moreover, it
is argued that this is a self-fulfilling prophesy – the more the representation
is assumed to be common sense by decision makers, the more it is likely to
lead to ‘out of sight, out of mind’ energy policies, and to institutions and
technologies that foster its continuity, creating a context with limited scope
for public engagement with the energy system. Imagining the likely implica-
tions of the centralized system and its related social representations of
energy and energy users for future energy system evolution, one might spec-
ulate as follows: 
In terms of governance: holding the view of the public as
consumer/deficit suggests that decision-making about system evolution is
best left to the experts (that is to a bounded array of ‘technocrats’ already
involved in managing the centralized system at the national level, including
working groups involving government departments, regulatory bodies,
industry and some academics) rather than being opened out to encompass
more collective, deliberative processes directly with the public. Scepticism
about the value of deliberative processes in energy system evolution would
be consonant with this position.
In terms of technological change: designers, developers and installers of
new energy technologies would aim to minimize public engagement since
this would be assumed to increase the risk of resistance, delay, planning
refusal and inefficient or incorrect use of technologies. Large-scale energy
generation would be preferred and sited at a maximal distance from centres
of population; for example, off-shore or in remote areas. New energy-
demand technologies, including ‘smartmeters’, would be designed on a ‘plug
and forget’ basis, aiming to minimize disruption to existing lifestyles; load-
management devices would be embedded within existing appliances to work
as independently as possible of the consumer so as to minimize inconven-
ience.
In terms of public acceptance: it would be assumed that the best way to
ensure acceptance of new-energy technologies would be to get sufficient
incentives (or benefits) in place and market them effectively to ensure
consumer adoption; deal with NIMBY resistance to change by siting tech-
nologies away from centres of population and by obliging developers to
compensate local residents, under the guise of local community economic
benefits (e.g. DTI, 2005b); prioritize policies to maintain low energy prices,
consumer choice and reliable supply.
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There are two issues that need to be discussed when considering these pathways
of system evolution: whether the ‘deficit’ view is valid, and whether a pathway
of system evolution based upon its core assumptions can be said to represent a
more ‘sustainable’ energy system.
First, both deficit and related NIMBY views, despite being widely held, have
been critiqued as an inaccurate account of public responses to new technologies
on a number of different levels: whether the gap between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’
knowledge is best understood in terms of deficit/surfeit, in comparison to qual-
itatively different forms of thinking or knowledge practised by different groups
(e.g. Irwin et al, 1999); whether new technologies are responded to by isolated
individuals, or are socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) by social
actors through everyday interpersonal communication and exposure to mass
media (e.g. Grove-White et al, 2000); and whether public acceptance is best
secured through top-down, one-way information and awareness-raising
campaigns funded by central government or industry in comparison to bottom-
up, deliberative processes of public engagement (Grove-White et al, 2000).
Second, there is the issue of what ‘sustainable’ energy means, and who
decides. If the most common or dominant way of thinking about the sustain-
able energy system of the future is one defined as basically with less
environmentally negative consequences, then the main challenge is how to
assimilate low-carbon (nuclear or renewable energy) technologies within the
existing large-scale technical system. In terms of the scope for renewable energy
development, this suggests integrating renewables within the conventional
‘hard’ energy pathway, favouring rapid and large-scale deployment within a
‘streamlined’ planning process with limited public involvement, minimizing the
engineering challenge of intermittency to security of supply and maintaining
low prices. To a degree, this is an accurate representation of policy and practice
for wind energy in the UK and elsewhere in the early 1990s (Breuker, 2005),
which favoured large-scale over smaller scale renewable energy development
led by private utilities rather than communities and conceived as an asocial
process of technology development.
Representing sustainable energy as minimizing environmental impacts
suggests optimizing the balance between ‘energy as commodity’, ‘energy as
strategic resource’ and ‘energy as ecological resource’ viewpoints, and playing
down the importance of social aspects. However, this is an incomplete and unsat-
isfactory way of applying sustainable development to energy issues. Whilst there
is no clear model available characterizing social aspects of a sustainable energy
system (Tleubayeva and Devine-Wright, forthcoming), it is the case that princi-
ples of sustainable development, such as equity and participation as enshrined in
UK and international sustainable development policy documents (e.g. DEFRA,
1999), suggest a pathway of system evolution where technological change is
informed by, and embedded within, engagement with as wide an array of stake-
holders as possible, including the public, at different levels – local, regional and
national. This has been represented as the adoption of a ‘paradigm change’ in
energy policymaking, embracing both institutional dynamics of innovation
processes and fostering societal engagement in implementation (Szarka, in press).
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Decentralized energy technologies and 
representations of the public as energy citizens
Circulating alongside this ‘deficit’ view, an alternative representation of the
public can be identified involving quite different assumptions about public
awareness, motivation and concern about energy, and it is likely to lead to very
different pathways of technological change. This is described as ‘energy citizen-
ship’ (Morris, 2001; Devine-Wright, 2004) in which the public are conceived as
active rather than passive stakeholders in energy system evolution and where
the potential for action is framed by notions of equitable rights and responsibil-
ities across society for dealing with the consequences of energy consumption,
notably climate change. Energy citizenship is not a new idea. Traces can be
identified in writings on the virtues of alternative technology and ‘small-scale’
development, for example the seminal work of Schumacher (1974). What is
novel is the degree to which it appears to be becoming an integral, conventional
element of UK government energy policy, informed by wider policy on sustain-
able development, including the negative impacts of globalization and the
benefits of ‘localization’ (e.g. Hines, 2000) in relation to food production and
consumption, travel, water, waste and energy, and emerging ideas about sustain-
able consumption (Jackson, 2004).
Energy citizenship is a counterpoint to the social and psychological ‘detach-
ment’ of the public from energy systems embedded within centralized systems
and deficit views of energy users. It can be identified in a number of different
sources or drivers for change. First, there is the emerging potential for smaller-
scale energy generation, most obviously domestic scale devices, which could
co-evolve with a more engaged and aware public or publics. Second, there is
the view that a more sustainable energy system should imply or necessitate
greater levels of public participation in energy decision-making, based upon a
form of Local (Energy) Agenda 21. Lastly, there is a pragmatic view that public
acceptance of technological change necessitates greater levels of engagement
with the public about energy technologies, as such engagement may create
better conditions for consensus to emerge about new development.
Whilst citizenship has conventionally been defined as the membership of a
political community that entitles a subject to the exercise of rights and obliges
the fulfilment of certain duties or responsibilities (Reeve, 1996), recent writing
in environmental politics has begun to explore a wider notion of citizenship in
relation to environmental problems. Dobson (2003), for example, has claimed
that the principle responsibility or duty of environmental citizenship would be
to ‘ensure that (one’s) ecological footprint does not compromise or foreclose
the ability of others in present or future generations to pursue options impor-
tant to them’ (quoted in Bell, 2003, pp3–4). In a review of environmental
citizenship literature, Barnett et al (2005) noted several dimensions of environ-
mental citizenship: ascription of private responsibility for environmental
problems, an emphasis upon environmental justice, and individuals responding
to environmental problems through collective action. Energy citizenship is a
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view of the public that emphasizes awareness of responsibility for climate
change, equity and justice in relation to siting controversies as well as fuel
poverty and, finally, the potential for (collective) energy actions, including acts
of consumption and the setting up of community renewable energy projects
such as energy co-operatives.
Psychologists have been critical of the dominant ‘model’ or representation
of the public held by policy makers and political scientists that views the person
solely as a personal utility maximizer, focusing upon short-term, material gains
or benefits (e.g. Tyler et al, 1986). Instead, psychological literature on citizen-
ship suggests a range of values, beliefs and norms determining citizenship
behaviours such as signing petitions or supporting particular energy policies.
Taking value-belief-norm theory of support for environmental movements
(Stern et al, 1999), Steg et al (in press) have empirically shown how biospheric
values, an ecological worldview, awareness of negative environmental threats
or consequences, ascription of personal responsibility and feelings of moral
obligation shape public acceptance of higher energy prices. Other writers (e.g.
Lubell, 2002) have suggested how perceptions of collective as well as personal
cost and benefit can motivate acts of citizenship such as willingness to partici-
pate in cooperatives, echoing the subjective utility beliefs of Ajzen’s Theory of
Planned Behaviour (1991) at the community or group level of analysis. Other
writers have focused upon processes of social identification as a motivational
basis for civic participation (feelings of belonging in a group or social network
(e.g. Stürmer and Kampmeier, 2003); perceived efficacy at personal and collec-
tive levels (Bandura, 1997) and perceived justice (Zoellner and Schweizer-Rees,
2005). These are explored in more detail in the following section, contextualiz-
ing energy citizenship in the development of micro-generation technologies and
public participation in energy policy making and development.
Contexts of energy citizenship behaviour
Social and psychological aspects of microgeneration
It is likely that decentralized generation from homes and buildings, along with
local power plant such as small-scale wind farms or district heating systems
with CHP plant, will represent very different contexts for energy behaviour in
the future. Deployment of micro-generation and smart-metering technologies
will transform buildings into power stations and offer unprecedented opportu-
nities for ‘in sight and mind’ energy systems. These devices not only challenge
accepted ways of imagining or talking about energy generation and supply, such
as the utility of the concept of ‘power station’ in a decentralized energy future
(Devine-Wright, 2004), but are also likely to substantially raise the salience of
energy issues in everyday life, making people more aware of how heat and
power is generated, supplied and consumed, and closing the current awareness
gap between personal energy consumption and the consequences of such
consumption for environmental problems such as climate change.
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If this is the case, it could lead to elevated awareness of consequences,
ascription of personal responsibility and personal norms that Stern et al (1999)
identified as psychological determinants of pro-environmental behaviour. But
raised awareness does not only suggest new contexts for shaping moral motiva-
tions for environmentally significant behaviours; it also suggests new potential
for more self-interested energy behaviours. Real-time pricing and consumption
feedback via the incorporation of information and communication technologies
in smart metering devices could radically alter the potential for economic tariffs
offered for generating and consuming energy at different times of day and year.
Purchase of shares in community renewable energy cooperatives offers a form
of energy consumerism that is simultaneously self-interested, pro-environmen-
tal and civic-minded. The potential interconnectedness of energy systems, for
example through community owned power plant or locally managed micro-
grids of heating and power supply systems, could ‘socialize’ the basis of energy
use, linking pre-existing place and social identity processes with energy tech-
nologies, embedding energy technologies in social networks and enhancing
social cohesion. Finally, micro-generation can foster feelings of control and
perceived self-efficacy amongst energy users, currently minimized by centralized
energy systems, symbolized by ideals of self-sufficiency.
Recent advocacy for micro-generation energy technologies highlight the
potential of decentralization for greater public engagement. Van Vliet and
Chappells (1999) contrast the role of energy ‘consumers’ with that of ‘co-
providers’ who are not passive recipients of energy from a centralized system,
but proactive agents of change in a more interdependent and evolving system
of energy products and services. Dunn (2000), Hewitt (2001), Lovins and
Lehman (2002), Rifkin (2002) and Vaitheeswaran (2005) alike focus upon
potential economic, technical and environmental benefits of smaller scale,
new and renewable technologies, with a lesser focus upon social benefits such
as greater civic participation and empowerment. These writers take the posi-
tion that system evolution of this kind will lead to greater social acceptance
of new and emerging energy technologies, increased well-being and quality of
life, particularly in developing countries, without already well-developed,
centralized grid infrastructures. Other writers have taken a stronger political
and sociological focus, advocating members of the public to take greater
personal responsibility and control over energy generation and supply, for
example by participating in the formation of public power corporations
(Morris, 2001) and helping to renew ailing civic institutions, particularly at
the local level through participation in community projects (Hoffman et al,
2004).
Whether one adopts a sceptical or supportive attitude to this body of advo-
cacy, it is apparent that it represents a novel way of thinking about energy that
employs metaphors of politics and change. Advocacy contributions allude to
bottom-up control and system change. Local and small-scale energy technolo-
gies will give ‘power to the people’ (Hinshelwood, 2000; Hewitt, 2001;
Vaitheeswaran, 2005), will ‘decentralize power’ (Greenpeace, 2005), signalling
a ‘micropower revolution’ (Dunn, 2000) or ‘energy revolution’ (Greenpeace,
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2005) and be illustrated by a ‘microgeneration manifesto’ (Green Alliance,
2004). For example:
Decentralising energy would democratise energy. By enabling local
action and empowering individuals and communities as produc-
ers, decentralisation has the potential to bring about a massive
cultural change in our attitude to and use of energy. (Greenpeace,
2005, p2) 
Excitement about the socio-cultural and political implications of decentralized
energy is not limited to advocates from the voluntary sector or environmental
NGOs (non-governmental organizations). It is suggested by statements made
by the UK energy minister Malcolm Wickes, when launching the official consul-
tation on micro-generation (DTI, 2005c): 
Climate change is often portrayed as a global problem requiring a
global solution… Many are now starting to recognise that each
and every one of us has a part to play… Let us be clear. Individuals
as well as Governments and corporations can make a difference.
And this is where microgeneration comes to the fore. Rooftop
wind turbines, solar panels, heat pumps, bio-energy, micro-hydro
… these exciting technologies can help the individual to make a
real difference to our climate. As someone once said – small is
beautiful. And this applies just as much to power generation as it
does to mobile phones. Before the advent of large-scale power
stations, self-sufficiency in energy generation was the norm – water
mills used to grind corn, coal-fired boilers providing heat. Of
course I am not advocating a return to the early 1900s. But
advances in technology means that products are now available that
allow the individual to regain this self-sufficiency. (Wickes, 2005)
The quotation suggests that adoption of micro-generation technologies by indi-
viduals is conceived as a way in which individuals, rather than businesses or
government agencies, can actively take responsibility for their role in mitigat-
ing carbon emissions and, in doing so, contribute to solving environmental
problems, clearly implicating notions of energy citizenship described above.
From a psychological perspective, the motivation for doing so is attributed to
a combination of environmental concern, ascription of personal responsibility
(implicating Stern et al’s (1999) value-belief-norm theory as important psycho-
logical determinants of pro-environmental behaviour) and a desire for
self-sufficiency or control, echoing in a number of ways the writings of
Schumacher in the 1970s and the concept of perceived efficacy (Bandura,
1997).
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Public participation in energy policy making and 
local development decisions
Stakeholder engagement has now become a commonplace of energy policy
development (e.g. British Wind Energy Association (BWEA), 2002; British
Biogen, 1998; DTI, 2005a). Although members of the public are not always
characterized as stakeholders in such consultations, individuals were invited to
contribute to the ‘integrated stakeholder consultation process’ conducted prior
to the publication of the Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003) using specific method-
ologies such as internet-based questionnaires, focus groups and two-day
deliberative discussion groups held in England, Wales and Scotland. The public
are also implicated in recently revised planning guidance on renewable energy
developments (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), 2004), which
emphasizes:
Local planning authorities, regional stakeholders and Local
Strategic Partnerships should foster community involvement in
renewable energy projects and seek to promote knowledge of and
greater acceptance by the public of prospective renewable energy
developments that are appropriately located. Developers of renew-
able energy projects should engage in active consultation and
discussion with local communities at an early stage in the plan-
ning process, and before any planning application is formally
submitted.
A number of initiatives led by regional and local government have been under-
taken to promote civic engagement with, and community benefit from,
renewable energy development. In Scotland, a ‘concordat’ was proposed by
Highland councillors aiming to ‘encourage industry to engage openly with and
within the community affected; to work to assist the maximum direct/indirect
community benefit and to divulge in confidence to the local renewable energy
community trust, the profitability of operations’ (Highland Council, 2003).
Argyll and Bute Council (2004) announced an agreement with a developer that
included activities such as ‘renewable energy education with local communities’
and ensuring that ‘maximum benefit is achieved for the communities in the
area’. In the South West of England, the Government Office devised a ‘Protocol
on Public Engagement for Wind Energy Developments’ (DARE, 2004), bring-
ing together diverse stakeholder groups with the aim of reducing uncertainty
caused by the varying approaches adopted by local authorities and renewable
energy developers in the region for engaging the public and other stakeholders
in energy development. The DTI are considering establishing a similar protocol
applicable to the UK as a whole.
The admixture of reasons for promoting civic engagement with renewable
energy developments highlighted in these local and regional initiatives are also
indicated by statements from central government. A DTI report on community
involvement in renewable energy projects (DTI, 2000) discussed the results of
community involvement in a renewable energy project: 
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• ‘Involvement will give the community some degree of control over the
scheme.’
• ‘A financial return should be generated, both to the community and
investors.’
• ‘If successful, involvement in a community venture will provide a sense of
satisfaction.’
Such statements suggest that energy citizenship, in the form of community
participation in energy development, will lead to a number of social-psycholog-
ical impacts for the individuals and groups involved, including increased levels
of self-efficacy (control and competence) at individual and collective levels,
financial benefit for local people (self-interest), positive emotional responses
and elevated self-esteem (satisfaction).
Putting such policy into practice, funded UK energy programmes include
the Community Renewables Initiative (CRI) put forward by the Countryside
Agency, which aims to provide advice and support to members of communities
wishing to develop local renewable energy projects. Other examples of govern-
ment-led support for ‘bottom-up’ collective energy action include Community
Action for Energy, managed by the Energy Saving Trust, which aims to support
community involvement and action for energy conservation. The magnitude of
UK local energy action, and the extent of public interest and engagement in
such activity, is suggested by the fact that they are more than 500 community
renewable energy projects currently underway in the UK (Devine-Wright et al,
2005).
These are leading to the emergence of novel energy institutions, business
structures and innovative finance mechanisms, which involve alliances between
public, private and voluntary sectors and are manifest in energy social enter-
prises and cooperatives such as Sherwood Energy Village in Nottinghamshire
(an industrial and provident society), Moel Moelogan in Wales, Baywind in
Cumbria and Westmill Windfarm, Oxfordshire. They also reflect new roles for
individuals as ‘activists’ or social entrepreneurs setting up local collective energy
schemes (e.g. Adam Twine in Westmill, Oxfordshire). In South Wales, a range
of participatory methodologies (most notably an independently run civic refer-
endum in which all locals aged 16 or over living adjacent to a planned wind
farm site were eligible to vote) were employed by a collective of local citizens
(Awel Aman Tawe (AAT), 2001). It is notable that the cost of such participa-
tion was co-funded by the UK government (DTI) in the form of an evaluation
study of the efficacy of different participation methodologies, and occurred
independently of formal land-use planning procedures (AAT, 2001). Although
it was not instigated or delivered by the local authority, it was designed to
complement and enhance existing procedures in such a way as to enable greater
levels of civic involvement in renewable energy decision making and planning
than are the norm.
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Energy citizenship and pathways of 
system evolution
Activities such as these suggest an alternative view of the public in relation to
energy that is not fully captured by concepts such as ‘consumer’, ‘energy user’
or ‘deficit’. The energy citizenship representation suggests that while members
of the public frequently act out of self-interest, they can also behave as social
and political actors concerned about the perceived legitimacy or fairness of deci-
sion-making, and sometimes feeling responsible for the welfare of their local
community, their children and future generations, and the environment, both
locally and globally. Energy citizens can feel positive and excited about new
energy technologies rather than apathetic and disinterested; be aware rather
than ignorant of the scale of its potential impacts on political institutions, the
environment and everyday lifestyles; and be willing to engage not just as indi-
viduals but as collectives in shaping technological change at local, regional and
national levels. To summarize, this suggests the following beliefs about the
public in relation to energy:
• that decentralized energy technologies can foster new ways of thinking and
behaving about energy, ways that may be difficult to conceive within the
mindset of the centralized system;
• that individuals may feel excited and positive about new energy technolo-
gies, rather than apathetic and disinterested;
• that individuals will want to take a more active role in generating heat and
power, in supplying energy and in co-managing local distribution supply
networks;
• that individuals are able and motivated to engage with the wider energy
system via new energy technologies such as ‘smartmeters’;
• that individuals value at least a degree of self-sufficiency from the central-
ized system, as fostered by domestic and local ‘power stations’, or local
‘micro-grids’;
• that motivation to adopt micro-generation is at least in part based upon
awareness of environmental problems such as climate change, ascription of
personal responsibility to respond to such problems in a way that will make
a difference and feelings of moral obligation to act;
• that individuals will be motivated and able to participate in local to national
level political processes such as consultations on new energy policies;
• that individuals will wish to participate in local planning consultations
concerning proposed energy developments;
• that local communities will accept renewable energy developments, if such
developments are conducted in a manner that gives local people some degree
of control as well as economic benefit.
Tracing the likely implications of a less centralized and more participatory
energy system, one might speculate as follows:
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In terms of governance: energy system evolution is best guided by
sustainability principles, including social aspects such as public participa-
tion, local action, equity and justice alongside remedying poverty.
Boundaries between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ should be challenged and energy deci-
sion making opened out to encompass more collective, deliberative
processes involving national, regional and local debate and methodologies
such as citizens panels and juries. Policy makers should adopt a perspective
on technological development that aims to ensure the co-production by all
stakeholders of social consensus on system evolution, based upon the theme
of equitable civic rights and duties for environmental protection and quality
of life.
In terms of technological change: energy citizenship suggests maximiz-
ing rather than minimizing public engagement with system evolution, for
example by siting or placing new energy technologies where they are most
likely to engage the public’s attention, and valuing smaller-scale in addition
to larger-scale developments. This could include local power plant ‘in
people’s back yards’ (e.g. on roofs of new homes) as well as smartmeters at
eye height in kitchens (as already put in place in the innovative zero-carbon
Beddington Zero Emission Development (BedZED), London); the public
are more effectively involved as stakeholders in land-use planning decisions;
economic instruments are put into place to stimulate local entrepreneurial
action for energy conservation and renewable energy generation, for
example the development of share-owning cooperatives involving partner-
ships of private, public and voluntary institutions.
In terms of public acceptance: whilst incentivizing public engagement in
system evolution (for example, by rewarding individuals for time spent
responding to consultations or volunteering in community energy actions,
or enhancing economic returns for energy generated by small scale plant at
local or building levels), energy policy simultaneously promotes concerted
action at national, regional and local levels to raise awareness of the conse-
quences of current patterns of energy production and consumption. More
assertive leadership is provided by decision makers at all levels on the shared
responsibility, rights as well as duties, held by all citizens in responding
effectively to energy-related environmental problems such as climate
change, with the potential for individual or household carbon allowances
given serious consideration.
Despite the dangers of over-simplifying each position, Table 4.2 summarizes the
essential differences between the perspectives outlined above.
Presenting these ideas in this form has the disadvantage of suggesting that
these representations are dualistic opposites, and that the ‘energy citizen’ view
will or should simply replace the ‘consumer/deficit’ as normative in UK energy
policy. Instead, it is argued that all of these different facets of representing
energy, and the public in relation to energy, are to different degrees already
implicated in different aspects of UK energy policy and practice, and that past
research on social representations of environmental beliefs (Castro and Lima,
78 People and Sustainability: Appreciating Multiple Identities
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 78
2001) has demonstrated how change commonly involves not the ‘replacing’ of
one way of thinking with another, but the holding of what may be perceived as
mutually incompatible positions simultaneously.
Such diversity of representation in UK policy and practice does result in an
often confusing picture about who energy policy is for, to what degree the public
should be involved in energy governance and what beliefs about the public are
compatible with a more sustainable energy system. The many different institu-
tions involved in shaping UK energy policy and practice, from Greenpeace to
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Table 4.2 A summary of facets of social representations of 
energy system evolution




Automated, ‘plug User engagement
and forget’
‘Hard’/technical ‘Soft’/socio-technical
Environmental Continued use of Use of renewables, and avoidance of 
hydrocarbon less ‘green’ energy resources such as 
technologies (e.g. waste incineration and hydrocarbons
clean coal and 
carbon sequestration) 
Support for new Rejection of new nuclear plant
nuclear plant
Governance Top-down More bottom-up
Centralized Greater role for local and 
institutions regional institutions









Lazy Motivated and engaged
Passive Active
Individualistic Socially embedded
Self-interested, Motivated by a range of values, 
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the Countryside Agency, the Renewables Power Association (corporate
umbrella body) to the Royal Academy of Engineering, Number 10 to the
Renewable Energy Foundation and the Department of Trade and Industry,
representing voluntary, private, academic and public sectors, are likely to hold
these views to different degrees, explicitly and implicitly. As a result, achieving
consensus about how best to achieve a ‘low carbon economy’ or a ‘low carbon
society’ will require a more explicit awareness by such institutions of the models
of the public latent within particular viewpoints, policies and practices. 
Challenges and opportunities in promoting 
energy citizenship
Whilst asserting that the energy citizenship representation of energy users is
more compatible with the principles of sustainable development, it is also the
case that there are a number of significant challenges standing in the way of
wider acceptance and adoption of this viewpoint. 
First, it is by no means clear that the public are willing to take up the
enhanced, active role presumed for them. Although some evidence exists that
members of the public hold positive beliefs about locally embedded renewable
energy developments, seeking local energy supply, a share of profits and even a
degree of ownership (Devine-Wright, 2005b), some scholars of community
energy involvement (e.g. Hoffman et al, 2004) have noted the more general
socio-cultural trend away from civic participation as indicated by measures of
social capital such as voting and volunteering, thereby expressing some scepti-
cism about the potential for local energy projects to invigorate local democracy.
If such actions are more broadly in decline in society, it may be over-optimistic
to hope that decentralized energy technologies will somehow be perceived and
responded to in a very different way.
Second, there are formidable obstacles to innovation in energy systems.
Some of these involve institutional barriers; for example, in a debate on micro-
generation in the House of Commons (Hansard, 2005), David Heath MP
commented:
those interested in hydroelectrics have forcibly pointed out the
difficulties with the licensing system. They showed me the forms
that they must fill in, which are astonishingly complex. There is
virtually no difference between applying to run a small water
turbine and applying to run Hinkley Point (nuclear power plant)
in terms of the complexity of the information that is required…
That makes it very difficult for someone who is not an expert even
to attempt to apply. Could we introduce a threshold below which
such activities are exempt as permitted development, which might
apply not only to water turbines, but micro-wind turbines too?
Such policies would certainly promote the use of microgeneration
among householders.
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The quotation suggests that applying or maintaining institutional processes
designed for a centralized system to decentralized technologies is inappropriate
and will obstruct system evolution.
Third, the manner in which key institutions in the UK electricity industry
represent the public will affect or constrain change. Empirical research suggests
that it is the consumer/deficit representation of energy users, rather than that of
energy citizenship, that is predominant within UK institutions involved in elec-
tricity supply, regulation, metering, consumer affairs and local energy
management (Devine-Wright and Devine-Wright, 2005). In the context of
personal interviews, when asked to describe the ‘typical domestic electricity
user’ industry representatives responded with statements such as: 
• ‘The other thing then is do we have to do it? Because people are lazy. Have
they got to do it? Why should they now?’
• ‘… most consumers don’t really care… How much is it? £400 per year?
How much per month? Phah [noise of not caring]… Not just complicated
mechanisms an issue. Does not care.’
• ‘People don’t have much understanding and it takes a lot of time to under-
stand the whole system it is you know you just turn on the light but then
the mechanism is so complicated but people don’t have the interest to know
about that.’
Such statements suggest little awareness or enthusiasm on the part of key stake-
holders in the UK electricity system for engaging with the public as energy
citizens in energy system evolution.
Fourth, the fragility of current policies to support community involvement
in renewable energy generation is suggested by continued uncertainty over the
long-term funding of initiatives such as the CRI, the lack of centralized coordi-
nation of community energy action across government departments (Owens,
2004) and the fact that, even in the specific case of the AAT development, where
a majority of local citizens voted in favour of a proposed community-owned
wind energy development in an independently run referendum, the proposal
has subsequently been refused planning permission by the local authority, indi-
cating the marginal role such non-statutory yet participatory processes can play
under current planning legislation. 
Finally, on a more positive note, the potential to harness personal motiva-
tion for increased control, freedom and independence in energy supply and
consumption may represent a significant psychological opportunity to promote
evolution towards a decentralized energy system in a manner that promotes
energy citizenship and the commodity representation of energy. The following
quotation about decentralized generation from a UK industry representative
suggests this view: 
… people would really like micro-CHP … because they hate utili-
ties they would see it [installing micro-CHP] as ‘doing them
down’. I am not quite sure what the reality of independence is but
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people see disrupting this as very subservient. You are the end of
the wire. You get what you are given. You get this bill it might be
right you never know. I think this a very lopsided one-sided
arrangement. I think customers do see that anything that would
level or even that relationship – they would quite like it.
Conclusions
Just as there are different ways of understanding energy, so also exist multiple
representations of the public in relation to energy, which, in part, shape how
new energy technologies and systems evolve. In this chapter, two different path-
ways of energy system evolution (centralized and decentralized) were identified
and suggested to relate to two different forms of user representations
(consumer/deficit and energy citizen) and two kinds of governance (representa-
tive and participatory democracy). Whilst such alternatives suggest dualistic
options and either/or thinking, it is likely that both consumer and citizen repre-
sentations of the energy public coexist to varying degrees, shaped by the values
and practices of the individuals and institutions involved. It is argued that,
whilst ‘energy citizenship’ is more reflective of the values of sustainable devel-
opment, significant obstacles exist to putting it into practice in the UK, not least
the dominant emphasis upon energy as a ‘commodity’, the necessity to change
commonly held ‘deficit’ views and the challenges involved in motivating differ-
ent social groups to put aside the legacy of the centralized system and engage in
energy-related governance processes at local, regional and national levels.
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Chapter 5
Governance Lessons from Green
Niches: The Case of Eco-Housing
Adrian Smith
Introduction
Ideas under the label alternative technology (AT) were an early expression of
sustainable technology. AT emerged in the 1970s, advocated by a social move-
ment with a particularly radical approach to technology development; to
specific forms of technology; and to the social goals that technology must facil-
itate (Winner, 1979; Smith, 2004). Housing was an early concern for AT
activists, and many of the housing ideas espoused by the movement remain alive
amongst green builders today. This chapter is concerned with those green build-
ing ideas and activities. They represent a vision for green housing quite different
from the homes most of us live in.
Why and how should we take notice of these ideas and activities? Well,
sometimes associated initiatives become celebrated, prize-winning exemplars of
sustainable development. The Beddington Zero Emission Development
(BedZED) is a recent example. It is a housing development in Beddington, South
London where net imports of energy are zero. It has won many accolades,1
attracted many visitors, and been used by policy makers as a backdrop for
launching policy initiatives (e.g. a Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
photovoltaics (PV) programme). The development (82 sustainable homes) is the
kind of thing many policy makers would like to see replicated. Sustainable
homes like these provide the kind of ‘ready made’, practical solutions for policy
problems, like climate change, and help ground policy rhetoric and aspiration
(Lovell, 2004).
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The Hockerton Housing Project2 in Nottinghamshire is another example.
This too has become an exemplary sustainable housing development, with on-
site renewables and water systems supporting a row of six low-energy,
earth-sheltered, passive solar dwellings. Such schemes attract media publicity
and official approval (Hockerton was opened by Construction Minister Nick
Raynsford). And they become objects for building research and best practice
guides (e.g. Building Research Establishment, 2002). Such attention suggests
there is a desire to learn from these niche housing developments.
Recent interest in green niches has also come from theorists interested in
governance for sustainable technologies. The strategic creation of innovative,
greener niches has been proposed as a new approach for sustainable technology
governance (Schot et al, 1994; Kemp et al, 1998; Hoogma et al, 2002; Loorbach
and Rotmans, 2006). In essence, the niche-based approach advocates the
planned and protected creation of niche situations in which novel technical
artefacts and user practices can come together in more sustainable forms (Kemp
et al, 1998). The ambition is to create lessons from these ‘socio-technical’ niches
and to use them to help diffuse sustainable practices more widely in society.
Of course, simply because the niche concept and associated ideas are new
to theorists does not mean green niches are a completely new phenomenon.3 As
the opening reference to AT implies, activists have been trying to create more
sustainable practices for over 35 years, with mixed success (Winner, 1979;
Pursell, 1993; Jamison, 2002; Smith, 2004). Wider recognition of these green
niches by society, government and business has fluctuated over this period.
Current theoretical and policy interest raises their saliency once more. Whilst it
is true that eco-housing was not created as a ‘strategic niche’, it is the case that
green building activists were creating exemplars with the purpose of pressing
widespread changes in housing. Their attempts do therefore have relevance for
the new strategic niche management theory, which shares a similar sense of
mission.
This chapter argues that drawing lessons from niches is not as straightfor-
ward as we might hope. Nevertheless, progress is possible. In the following
section, niche-based approaches to sustainable technology governance are intro-
duced. The question of socio-technical context is raised as an important
consideration in the potential for this governance approach. The point is rein-
forced in the subsequent section, in which the characteristics of the green
building movement are introduced. Green builders operate in a very different
socio-technical context to mainstream volume house-builders – a point summa-
rized in the penultimate section of the chapter. The chapter concludes by
considering the implications for governance, the challenges that translating
practices between different contexts poses, and some tentative proposals for
policy reform.
90 Technology and Sustainability: Contextualized Accounts
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 90
Niche-based approaches and the socio-technical
perspective in sustainable technology
governance
Shove (1998) has noted how building research tends toward an exclusive
abstraction of the technological and economic performance of elements of
exemplary dwellings (e.g. a solar heating system). She argues that the very
different ‘socio-technical contexts’ in which more conventional houses are built
and used are ignored by such abstract technical analyses, and thus important
impediments for the adoption of green housing practices (like solar heating) are
subsequently overlooked (Shove, 1993; see also Rohracher, 2001). An approach
concerned with socio-technical context would look to the guiding principles,
industrial structure, user relations, policy, knowledge and social meanings that
shape technology use in specific situations or classes of situation.
In taking the socio-technical view, however, one must be careful not to study
the embedding and structuring effect of prior socio-technical practices to the
exclusion of studying opportunities for new practices. Shove and others identify
how existing socio-technical contexts close down space for alternative possibil-
ities. If the socio-technical perspective is to be used in a proactive and
prospective fashion, then it ought to be able to spot processes by which contexts
are destabilized and space for alternatives open up. How do existing practices
become problematic? How do they become disembedded? How do alternative
practices exploit this space and work to reconfigure the socio-technical? In
short, it would help to see some examples of socio-technical agency to comple-
ment the examples of socio-technical structuring. The green building movement
and the eco-house niche it has created is one such example.
The point made in this chapter is that we must not be ignorant to the socio-
technical processes creating green niches and their contexts. Actors drawn to
sustainable housing solutions for, say, a regulatory imperative for ‘low carbon’
housing risk missing the deeper story behind the exemplars, whose broader
ecological values and vision for housing is quite distinct. Co-option of green
housing elements ‘tends to overlook the social processes behind the design and
construction of the sustainable houses, in particular the beliefs and motivations
of the project team’ (Lovell, 2004, p52). 
Like sustainable housing initiatives before it (e.g. the low-energy homes in
Milton Keynes in the 1980s), BedZED is being monitored and evaluated,
reports are published on its performance, and it is serving as a basis for best
practice guides. There is certainly plenty to learn from this innovative develop-
ment. However, looking at things as they stand, as exemplars for wider practice,
we must not forget the unique circumstances that lead to their creation. Some
of the values, processes and actors involved in BedZED are different compared
to more conventional housing developments. It is important that we remember
this. Housing designs are ‘part and parcel’ of the context in which they are
embedded (Leopold and Bishop, 1983; Hooper and Nicol, 1999).
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In the case of BedZED, some of the unique circumstances behind its creation
include a team of architects led by a determined individual (Bill Dunster), whose
prior commitment extended to applying green design in the construction of his
own home. They also include partnership with an innovative environmental
advocacy and solutions-based organization committed to bioregional ideas for
local sustainability – the Bioregional Development Group. Together they had
the knowledge and motivation to build differently. For example, they went to
great lengths to try and source reclaimed steel and other construction materials
(Lazarus, 2002), and trained contractors in the skills needed to build their
designs. They were helped in this by a client willing to consider extra-market
values, interested in sustainability issues, and with concern for the lifecycle
operation of its buildings (the Peabody Trust social housing landlord). Similarly,
the Hockerton Housing Project was an eco-housing initiative whose process
diverged from the norm. It was self-built by a community committed to green
building ideas, willing to learn the necessary skills for constructing their homes,
who had a material interest in the operational and lifecycle costs of the building
(i.e. no developer–occupant split), and benefited from links with a pioneering
green architect who lived locally. Such circumstances count. They open up
opportunities for introducing new ideas, social arrangements and technological
practices. This brings one back to Shove’s point about the significance of
contexts and histories, and the way they influence which socio-technical config-
urations are considered to ‘work’ and are valued under given circumstances.
Niche-based governance approaches like strategic niche management
(SNM) seek to accelerate the influence of exemplary green solutions upon the
mainstream by being more sensitive to the full socio-technical context.
Advocates urge the planned and protected creation of niche situations in which
novel technical artefacts and user practices can come together in more sustain-
able forms (Kemp et al, 1998). The ambition is to derive lessons from the novel
‘socio-technical’ practices in the niche, and to act upon these lessons in such a
way as to help similar practices diffuse more widely in the mainstream. These
socio-technical lessons relate not only to the narrow technical and economic
aspects of green housing, such as water systems, but also to the kinds of social
practices and meanings upon which those technologies are predicated, such as
active management of water use. Wider lessons are also sought relating to the
institutional reforms (e.g. training, markets, regulations) that can help niche
forms of housing ‘work’ beyond niche contexts, and so diffuse more widely
(Hoogma et al, 2002; Smith, 2004). 
Such lessons have to be acted upon (embedded). A constituency of support
is necessary. This becomes easier as the alternative socio-technical practices
become more efficient, effective and credible – a process helped by the recruit-
ment of resourced, capable and influential actors. Commitment and
participation in strategic niche management is thus a ‘collective endeavour’ of
‘state policy-makers, a regulatory agency, local authorities (e.g. a development
agency), non-governmental organizations, a citizen group, a private company,
an industry organization, a special interest group or an independent individual’
(Kemp et al, 1998, p188). This socio-technical constituency has to create a
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climate in which niche practice appears a reasonable expectation for the future
(Basalla, 1988). It has to persuade resourced actors that their interests and
values can be reframed and best met through the alternative arrangements in
the niche, compared to the older practices extant in the wider socio-technical
regime. It is this networked, multi-stakeholder approach that suggests SNM is
more a governance approach than a specific policy instrument or task of govern-
ment. Indeed, embedding niche lessons will require coordination across a
variety of policy instruments (e.g. fiscal incentives, regulatory measures, educa-
tion and training, public procurement).
However, there is a paradox to the SNM social learning ambition. Niches
in tune with the incumbent regime are more likely to diffuse (Weber et al, 1999),
but will not demand very great changes in socio-technical practice; whilst
radical niches, like those studied here, will not diffuse much at all. Highly diver-
gent sustainable niches will have to offer considerable positive feedbacks, in
terms of development potential and scope for profitable application, before
‘mainstream’ actors break from the existing regime and move into the sustain-
able niche (Smith, 2003). A question remains as to precisely how incumbent
regimes (including policy reforms) are able to act upon lessons about sustain-
ability generated by green niches. At which juncture, it is time to proceed with
the case study. It represents an acid test for niche-based approaches since it
deliberately involves particularly radical initiatives in sustainable development.
This chapter contends that differences across socio-technical contexts appear to
be a key issue affecting the degree of learning and diffusion of practices.
The green building movement and its 
socio-technical characteristics
The numbers of eco-houses built in the UK each year are small, and difficult to
pin down precisely. Brinkley estimates around 100 eco-houses are built each
year, without elaborating how he arrived at the estimate (2002, p218). One
survey put the total number of ‘sustainable housing schemes’ in the UK at 400,
without listing them, and provided details for 80 of the best, all of them small-
scale (White, 2002). Whatever the precise number, it seems clear that
eco-housing remains a very small niche. It compares with around 190,000 new
dwellings built each year and a total stock of 26 million dwellings in the UK.4
Nevertheless, policy support is increasingly being applied to the promotion of
more sustainable practices for the hundreds of thousands of homes proposed in
the large housing schemes planned for growth zones like Thames Gateway and
elsewhere.5 There is a desire amongst policy makers for these volume housing
projects to provide sustainable homes and communities (Office of the Deputy
Prime Minister (ODPM), 2005). How can the eco-housing experience inform
this mainstream interest in sustainability?
The figures above put the contribution from building new, greener houses
into perspective. It will take over 130 years to replace the existing stock of
dwellings at existing build rates. So, whilst this chapter is concerned about the
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movement of green building ideas into the mainstream construction of housing,
an even bigger challenge is to refurbish and improve the performance of exist-
ing buildings. Some of the ideas set out in this chapter about translating green
building practices across contexts remain relevant, but the refurbishment issue
merits special attention beyond this contribution.
The origins of eco-housing in the UK can be traced back to the 1970s, when
alternative technology activists began thinking about housing and the environ-
ment. A few architectural schools (e.g. Cambridge, Hull and the Architectural
Association in London) provided bases for people to develop ideas and gave
them space for practical experimentation. One iconic example was the
autonomous home built by the Street Farmers’ radical eco-architecture group in
the fields of Thames Polytechnic in 1972. ‘Autonomy’ was an important early
theme in green building – a theme that encapsulated many of the issues that
remain of concern to green builders today. As students graduated they joined
other activists in building eco-homes or renovating existing houses.
Early activists financed themselves by becoming involved in government
research programmes and demonstration projects in low-energy homes (which
emerged in the wake of the energy crises), as well as trying to initiate their own
projects and green architectural practices. It was really a practical attitude, and
an impatience to get on and build eco-houses, and learn from the experience,
that characterized the early green building movement. Green builders took
advantage of public funds for job creation schemes and grants available for
renovation and housing cooperatives in order to create more radical eco-
housing projects. Early green builders Brenda and Robert Vale explained this
practical attitude thus:
One live, working experiment, however impractical if it were
applied universally, will transmit an idea far better than a shelf full
of theoretical reports. Something that can be seen and touched and
shown to work to some degree arouses curiosity, and curiosity in
turn leads to solutions. (Vale and Vale, 1975, p18)
This attitude lends itself to a desire for eco-houses to both inspire and debate
housing sustainability. Initiatives were well documented in the alternative press,
such as Undercurrents magazine, and served as test beds for ideas being dissem-
inated by green builders through books, articles and TV series (e.g. Vale and
Vale, 1975; Clarke, 1976; McLaughlin, 1976; Borer and Harris, 1994).
In many cases there are direct links between these earlier activities and
initiatives today –  for example, pioneers continue practicing and training
others. Today, a loose but much broader network of builders, architects,
activists and clients continue to experiment and produce homes echoing earlier
concerns. Green builders communicate via specialist publications, associational
organizations, events and training programmes (e.g. Building for a Future
magazine; the Association for Environment Conscious Building; self-build train-
ing courses; and the advocacy and design work of green architects and activist
builders, like Architype, Gaia Architects). There is an element of mission within
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these networks. This is not solely a niche market. It includes the advocacy of
green ideas and techniques through training, and the public promotion of green
houses as practical demonstration projects. It seems reasonable to give this
activity the label green building movement in order to denote the spirit of collec-
tive advocacy involved in green housing.
As the green building movement evolved, so a number of salient principles
and practices emerged. Although early initiatives sometimes performed poorly
(e.g. solar heating systems), this did not invalidate these efforts in the minds of
activists; it simply illustrated a need for further commitment, experimentation
and development. 
Green building is not a monolithic school of architecture and building: prac-
titioners disagree over trade-offs between various goals (e.g. earth-sheltered
constructions with high thermal mass versus lightweight, insulated timber
designs). Even so, there remains a sufficiently distinctive collection of overarch-
ing values, ideas and practices from which a socio-technical niche can be
discerned.
Autonomy has already been mentioned as an early goal, and reflected the
ideals of some in the wider AT movement, who considered the ecological society
as being best served by socio-technical practices that facilitated decentralized,
cooperative living (see Boyle and Harper (1976) for debate about the practica-
bility and desirability of this ecological vision). The ideal for autonomous
housing is ‘a house operating independently of any inputs except those of its
immediate environment. The house is not linked to the mains services of gas,
water, electricity or drainage, but instead uses the income-energy sources of
sun, wind and rain to service itself and process its own wastes’ (Vale and Vale,
1975, p7). Housing technologies were sought that might offer the prospect for
occupants to live ‘off grid’ and facilitate green lifestyles. An activist in 1975
described their attempts at autonomy thus:
Through our building activities we have a good mechanism for the
application of some alternative technology hardware. For
example, one of the schemes currently underway includes a solar
roof as part of an improvement grant scheme. In another case,
involving the renovation of six small cottages into four new units
we have actually managed to get approval for a methane digestor
– not to mention a possible solar panel and wind generator: this is
also part of a standard improvement grant scheme. We envisage
that the largest of the four new units will be about 50% energy
autonomous for a negligible extra capital cost. (John Potter,
COMTEK, quoted in Undercurrents, Issue 11, p9)
In addition to environmental autonomy was an interest in social autonomy,
expressed in a concern for technologies and techniques that could be ‘under-
stood and practised by people without recourse to specialised training’ (Vale
and Vale, 1975). There was interest in the idea of ‘dweller control’ over the
house-building process (Turner, 1976) and concomitantly in housing technolo-
gies susceptible to user participation, control and even self-build.
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Even if autonomous housing is forgotten today, associated technologies and
techniques retain interest amongst green builders because they are still consid-
ered to reduce dependency on distant, external resource inputs. These include
rainwater harvesting; water recycling and on-site wastewater treatment;
superinsulation of the building fabric; material selection on locality and envi-
ronmental grounds; passive solar design; heat and electricity storage; small-scale
wind energy, PVs and other distributed micro-generation technologies in the
home; heat recovery and heat pumps. Today, in some cases, the environmental
appeal of these technologies is augmented by mass market potential, in contrast
to AT interest in decentralized, self-reliant ecological lifestyles.
Bringing these elements together in eco-houses requires a different approach
to housing design, construction and operation. One is less free to draw upon
external resources to power and service a housing structure that normally takes
any form irrespective of location, but which in eco-housing must be sensitive to
the site and resources. The eco-house becomes a working machine in which
lifestyles have to be considered carefully and matched with the supply systems
built into the house. So, for example, cisterns for rainwater collection and use
are not only sized adequately, but also are sited to make full use of gravity, in
order that electronic pumping loads are kept low. The layout of buildings, and
even angle of glazing, is set to make full use of the low sun in winter, whilst
shading the high sun in summer. Site specificities count. Rooms are allocated
according to use over the day and year, and the proximity this requires with
respect to thermally massive walls, solar conservatories, natural ventilation
airways, and the services of water supply, use and treatment. In short, form
follows environment to a greater extent than high-input conventional housing.
Design follows material life-cycle principles as far as possible. The sourcing
of materials, preferably as local as possible, has been a key concern. It involves
care for the environmental footprint embodied in building elements. Natural,
local materials are preferred. Techniques using natural materials include cob
(mixing earth and straw), strawbale construction, rammed earth, timber and
use of lime as a setting agent in mortars, renders and concrete (Borer and Harris,
1998; Jones, 2002). Alternatively, some green builders have been trying to reuse
construction materials and reclaimed elements in their projects. Attempts have
been made to source items such as doors and structural steel. Merchants in
reclaimed building material are gradually beginning to emerge. Obstacles
include the absence of test procedures and robust standards of performance for
reclaimed elements, and tight commercial and time pressures discouraging
demolition contractors from reclaiming materials.
Concern for material sustainability has led some green builders to recon-
sider vernacular forms of housing. That is, learning from traditional practices
and techniques that out of necessity were restricted to local materials and low
energy and water inputs for services. Solutions to old material constraints are
reinterpreted under the new social desire for environmental restraint.
Traditional vernaculars consequently inspire some green builders, and adapta-
tions in building techniques and materials are made, such as natural ventilation
techniques rather than mechanical air-conditioning.
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Technical novelties in the niche involve new or renewed skills from green
builders. They have to be able to integrate the various technologies, and use
construction techniques different to those evident in more conventional, volume
house-building situations. Superinsulation and heat recovery, for example,
require levels of air tightness much higher than in normal housing. Similarly,
roofs designed to collect rainwater, rather than shed it rapidly, must be excep-
tionally watertight, and the stored water has to be managed carefully in order
to ensure it is potable and available.
Eco-houses can also place different demands on the occupants. Some
favoured technologies require more active relationships – such as monitoring
power levels in batteries, checking water levels in cisterns, closing blinds over
sun-spaces during evenings, maintaining grey water treatment systems. If a
passive solar house becomes a few degrees colder in winter then comfort might
be sought using technologies like jumpers and warm clothing rather than a
conventional heating system. Not all green households are so ascetic, and well-
designed eco-houses need not be hard work. The point remains, however, which
is that the values and perspective of householders has to approach that of the
designers if the eco-house is to work.
Within green building, this socio-technical matching of design and use has
been eased by the fact that many eco-houses are bespoke projects, and house-
holds have the commitment and inclination necessary. Enthusiasm for ecological
principles inclines users to be (at least initially) more patient, tolerant or
supportive in adapting to the demands of the working relationship involved
between occupant and eco-house. Such involvement has been facilitated by an
attachment to self-build or client involvement in projects (Broome, 1996). The
small-scale nature of developments also permits experimentation. Compared to
the development of a large housing estate, problems in the single eco-house can
be corrected more easily and with less pervasive consequences.
Indeed, green builders acknowledge the importance to innovation of learn-
ing from mistakes. Tough lessons were one outcome of early AT initiatives in
housing. Indeed, US-based autonomous housing activist Mike Reynolds has
called for ‘forums of failure’ where green builders can experiment. His designs
are the product of ‘30 years of failure. You learn by failure. We’re asking politi-
cians to give us situations where we can fail’.6 Over time, performance does
improve. And yet developments today, like BedZED, continue to experience
teething difficulties over socio-technical performance. The niche-based policy
view would see this as a valuable part of a broad learning process. There are
limits, of course. Clients have to be happy with the finished product, and too
many failures simply give green building approaches a bad reputation in the
wider industry. However, a degree of openness towards trial and error is in
sharp contrast to the situation for volume house-builders, where making the
same mistake on the scale of hundreds of houses across a large project can leave
the developer open to considerable liabilities.
Cost considerations feature in all projects. Eco-housing concepts still have
to be financed if they are to be built, and sometimes the capital costs of designs
are higher. However, where additional costs can be met, they are often justified
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by savings in operation, or by appeal to environmental externalities, or offset
against wider network costs avoided (e.g. superinsulation and lower or no
utility bills) (Vale and Vale, 2000). At other times, green values lend themselves
to a very different kind of calculation, such that costs, whilst an important
constraint, are nevertheless traded-off differently, and marginally higher costs
are tolerated for green features, or offset through self-building.
Here, green building principles imply a different set of criteria for judging
the efficacy of ecological construction. Green builders challenged narrow
economic measures from the outset (e.g. Architectural Design 1972, vol 7,
p420). Evaluation is extended to concern for total operating costs over the life-
time of the building, as well as the initial material and construction costs.
Lifetime criteria count in green building. Even where life cycle paybacks are
small, the extra costs are accepted on the grounds of more diffuse environmen-
tal values. One green household even justified spending £15,000 on PV panels
(bringing only £150 energy saving each year) by comparing their green expen-
diture with the amounts other households spend on stylish kitchens (Lovell,
2004, p49).
Clearly, green builders are operating in a socio-technical niche very differ-
ent from the mainstream regime for volume house-building.7 Life cycle cost
considerations are not so deeply embedded in volume house-building, where
the split between developer and user is felt more keenly. Materials are shipped
in as required without much thought given to embodied energy or resources,
other than to the extent that this is partially reflected in the price of materials.
Volume builders use standard designs (e.g. a pattern book of twenty or so differ-
ent house designs) and well-known, tried-and-tested construction techniques
(e.g. brick and block) in order to keep costs down. Standardization facilitates
the easy use of subcontracted labour, and permits the bulk purchase of materi-
als through central supply offices. Such attachment can leave developers
unaware of new technological developments elsewhere, or wary of pursuing
innovations.8 There is little opportunity for occupants to become involved in
volume housing design. Moreover, occupants are anticipated by volume house-
builders in a very passive and conservative fashion. Homes are marketed
through internal fixtures and fittings rather than environmental performance.
If the green building movement were to serve a strategic niche function then
lessons would have to navigate quite a divide in socio-technical practice. That
socio-technical divide is illustrated in summary form in Table 5.1. Somehow,
innovations in the green niche would have to be translated into meaningful
lessons for the mainstream regime.
Under pressure for environmental improvements, building regulations have
for many years attempted to improve the energy performance of buildings. They
are currently being extended to a wider set of sustainable building considera-
tions. However, these are based on judgements of what is deemed a reasonable
demand upon the mainstream socio-technical regime (Raman and Shove, 2000).
In contrast, green building practices can rub against existing regulations –
which are designed with the mainstream housing socio-technical regime in
mind. The use of reclaimed materials, like structural steel, and natural materi-
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Table 5.1 Comparing the green building socio-technical niche with 
the volume house-building regime
Socio-technical Green building Volume house-builder
feature movement
Guiding principles
Values Ecology Profit and loss
Design principles Green vernacular Standard patterns (e.g. limited 
Adapt to site-specifics designs) of developers choosing
Centralized teams
Technologies
Hardware Novel Tried and tested
Small-scale/autonomous Grid/central services
services
Materials Natural and reclaimed Routine, bulk purchasing
materials Listed suppliers
Green building supplies
Innovation Step changes Incremental
Industrial structure
Process Bespoke building Speculative building
Specialist builders Subcontracted labour
Skills Mix of craft-based and Standard industry practice
speciality skills, e.g. Mass production
renewables
Costs Life cycle costs Construction costs
Premium for sustainable Profit from contracted price
features
Risk Single house – learn One fault on many dwellings – 
from correcting faults large liabilities
Scale Single dwellings or Larger estates
small groups
User relations
Household Active commitment to Passive & conservative consumers
assumptions a green life style
User involvement High-user involvement Purchaser of property
or self-build
Policy
Regulations Land use planning and Land use planning and building 
building regulations can regulations are followed
be a constraint
Knowledge
Search criteria Knowledge relevant to Knowledge relevant to existing 
reducing the ecological competencies and business 
footprint of homes practice
Meaning
Commitment Sustainable values and Housing markets and building 
green life styles regulations
Note: Socio-technical dimensions taken from Geels (2002) and Schot (1998).
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als, like straw bale, can worry building inspectors since their regulatory frame-
work is unfamiliar with such novelty. Unless there has been a precedent locally,
‘the process of obtaining a permit can be a lengthy and laborious process of
dialogue, education, and planning’ (Bainbridge et al, 1994, p47; Rosen, 2004).
Regulatory mismatches simply underscore the different socio-technical context
in operation in the green building niche. In advance of any widely disseminated
record of performance, green builders have to make an extra effort to get their
novel designs and materials passed by building control regulations. In contrast,
volume house-builders are largely followers of building regulations like energy
efficiency, which they lobby hard to influence – and then fail to comply with in
as many as one third of new developments (Raman and Shove, 2000; ENDS,
2005).
Of course, this simple contrast between green builders and volume house-
builders necessarily skims over a number of subtleties, but it is sufficient for the
purpose of this chapter, which is to point out the considerable difference in
socio-technical practices that produce eco-houses and volume houses respec-
tively. So how might mainstream lessons about sustainable housing design be
drawn from green niches that diverge so radically from the mainstream?
Discussion - lessons for governance
A small green niche in eco-housing in the UK, produced by the green building
movement, offers practical lessons for sustainable housing. The key challenge
for governance is translating this particular framing of sustainability from an
originating, green building socio-technical context that is very different from
the target, mainstream house-building socio-technical context. Reinterpreting
problems and adapting deep green lessons to mainstream requirements proves
extremely challenging. As one interviewee put it:
Most green houses are one-offs, they’re bespoke buildings and they
happen because an individual wants a building like that, and
there’s someone there who can do it; but if we tried to replicate
that into the hundreds, let alone the thousands and tens of thou-
sands of buildings that are needed! It’s not possible to do a typical
green building and replicate it thousands of times over. The issue
… is how do we get the volume building sector to take on green
building principles, but they are still buildable and fit the volume
housing market. (interview)
Given this situation, governance for sustainable technologies must support
translations between niche and mainstream. This support and translation can
take a number of forms, but here the focus is on two possibilities in particular:
(1) Adapting lessons and practices; (2) Altering socio-technical contexts. Each
of these is elaborated on below.
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Translation 1: adapting lessons
The first translation involves the more conventional idea of technology transfer,
in the sense that a specific socio-technical practice is taken out of its originating
context and inserted into a different context. This is what we see when policy-
makers hold up eco-houses as exemplars for a policy goal, like climate change
or water conservation. They wish to see certain socio-technical practices in the
eco-house replicated more widely, such as greater use of active solar heating, or
more grey water recycling.
In order to be successful, there must be sufficient flexibility for these prac-
tices to be considered to ‘work’ and add value under more mainstream contexts.
Do these practices make sense to mainstream developers? Are they profitable?
Can it be installed easily, given the skills and routines of contractors? Are these
innovations the kinds of things that count in developer considerations and
requirements? How easily can institutions and infrastructures be reformed to
facilitate transfer? How disruptive of supply chains are these new socio-techni-
cal practices, and can they open up new business opportunities for suppliers?
These are some of the considerations that will determine whether a socio-tech-
nical practice arising in a green niche is considered also to work in volume
house-building situations.
Governance processes that negotiate changes to building regulations might
be considered to follow this mode of translation. In regulations, builders are
required to meet certain environmental standards.9 Additional to government
regulations – whose implementation is reliant upon actors beyond the state –
are voluntary codes for improving environmental performance created and
adopted by firms, professional associations and other bodies (e.g. accreditors of
environmental management systems). It is in this sense that regulations and
codes can be considered as governance. However, this kind of translation and
associated mode of governance is not particularly demanding because it does
not demand deep deliberation on the problem of sustainable housing. Standards
and codes are negotiated on the basis of what is judged to be a reasonable
demand, given mainstream socio-technical contexts (Raman and Shove, 2000).
In other words, regulation looks at translating green practices that do not pose
too much disruption (relatively speaking) for mainstream socio-technical
contexts. Governance processes that include the building of new coalitions
behind alternative problem framings are largely absent. Governance is relatively
thin here because it does not seek to transform the criteria against which niche
socio-technical practices are deemed to ‘work’ in mainstream contexts.
So, under this first mode of translation, governance is likely to help only
those practices that fit easily into the mainstream context for house-building, or
that can be added on without too much cost or difficulty. If highly insulative
glazing can be found at the right price it will be installed. If PV is required it
will be bolted on – even in advance of more sensible energy conservation meas-
ures (Liddell and Grant, 2003). However, sometimes even relatively
straightforward practices, like greater wall insulation, can pose a challenge if
standards become too tight. Cavity spaces may become too great for traditional
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brick-and-block build methods. Alternative, prefabricated wall materials may
perform better but require new supply chains, skills and installation techniques
on-site. Obviously such considerations become even more acute for more
unusual green build techniques, like rammed earth or strawbale.
The governance lesson here is that it is important to understand the differ-
ences in socio-technical context in order to better identify which greener
practices have sufficient flexibility to be considered to ‘work’ under both
contexts. However, the kinds of practice that are sufficiently flexible to work
under such divergent contexts may not be particularly green – they cannot
embody the green context that produced them (i.e. underpinning values and
performance criteria) too strongly, since this would limit their transferability.
Transferability requires them to be able to ‘slot into’ the mainstream practices,
or be susceptible to being added on, without too much disturbance. As such,
add-on technologies like PV might be more attractive than fundamental reori-
entations like autonomy. Unfortunately, under this kind of translation you may
get diffusion but little innovative buy-in. House-builders and households will
continue to be regulation following rather than voluntarily over-complying in
search of sustainable development.
Translation 2: altering contexts
The second kind of translation open to governance recognizes the difference in
context more profoundly, and seeks to understand the values, principles and
activities that create green housing. Governance processes might then try to
inculcate in the mainstream some of the values, principles and framings held in
the green niches. That is, try to bring the mainstream socio-technical context
closer to that behind the green building movement. This is a more challenging
goal because it would imply some kind of buy-in from mainstream actors,
including customers, who might then become more inclined to innovate. Green
elements would become a standard part of housing practice and a motivation
for future experimentation and innovation in housing. This could be encour-
aged through governance processes that support intermediary developments
that bring green builders and mainstream developers together. In short, gover-
nance must bring the mainstream volume house-building world into sustained
contact with the green building niche.
In some respects, BedZED is an example of an intermediary development
that is doing this, since it involved mainstream firms in building services (Arup),
structural engineering (Ellis and Moore), and construction management
(Gardiner and Theobald). Mainstream frameworks can pose challenges when
contractors are brought into greener housing projects, since novelty in the latter
can undermine competences rooted in the former. At BedZED, mainstream
contractors had to get to grips with the demands of the sustainable designs,
learnt from the experience, and in this way expanded their capacity for engag-
ing in projects for sustainable development.10 For example, the project had to
convene special workshops for contractors in order to explain the special air-
tightness requirements for the project, and feedback lessons from the
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construction of early units into that for subsequent units. This adds time and
effort to construction (Ramshaw, 2004, p13). Training has to provide an accom-
modation between any specialist demands in green building techniques and the
skill base of the workforce available.
Similarly, the Hockerton Housing Project exposed a regional housing devel-
oper, Gusto Homes, to green building ideas and practice to such an extent that
it inspired a reorientation of the business. Some of the practices at Hockerton
now feature in the more conventional homes built by Gusto. Gusto build to
standards greener than regulations require, and incorporate features such as
rainwater collection, solar water heating and mechanical heat recovery ventila-
tion. These have added a premium of around 10 per cent to the homes at their
award-winning Millennium Green development. 
Stamford Brooke is another project that approximates to the idea of an
intermediary development. It is a project led by the National Trust (a landown-
ing conservation charity) for 650 houses on land it owns in Cheshire. The
Trust’s core concern for building conservation and traditional construction
vernaculars mean it has an affinity with the green building movement and an
interest in sustainability (interview evidence). At Stamford Brooke the Trust
was required to use mainstream developers, but remained keen to push for green
standards of construction. To this end they encouraged and cajoled the devel-
opers into building to regulatory standards expected in ten years time. The
process was helped by a technical committee including green building practi-
tioners. This committee has kept pressing the developers and pointing to
examples, techniques and suppliers that could meet these green requirements.
In this way, developers were made aware of elements of the green building
movement that could prove useful in the future, and might even be incorpo-
rated in other developments today (e.g. high-insulation windows, low-flush
toilets).
In effect, these examples are like stepping-stones between niche and main-
stream. They provide spaces where the practicability for volume house-builders
to operate more like green builders can be explored. Viewed in this light, we
can re-conceive initiatives like BedZED as instances of developments, the values,
processes and circumstances of which actually bring contrasting socio-technical
contexts together. Green builders and mainstream developers become aware of
the principles, framings, criteria and constraints that the other operates under.
Governance processes might be innovated to try and support these intermedi-
ary developments.
In practice, the split between the above two kinds of translation is less stark
than it appears. In trying to transfer a green socio-technical practice into the
mainstream, some kind of socio-technical changes will be required. The differ-
ence is in the degree of involvement in translation by actors from each context,
and the degree of change being deliberated: is it about transferring practices or
deliberating upon fundamental re-framings? One advantage of creating learn-
ing situations like BedZED and Stamford Brooke is that volume house-builders
can come into contact with green building ideas on a more practical basis and
learn through doing. As a result, there might be scope for a deeper internaliza-
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tion of elements of the green building vernacular, such that more conventional
translation (e.g. through building regulations) appears less daunting and
proceeds more effectively. Such insights have relevance beyond eco-housing –
wherever the goal is to explore how green niches can help mainstream practices
be reoriented more sustainably. The insight provided by the analysis here is to
look for creative clashes between socio-technical contexts in specific develop-
ments. 
How might governance processes do this in a practical sense? Here are some
tentative suggestions requiring further research:
• More imaginative facilitation and process criteria either in publicly funded
programmes, or through regulatory frameworks, could provide a lead. The
history of the green building movement suggests there will always exist
activists who seek out opportunities to build as sustainably as possible.
More bureaucratic public authorities and technical committees are unlikely
to be able to practice this kind of nimble, green entrepreneurship. Nor can
they appreciate and internalize all the values constituting green building.
Governance could certainly give such values room to breathe.
• Risky new projects could be underwritten with public funds, or public land
made available to innovative green community initiatives (access to land
being a key constraint for many grass roots groups). 
• Public authorities could help by being sympathetic to designs and techniques
that sit awkwardly with existing building controls and planning regula-
tions. Perhaps even relaxing controls temporarily, without implying general
precedents, and under careful monitoring. 
• Space for failure as well as success has to be provided.
However, this kind of intervention will only help nurture green building initia-
tives; it will not translate lessons for the mainstream. It is the intermediary
developments that do this, and here innovations in governance are required. We
have already discussed the potential for intermediary developments to bring
actors from the two contexts together. Alternatively, training policy could
support ‘green sabbaticals’ that would cover salary costs for likely change-
agents from mainstream firms to spend a period of time working alongside
activists in green niches, and then disseminating the lessons drawn from the
experience. Such experiences ought to aim to build mutual understanding, and
respect for the goals of radical sustainable development.
A final kind of governance reform that could encourage greater engagement
from the mainstream would be to reform the way public policy is developed.
This has been suggested by the Sustainable Consumption Roundtable (SCR) in
the context of making food retailing more sustainable, but might be usefully
applied to niche-mainstream situations too. The Roundtable noted how main-
stream firms have little incentive to devote finite capital in green projects when
more conventional business investments yield higher returns:
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For early movers on sustainability the opportunity cost of ignor-
ing this fundamental business principle can be highly damaging…
What is needed is an approach that gives encouragement to the
early movers to demonstrate what is possible on a menu of issues,
with a clear commitment to enact well-designed policy measures if
the rest of the sector does not follow. (SCR, 2005, 1 and 4)
The 60-year history of an organic niche in the food context (Smith, 2006), and
the 30-year history of the eco-housing niche discussed here, both suggest that
pioneering movers on sustainability have existed for a long time. What the SCR
suggests is the need to encourage involvement in niche experimentation by early
movers from the mainstream. That can be done if government commits to
reforming regulations in step with the sustainability activities of leading players.
This will boost first-mover advantages. In other words, it will create an incen-
tive for mainstream involvement in niches because it has the supportive
attention of policy makers and assurances that this provides an advantage in
the governance of the sector.
Conclusion – Translating between 
niche and mainstream
This chapter has noted how innovative green housing developments can some-
times attract widespread approval without widespread emulation. Policy
makers hold them up as examples in good practice that embody their policy
goals, whether for low carbon emissions, or efficient water usage, or resource
productivity, etc. This chapter has argued that such exemplars are often prod-
ucts of a niche socio-technical context quite different from the mainstream
housing context, in which it is hoped some reproduction of good practice will
take place. The point was illustrated by elaborating the development of ideas in
the green building movement in the UK over the last 30 years. The green niche
was then contrasted with the volume house-building context. Ideas for translat-
ing lessons and practices between these two contexts were presented.
Considered in this translation light, existing policies, such as building regula-
tions, can be understood differently. They seek to transfer socio-technical
practices that have sufficient flexibility to translate easily between contexts. An
additional, and more ambitious, governance strategy would seek to try and
transform the mainstream socio-technical context itself. It would try and steer
that change closer to the values and guiding principles that exists currently in
green niches.
Of course, whilst it is essential to understand opportunities for translating
sustainability lessons between different socio-technical contexts, and to remem-
ber the values that inspired and underpinned the creation of niche green
initiatives, it is also wise to recognize constraints for learning. What works on a
small, niche scale may not do so on a mass scale. Nor can one naively ignore
those business, government and social actors that have a powerful material
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interest in mainstream socio-technical regimes. Implicit in SNM is a rational
model of governance, in which niche lessons will be taken up and acted upon
consensually. A more argumentative model would see those lessons being vari-
ously taken up, rejected or ignored by different actors, and debated and
reshaped to suit their material and economic interests. We see some evidence
for this in the slow and limited reforms to building regulations. In practice,
green niches are likely to be only a source of debatable ideas for mainstream
sustainable development, not a model for mainstream transformations. This
chapter has explored how anyone interested in niche-based approaches to the
governance of sustainable technologies might engage in those debates. How
those debates play out in practice will constitute what sustainable development
actually means for mainstream housing.
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Notes
i Including the shortlist of the prestigious Stirling Prize of the Royal Institute of
British Architects.
2 Winner of the 2001 Solar Prize for solar construction by the European Solar
Association.
3 Whilst the proactive creation of green niches is new in sustainable technology
theory, it derives from a perspective on technology development deriving from
evolutionary economics.
4 Statistics from Office of Deputy Prime Minister website (www.odpm.gov.uk;
accessed 27/04/2005).
5 Over the next ten years the Thames Gateway project plans to construct 120,000
new homes; and the growth zone around Milton Keynes and the South Midlands
anticipates over 133,000 new homes.
6 Presentation to the International Earthship Summit, University of Brighton, 29–31
October, 2004.
7 In what follows, the mainstream socio-technical regime has been characterized
using secondary sources (e.g. Hooper and Nicol, 1999; Leopold and Bishop, 1983;
Barlow, 2000; Housing Forum, 2002; Colquhoun, 1999).
8 See: www.cabe.org.uk/news/press/showPRelease.asp?id=669 (accessed 28 October
2004).
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9 In practice, they earn points for different kinds of improved building performance,
which means they have a degree of flexibility over how they incorporate environ-
mental considerations into their building, and they must attain an overall score for
the house to be deemed adequate.
10 Arup, for example, are now working with the Shanghai Industrial Investment
Corporation to develop a sustainable city on the island of Dongtan in the mouth
of the Yangtze River. Of course, businesses can be involved simultaneously in rela-
tively sustainable and unsustainable projects. The point made here is that
involvement in greener projects stretches their capabilities, making them able to
meet client, regulatory and public demands for more sustainable practices when
and where they arise.
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Chapter 6
Micro-Generation: A Disruptive
Innovation for the UK Energy System?
Raphael Sauter and Jim Watson
Introduction
The connection of large numbers of distributed generators to the electricity
system is essential to meet the UK government’s targets for renewable energy
(10 per cent of electricity supplied by 2010) and combined heat and power
(10GW of CHP installed by 2010). In its recent micro-generation consultation
(Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 2005) the UK government confirmed
the Energy White Paper’s (DTI, 2003) aspiration for larger contributions from
renewable energy sources beyond 2010 in response to climate change and
energy security concerns. In many other countries too, there is a trend towards
smaller scale sources of generation (e.g. International Energy Agency (IEA),
2002; Pehnt et al, 2006). A variety of drivers has been identified for the
expected growth in micro-generation technologies, including environmental
concerns (particularly the need to reduce carbon emissions), worries about the
insecurity of energy supplies, the development of new energy service companies
and programmes to tackle fuel poverty.1
One of the most radical implications of the expected growth in distributed
generation is the possibility of micro-generation of electricity in individual
homes. This could be by means of micro CHP units instead of central heating
boilers, or by small-scale renewable technologies such as photovoltaic (PV)
panels or micro-wind turbines. In the UK, micro CHP units with capacities of
less than 5kWe (kilowatt electricity) could achieve an installed capacity of
300–500MWe (megawatt electricity) by 2010 as compared to zero in 2002
(Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 2004). The
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potential micro CHP market for the UK is considerable, with around 17 million
gas-fired central heating systems and 1.3 million gas boilers sold every year
(Crozier-Cole and Gareth, 2002).
If they are installed in sufficient numbers, domestic micro-generation tech-
nologies could be highly disruptive for current energy systems (Fleetwood,
2001; Adner, 2002). By blurring the boundary between energy supply and
demand these technologies could change consumer-provider relationships, and
enable consumers to play a more active role in energy service provision
(Chappells et al, 2000; Collins, 2004). They could raise awareness of energy
consumption and therefore result in different consumption patterns or lower
the amount of electricity consumed (Dobbyn and Thomas, 2005). They also
present a new set of challenges for the electricity system. Micro-generation tech-
nologies might foster fundamental changes in system architecture, operation
and control (The Economist, 2000).
The main aim of this chapter is to analyse the potential disruptiveness of
micro-generation for the system of electricity provision. As some of the more
rhetorical literature about micro-generation suggests, the extent of disruptive-
ness depends on what perspective is taken. It leads to the question of what or
who might be disrupted? The chapter examines this question in the light of the
large technical systems (LTS) framework that was developed by Thomas
Hughes. This framework provides a basis for considering the electricity system
as a whole, including its technologies, institutions, regulations and actors. It
consequently broadens the firm-based analysis of disruptiveness that is most
prevalent in the literature. The paper argues against a general framing of micro-
generation as being ‘radical’ or ‘disruptive’. Such a framing might create
unnecessary resistance in the existing energy system. Instead it tries to identify
particular system components and actors that may indeed be radically affected
by micro-generation, and to outline governance implications.
The chapter comprises three main parts. The first outlines the main features
of LTS and examines the extent of inertia within these systems. Drawing on the
historical LTS perspective, the second part outlines the range of possible impacts
of change – from incremental to radical impacts – from an ex ante perspective.
It builds on an approach that considers the impact on innovating firms, and
extends this to include broader impacts on socio-technological systems. It also
places particular emphasis on the consumer’s role in these systems. The third
part of the paper applies this broader framework to the case of micro-genera-
tion with reference to the UK energy market. It considers a number of different
models for micro-generation deployment and conducts an initial analysis of
disruptiveness with respect to a wide range of possible impacts. This analysis
shows that different models of deployment will have different patterns of
disruptiveness. The chapter will conclude with implications for governance
strategies for the market uptake of micro-generation technologies.
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The electricity system as a large 
technical system
The study of LTS has become increasingly important during the past two
decades (e.g. Hughes, 1983; Mayntz and Hughes, 1988; Davies, 1996). These
systems – which include air traffic control, electricity supply industries and rail
networks – tend to consist of a complex network of new and old technologies,
bespoke equipment and organizational relationships. Large technical systems
are singled out as a distinct category since they have unique characteristics.
According to Thomas Hughes, a pioneer in this area, they have three distinct
features (Geyer and Davies, 2000):
• A set of components that can be both technical (e.g. power stations, trans-
missions lines) and non-technical (distribution companies, environmental
laws).
• A set of horizontal and vertical interconnections between the components.
This means that changes in one component often lead to changes in others.
• A control component that sets out the way in which the economic and wider
social performance of the system is regulated. Control is exercised by
management and economic systems (e.g. wholesale power markets), techni-
cal systems (e.g. control technologies) and regulatory systems (e.g. through
regulators).
Hughes’ work on the LTS concept was focused on the invention and develop-
ment of an LTS, its transfer to other societies and system growth. The latter
was subsequently further investigated (Mayntz and Hughes, 1988). LTS
research then focused on the question how to change an existing LTS
(Summerton, 1994a) and on the governance of an LTS in the context of a chang-
ing environment characterized by the questioning of the economic performance
of hierarchical systems, a distrust of centralized governmental action and the
decreasing acceptance of LTS by the public (Coutard, 1999).
System inertia and barriers to change
The defining features of a typical LTS identified by Hughes have far reaching
consequences for the operation and development of the system. These conse-
quences are particularly important for those proposing to make radical changes
to current technical systems – in our case, those seeking to radically shift the
UK energy system to incorporate micro-generation. As Thomas Hughes points
out, achieving such a radical shift is not merely a technical challenge. It also
faces considerable opposition since it challenges the institutional and organiza-
tional arrangements of the current system.
Large scale technology, such as electric light and power systems,
incorporate not only technical and physical things such as genera-
tors, transformers and high-voltage transmission lines, but also
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utility companies, electrical manufacturers and reinforcing institu-
tions such as regulatory agencies and laws… Large technological
systems represent powerful vested interests… Numerous persons
develop specialised skills and acquire specialised knowledge appro-
priate for the system of which they are part… [They] construct a
bulwark of organisational structures, ideological commitments,
and political power to protect themselves and the systems.
(Hughes, 1983, p2)
It is therefore necessary to further investigate these barriers to change, in order
to understand what radical change means to an existing LTS. Based on Hughes’
study, the following main barriers for change of an existing LTS can be distin-
guished: technology, institutions (including regulations) and actors or social
groups, which are all interconnected. At the technological level, the electricity
system has been characterized by central power plants that are horizontally
integrated via dispatch systems. It has also been vertically integrated on the
supply and demand side. The provision structure is vertically organized around
central power plants through infrastructures such as gas pipelines and the elec-
tricity network. Electricity is transported through the transmission and
distribution network to the consumption points, largely in a one-way direction
from the central power plant to the consumer.
At the institutional level, hierarchical and centralized organization around
an LTS, such as state bureaucracies and industries, have led to new forms of
organization; institutions reflect these new systems and are even organized
around them (Mayntz, 1993) with the underlying objective to protect LTS as
their raison d’être. In this context Winner (1999) points out that technologies
have been used to settle political issues in a particular community or are adapted
to a certain political context. Winner therefore doubts if the creation of new
administrative hierarchies is a necessary consequence of particular technologi-
cal systems. Rather, the type of hierarchy is a political choice. As this paper will
illustrate, a number of different organizational structures could be used to
support the deployment of micro-generation.
Both companies and political administrations may be opposed to radical
changes due to internal organizational inertia or ‘cultural lock-in’ of big organ-
izations (Foster and Kaplan, 2001). Incumbent industries may oppose disruptive
changes to the current systems since their products, knowledge and marketing
have been developed for the existing market and LTS (Tushman and Anderson,
1986). The institutional embedding process of technology can be understood as
the alignment of supporting institutions to the system and a resulting, mutual
reinforcing interdependence. This techno-institutional lock-in of the existing
energy system has also been described as ‘Techno-Institutional Complex’ (TIC)
(Unruh, 2000).
Actors’ behaviour is not only limited or enabled by technology and institu-
tions, but also by societal values (e.g. Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995). The symbolic
value of LTS has played an important role in the construction process of
national electricity systems: it has been argued that large hydropower stations
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have contributed to building Swedish nationalism (van der Vleuten, 2004),
while in France, nuclear technology has been closely linked to the idea of the
‘grande nation’ and French national identity (Hecht, 1998).
The embedded character of socio-technical systems has led to an ‘entrench-
ment’ of big technological systems that makes it difficult to keep them under
social control (Collingridge, 1992) and to introduce deliberate change.
Similarly, Walker (2000) identified ‘entrapment’ as a systemic facet of LTS.
Thus, changes in these systems are rather incremental to optimize the existing
system and are often described as path-dependent. In recent years the advent of
liberalization and re-regulation has started to challenge this structure, though
many of the technical aspects of vertical integration and centralization remain.
LTS are inherently averse to radical change. The following section will explore
how changes in these systems could occur in spite of these barriers.
Changes in an existing LTS
To explain changes in an existing LTS, Hughes developed the concept of ‘reverse
salients’ that can occur only if the system follows specific goals such as
economic efficiency. If components (technical or non-technical) of the system
do not comply with the system’s goals, they constitute reverse salients. In an
efficiency-seeking system these are inefficiencies caused by internal or external
factors. Under this logic, component changes occur to remedy these systemic
imperfections and consequently maintain and stabilize the existing LTS in the
longer term. These changes or corrections are incremental. However, they can
also constitute the ‘nucleus of a new system’ (Hughes, 1983, p81). If the
corrected component does not fit with other system components, they will have
to adapt, which may lead to a new system.
Climate change policy adds an additional system goal: the reduction of CO2
emissions in energy generation and consumption. Climate change could there-
fore create reverse salients within the existing LTS, where innovations correct
the electricity system into a more low-carbon direction (Winskel, 2002).
Domestic micro-generation can be seen as such an innovation. The question is,
however, what the consequences for the other system components will be. Does
micro-generation fit into the existing system as a new component, or is it rather
the ‘nucleus of a new system’ and therefore a radical change to the existing elec-
tricity system?
With respect to system change Summerton (1994b) stresses the ‘undoing of
closure’, that is, the opening of entrenched structures as a prerequisite for
system ‘reconfiguration’ – a term that already indicates its incremental
approach. She distinguishes between three possible reconfigurations: first, a
territorial expansion and interconnection of similar systems across political
borders; second, the crossing of functional system boundaries, for example
between the energy system and communication system, which results in a
‘second order system’ (Braun and Joerges, 1994; van der Vleuten, 2004); and
finally, reorganization as a consequence of liberalization and the end of former
monopolies. While these reconfigurations are incremental in nature, since they
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are supposed to improve the existing system, ‘abrupt innovation’ can result
from a series of incremental changes over time (Summerton, 1994b).
If these reconfiguration concepts are applied to the case of micro-genera-
tion, micro-generation technologies are unlikely to expand the electricity system
beyond the current territorial or political borders (at least in industrialized
countries). Instead, these technologies will decentralize and localize the electric-
ity infrastructure. They could also help foster the creation of a second order
system that is based on the electricity system and the communication technol-
ogy system. Different operational configurations of micro-generation that are
incorporated in the models set out later in this chapter could increase the use of
communication/control technologies to manage the energy system, and there-
fore replace existing control mechanisms.
Furthermore, the reorganization of the electricity system underway in terms
of privatization and re-regulation contributes to the undoing of closure at the
level of institutions and actors. Both on the supply and demand side, micro-
generation could broaden the number of actors and therefore change the
institutional arrangement. On the supply side, as Walt Patterson has pointed
out, micro-generation will increase the role of system participants who have
hitherto existed on the fringes of the energy system. These include ‘architects,
civil engineers, building service engineers … not to mention electrical and gas
engineers and information technology specialists’ (Patterson, 1999, p161). On
the demand side, liberalization and the introduction of competition made it
possible for consumers to become active consumers or even ‘co-providers’ (van
Vliet, 2004).
From this perspective micro-generation is both the result and source of
changes in the existing electricity LTS. The central question of this chapter is
whether the changes induced in the system by micro-generation will go beyond
incremental changes: will micro-generation be disruptive to the electricity
system, as has been claimed by a number of different studies (e.g. Patterson,
1999; Dunn, 2000; Fleetwood, 2001; Adner, 2002)? The framing of new tech-
nologies such as domestic micro-generation as radical or disruptive is a central
point in the analysis of its potential market uptake. Stakeholder perceptions of
whether a technological innovation is incremental or radical – whether it actu-
ally is or not – could influence its market adoption or rejection (Hall and Kerr,
2003).
Unlike incremental innovations, radical innovations are at variance with
the existing system; they disrupt and destroy (Abernathy and Clark, 1985).
Christensen used the term ‘disruptive innovations’ (Christensen, 1997), defined
as creating ‘an entirely new market through the introduction of a new kind of
product or service’ (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000). Studies dealing with
disruptive innovations are mainly concerned with the question of how these
innovations enter the mainstream market and the implications for companies’
strategies (e.g. Utterback and Acee, 2003). Other studies try to clarify the defi-
nition of ‘incremental’ and ‘radical’ innovations. However, they are focused on
product research (Garcia and Calantone, 2002) or on the technical aspect of
inventions (Dahlin and Behrens, 2005).
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In the following section we develop a framework to assess the impact of
new technologies on an existing LTS in terms of their disruptive or incremental
nature by drawing upon the LTS and innovation literature.
Towards an understanding of radical 
system change
To understand the disruptiveness of micro-generation for the electricity system,
this chapter builds on Abernathy and Clark’s (1985) matrix on the impact of
new innovations on firms, as previously suggested by Hofman (2003). This
matrix is helpful for the analysis since it assesses the impact of a technological
innovation on different main features of the electricity system. In its original
version, it considers two sets of factors – those that influence the technological
capabilities of the firm and those that influence the firm’s relationship with its
customers. For each factor, general descriptions of incremental and radical
impacts of new innovations are provided.
Abernathy and Clark acknowledge the limitations of this approach. They
state that ‘technological innovation may influence a variety of economic actors
in a variety of ways, and it is this variety that gives rise to differing views of the
significance of changes in technology’ (Abernathy and Clark, 1985, p4). For
this reason, their original focus on the innovating firm is not sufficient for the
consideration of more systemic impacts of micro-generation. This criticism has
also been acknowledged by many other recent studies taking a more systemic
perspective (e.g. Hall and Kerr, 2003; Geels et al, 2004).
In their analysis of the innovation dynamics of fuel cell technology, Hall
and Kerr (2003) point out that this narrow perspective is ‘myopic’. Analysing
the impact of fuel cell technology on the automobile, they suggest that all stake-
holders or actors affected by a technological innovation should be included in
the analysis of whether it is incremental or radical.
Consequently new more systemic categories are introduced along the above-
identified main features of the electricity LTS into Abernathy and Clark’s
matrix. Instead of the focus on technological capabilities and customer relation-
ships, the adapted matrix includes three domains of innovation: technical,
non-technical and control components. Technical components are the design
and embodiment of electricity generation technology, electricity network design
and metering issues. Non-technical components include the ownership of the
network and generation units, the structure of system participants, supply chain
or installers’ network, consumer-supplier relationship and skills (including
labour, managerial and technical). Finally, the control components are analysed
in terms of the regulatory setting (e.g. distribution charges), load management
(through the settlement system), the wholesale market and the financial frame-
work.
Following Abernathy and Clark, general descriptions of incremental and
radical impacts of new innovations are provided in Table 6.1. The table includes
a new third column which identifies actors that are most affected by each inno-
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Table 6.1 Some impacts of micro-generation innovation on the 
existing electricity LTS
Domain of Range of impact of innovation Actors affected
innovation Incremental Radical
Technical components
Design/embodiment Improves/perfects Leads to the Manufacturers, 
of electricity established design application of new installers, 
generation technology design (e.g. PV, Stirling consumers, builders
engine etc)
Electricity network Strengthens existing Demands new system DNO, suppliers, 
design network structure components (e.g. regulator, telecom. 
decentralized networks)Industry
Metering Builds upon existing Replaces existing Suppliers, DNO, 
meters metering infrastructure regulator
Non-technical components
Network ownership Keeps existing Radically changes the Network operators, 
ownership structure ownership structure suppliers
(e.g. microgrids)
Generation ownership Keeps existing Radically changes the Generators, suppliers, 
ownership structure ownership structure consumers
(e.g. to consumers)
Structure of system Strengthens existing Leads to new market All
participants structure between entry (independent 
incumbent players micro-generators)
Supply chain/installers’ Uses existing Destroys existing Product supplier, 
network structures channels installers
Consumer-supplier Strengthens existing Radically changes Consumers, suppliers, 
relationship relationship traditional relationship regulator
(e.g. consumers 
generate own power)
Skills (labour, Extends viability of Destroys value of Manufacturers, 
managerial/technical) existing skills (e.g. existing expertise installers, architects
links between electrical (e.g. installation 
and heating engineers) of hydrogen fuel 
cell systems)
Control components
Regulatory setting Strengthens existing Disrupts and creates Regulation authority, all 
regulation structures new regulation market participants
structures (e.g. for 
energy services)
Load management Builds on established Introduces new Network operators, 
procedures dispatch/settlement suppliers
procedures
Wholesale market Strengthens existing Creates new markets Network operators, 
market structures (e.g. decentralized suppliers
markets)
Financing Builds upon existing New market of Suppliers, consumers, 
financial arrangements financial services (e.g. banks
to finance energy 
services)
Source: Our elaboration, based on Abernathy and Clark (1985)
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vative impact. The lists of actors identified in the table are not exhaustive, but
include those that are likely to be involved and/or affected most by the diffu-
sion of micro-generation technologies.
As previously noted, micro-generation could be disruptive to a wide variety
of actors: firms that produce power generation, transmission and distribution
equipment, electricity network operators (e.g. Distribution Network Operators
(DNOs)), regulatory institutions, energy suppliers, consumers and so on. The
number and type of actors affected depends, however, on the national context
and its market concentration and organization. The innovation matrix for
micro-generation developed in this chapter is designed to be applicable to differ-
ent contexts in order to allow comparative studies in the future. However, the
empirical results in this paper refer to the UK context.
The explicit inclusion of actors in the broadened matrix underlines the fact
that perception influences judgements about whether micro-generation is
considered to be radical or disruptive. If it is perceived as radical innovation
that destroys existing markets, it is likely to face resistance from some system
participants. This perception will, however, depend on how micro-generation
units are owned, installed and operated. The distinction between the different
domains of innovative impact helps to identify those parts of the system that
will be particularly disrupted – and higher resistance might therefore be
expected. These individual impacts contribute to an overall picture of the
‘systemic’ disruptiveness of micro-generation.
Models of micro-generation deployment
To examine the extent to which micro-generation technologies could be disrup-
tive in the light of the adapted matrix, it is important to take into account some
different possibilities for their deployment and use (Watson, 2004). In particu-
lar, these different possibilities imply a variety of roles for consumers and energy
suppliers, but also finance actors, DNOs and others. They also have different
implications for existing institutions, and for other parts of the electricity
system, including its technical infrastructure (Sauter et al, 2005).
Three alternative models for deployment have been developed for this task
that suggest a wide range of consumer and energy supplier roles. The main aim
was to develop these models with a different degree of consumers’ financial and
behavioural involvement. They represent three rather ‘extreme’ models in terms
of the consumer-supplier relationship, and the role each side might play.
Consumer behaviour ranges from a passive role to a ‘co-provision’ role (van Vliet,
2004). The former role does not imply substantial changes in behaviour as a result
of having micro-generation installed in the home. The latter sees consumers as
becoming more active participants in the electricity system as self-providers of
energy services. The dynamic nature of the three models is reflected in Figure 6.1.
It shows on the horizontal axis the company’s role (between the current role as
main energy supplier to a more passive back-up role) and on the vertical axis the
consumer’s role (ranging between passive consumer and co-producer).
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The ‘Plug & Play’ model is inspired by the idea that micro-generation might
allow consumers to become partly independent of conventional energy suppli-
ers. Consequently the consumer takes the initiative to purchase, install and
operate the unit. The micro-generation unit is owned and financed by the home-
owner. Within this model, consumers might change their consumption pattern
due to a higher awareness of energy issues gained during the purchasing and
installation process. They might also do so for economic reasons in response to
the reward they are offered for any exported electricity: they might choose to
maximize their revenue through exporting as much electricity as possible into
the grid under a scheme of attractive export rewards, or they could choose to
maximize their on-site consumption, particularly if export rewards are low (i.e.
they reduce their electricity bill through lower consumption of imported elec-
tricity). Technically, this leads to the requirement of an import-export or
additional generation meter – possibly read remotely. This could also include
half-hourly data collection linked to time-of-day pricing if the micro-generator
was able to sell electricity at the real-time market price. This would have a
potential impact on the control components of the system.
The ‘Company Control’ model is based on the notion that companies might
use fleets of micro-generators as a substitute for central power generation – that
is, as a virtual power plant.2 This model involves a more passive consumer who
only provides the ‘site’ in its home for the micro-generation unit, which is
owned by an energy service company (ESCO) or traditional energy utility. As
opposed to Plug & Play, under this approach the company is the driving force
for the micro-generation installation – for example, promoting through market-
ing to its existing customer base. The micro-generation unit is operated
according to the company’s needs so as to help balance supply and demand,
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and to avoid buying electricity from the wholesale market.3 The needs of the
consumer – particularly for hot water and heating in the case of micro CHP –
must also be taken into account to some extent. Technically, this model requires
real-time remote control over the unit, involving a multifunction meter with
information about the operation mode (import, export) and a facility to send
control signals to the micro-generator to optimize the supply-demand balance.
In the third model, consumers and institutions at the regional or local level
in a particular geographical area decide to pool their resources to develop a
‘Community Microgrid’. The Community Microgrid model could be set up by
the local community and consumers to provide the energy services required, as
suggested elsewhere (Devine-Wright, 2004). The micro-generation units are
connected to the microgrid, which potentially implies a high level of consumer
involvement on two different levels. They have primary control over their unit,
but also will help to guarantee the supply-demand balance within the micro-
grid. Their incentive to do this stems partly from the fact that they may own
shares in the community energy company. Since micro-generated electricity fed
into the grid goes to the nearest load, this arrangement avoids the export and
settlement in the wider distribution grid, where it is only valued – if at all – at
the wholesale electricity price. As under Plug & Play, a high awareness on
energy issues or economic incentives may lead to changes in consumption
patterns. Technically it has similar implications as Company Control.
Table 6.2 summarizes the three deployment models, distinguishing between
their social, economic and technical characteristics. In the following section,
these different models will be tested against the developed matrix set out in
Table 6.1. For each model, it is assumed that a significant number of UK house-
holds have micro-generation units installed.4
Micro-generation models and disruptiveness in 
the UK context
The UK has a particularly long history of electricity and gas liberalization, and
its energy industries have a specific configuration of actors. These include a
strong regulatory body (Ofgem – the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets), an
electricity generation and supply market that is increasingly characterized by a
few large vertically integrated companies, organizational separation of trans-
mission and distribution companies, and a high rate of switching between
energy suppliers by consumers. Switching has now reached over 50 per cent,
and household customers can switch their energy supplier every 28 days. A
large share of electricity generation is contracted to the large suppliers and not
traded in the wholesale market. The transmission system is managed by
National Grid, whereas the distribution network is owned by 12 DNOs in
England and Wales, two in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland.
Although there is currently no major micro-generation policy framework in
place in the UK, some regulatory barriers have been removed. For example,
simplified connection and metering standards have been introduced. Ofgem
and the DTI have both issued consultations on their future approach to micro-
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Table 6.2 Models for the deployment of micro-generation
Plug & Play Company Control Community microgrid
A) SOCIAL
Agency Consumer Company Community energy 
Energy supplier company
Ownership Consumer Energy supplier Community energy 
Homeowner (potential ownership company (with private 
shift to customer at wire network) owned by 
the end of financing community / citizens
contract)
Consumer Consumer may adjust Passive consumer, but Consumer possibly 
involvement behaviour depending provides ‘site’ for adjusts behaviour & may 
on income structure micro-generation unit have financial stake in 
energy company
B) ECONOMIC
Up-front financing Cash Company: Company:
Bank loan balance sheet balance sheet
Finance packages Customer: Customer:
lease payments; lease payments;
premium energy price; premium energy price
contracting (mCHP)
Income for MG owner Avoided power import Avoids buying Retail price for 
Generation reward electricity at system micro-generated 
Export reward buy price electricity since direct 
Avoided grid losses supply via private wires
Implications for
Consumers Financial savings over No up-front costs and No up-front costs, 
medium/long-term energy service contract energy service contract 
and potentially 
influence on company 
strategy
Energy supplier Loss of sales Avoidance of buying Direct supply of 
Potential new market wholesale electricity micro-generated 
for home energy and lower grid losses electricity to customers 
services via private networks
DNO Loss in income from Loss in income from n.a.
use of system charges? use of system charges?
C) TECHNICAL
Operation On-site balance System balance as Shared operational 
mCHP according to domestic additional component interest
heat demand to on-site balance
PV, micro wind Weather dependent Weather dependent Weather dependent
Metering Import-Export meter – Remote multifunction Import-Export meter – 
Communication & possibly read meter possibly read remotely 
control remotely Facility for control Facility for control 
Possibly consumer signals to signals 
access to time-of-day micro-generator Consumer access to 
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generation (DTI, 2005). The DTI strategy – which is due to be published in
April 2006 – might include economic incentives for micro-generation deploy-
ment and measures to remove barriers in areas such as planning. Ofgem’s work
is much more technical and incremental, and it is unclear whether this will have
a significant impact on micro-generation deployment.
One area that is unlikely to be addressed by these policy and regulatory
initiatives is the current fiscal framework for energy investment in the UK.
Existing fiscal rules distinguish between investments on the energy supply side
and investments on the demand side – particularly in domestic households
(Chesshire, 2003). Whereas consumers have no access to tax or depreciation
allowances for investments in micro-generation, companies investing in central
generation are able to use enhanced capital allowances. They are also able to
pass on any sales tax (VAT) through to their customers, whereas household
consumers have to pay VAT for any micro-generation units they buy. Some
micro-generation technologies now attract a lower rate of VAT than the stan-
dard rate of 17.5 per cent.
With regard to the supply chain for micro-generation, the picture varies
from technology to technology. The UK boiler market is dominated by a supply
chain that goes from the manufacturer via merchants and/or retailers to the
installer. There are around 100,000 registered installers in the UK (Society of
British Gas Industries (SBGI), 2003), most of which have no experience with
micro CHP technology because deployment is at such an early stage. For solar
PV technology, there is now a relatively small network of specialist companies
and installers in the UK as a result of a modest government support programme.
Micro-wind is a largely untested technology, with very few trained installers,
though suppliers have concluded deals with at least two major utilities to supply
this technology.
Following on from this brief outline of the UK context, the matrix of
impacts of micro-generation outlined in Table 6.1 can be applied to the three
deployment models in Table 6.2. This results in three different patterns of
disruptiveness for micro-generation, as summarized in Figure 6.2. These
patterns have been generated by assigning quantitative indicators of disruptive-
ness to each innovative impact. These indicators are on a scale of zero to three.
A score of zero for a particular impact of micro-generation stands for no
change, a score of one indicates an incremental change, and a score of three
denotes a disruptive impact.
It is important to acknowledge that this quantitative scoring process is
inherently subjective, and the results from it should be treated with some care.
Judgements have been made about the breadth of each type of innovative
impact that micro-generation might cause. In addition, the scoring process has
tried to take into account impacts on the system as a whole, including those for
a variety of actors. In some cases, it has been difficult to reach an aggregate
score across these actors, which shows the need for further research that would
have to distinguish impacts for different actors. In view of these limitations, the
results presented here are tentative. They provide an indication of whether
micro-generation deployed under a specific model is likely to be disruptive for
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the electricity LTS. They also suggest which specific impacts are likely to be the
most disruptive.
Overall, the Plug & Play model of micro-generation is likely to be particu-
larly disruptive to the consumer-supplier relationship, while Community
Microgrid implies the most radical changes across the system as a whole. The
Company Control model is rather incremental and strengthens some features of
the current LTS – particularly the dominant position of the incumbent energy
companies.
In all of the models, the impact on ‘design/embodiment of electricity gener-
ation technology’ is similar, due to the shift from central power plant based
electricity generation to decentralized power plants. They are independent of
the financial or operating framework. Also, supply chain and skills will have to
change considerably under all approaches. However, the quality of these
changes will be rather different. While under Plug & Play the current manufac-
turer-merchant/retailer-installer will have to include a new product (which has
proven to be radical in the case of condensing boilers), under Company Control
the suppliers are likely to build up a new (or extend their existing) installers’
network. The need for new skills is similar for all models. All of the models
require considerable new technical skills (e.g. for installing micro CHP systems
instead of conventional boilers), new managerial skills (in particular for
Community Microgrid). To a greater or lesser degree, each model also suggests
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significant investments in transmission and distribution infrastructure to
support this new architecture. The settlement system will have to adapt for all
models – but to a greater extent under Community Microgrid.
While Plug & Play will be particularly disruptive at the non-technical level
in terms of changes in generation capacity ownership and customer-supplier
relationship, it will also imply major changes in the metering infrastructure.
Under a Company Control model, the most disruptive implications of
micro-generation occur at the technology and control level. Considerable
changes might be required to network design and organization, such as real-
time monitoring, multi-function meters and communication tools that allow
remote control of micro CHP units. This model is characterized by a continuing
dominance of electricity generation by incumbent electricity companies (albeit
through micro-generation rather than centralized generation). However, it is
possible that these companies will offer new energy services to consumers as a
quid pro quo for hosting micro-generation in their homes. In the context of the
relatively high switch rate of UK households, this may represent an option for
energy suppliers to strengthen their customer relationship over a longer period.
It is also possible that more conventional and incremental incentives will be
offered, such as simple change in tariff or export rewards linked to a supply
contract. In this model, the non-technical components such as consumer-
supplier relationship, ownership and structure of system participants will only
change incrementally because consumers continue to have a passive role.
Community Microgrid is the most disruptive model to the electricity system.
Micro-generation has radical implications in all three domains. For example,
micro-generation deployment requires significant changes to control compo-
nents due to the need for new regulatory and governance arrangements to
enable the development of integrated microgrids. Since the consumer’s role
changes both at the ‘micro’ level (within their own home) and at the ‘macro’
level (through the ownership of shares in the community energy company),
more intensive modes of communication are required. To cope with these new
challenges the consumers also need a considerably deeper knowledge of the
energy system and its functions.
Conclusions
This chapter has examined the potential disruptiveness of micro-generation for
the existing electricity system. Since the framing of a technological innovation
might create barriers within this system, it is of crucial importance to analyse to
what extent and under which circumstances domestic micro-generation might
be disruptive. This analysis has implications for the governance of an electricity
system with a substantial share of micro-generation technologies.
The chapter has built on the concept of LTS to broaden out the firm-based
analysis of disruptiveness that has often been used. It has developed an ex ante
framework for the analysis of the impact of technological innovation on the
existing large technical system for electricity. It has set out three models for
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micro-generation deployment and presented their specific patterns of disrup-
tiveness.
It suggests that micro-generation is not inherently disruptive for the elec-
tricity system. Micro-generation’s impact on the system depends heavily on the
model of deployment, the driving forces behind deployment and the consequent
arrangements for ownership, financing, operation and technological integra-
tion. For each of the models, some impacts are likely to be disruptive whilst
others will be more incremental. In order to distinguish the level at which each
impact will occur, different domains of innovation were identified. This
provided a clearer picture of what and who might be disrupted by a substantial
uptake of micro-generation in the UK.
The deployment models have highlighted different kinds of impact, and
differences in the extent to which these impacts might be incremental or radical.
Whilst the consumer driven Plug & Play model is more disruptive for the rela-
tionship between system participants (e.g. consumers and suppliers), the
company-driven Company Control model implies more radical changes at the
technology level since it requires more sophisticated load management solu-
tions. Community Microgrid is the most disruptive of the three models, with
potentially radical impacts across the electricity system.
This chapter provides some implications for the governance of an electricity
system that incorporates large numbers of micro-generators. Such a system has
additional goals: for example, for CO2 reduction and decentralized provision.
Under some of the deployment models discussed in this chapter, this system will
include a larger, more diverse range of actors. As discussed in the Introduction
to this book, the functional approach to governance is relevant to such scenar-
ios. Higher levels of complexity in socio-technical systems requires a shift to
governance that includes an increased role for non-governmental actors. The
State fulfils a coordinating (or regulatory) function. The DTI’s current work to
develop a micro-generation strategy is a good example of this coordinating
function in action.
This chapter has shown that such a shift is not inevitable even if micro-
generation becomes significant. An expansion of micro-generation driven by
incumbent energy companies will require no major change to the existing gover-
nance structure for the electricity system. Most of the changes required could
be technical in nature. However, Plug & Play and Community Microgrid will
involve a considerable number of new actors (e.g. regional market operators,
new types of energy company) and/or old actors in a new position in the system
(e.g. consumers acting as co-producers).
Under any of these models, the impacts of micro-generation could go
beyond the LTS for electricity provision. They may have knock-on effects on
other technical systems, such as those for housing design/construction and for
telecommunications. The governance of micro-generation will need to take
these effects into account.
Finally, a mass-market for micro-generation will only be possible with
further changes in existing regulations. These changes might include measures
to level the playing field between micro-generation and central generation,
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through changes in taxation regimes, for example, or changes in the wholesale
market structure. They could also include policies to encourage consumers to
invest, perhaps by offering grants or by regulations that encourage energy
suppliers to operate as energy service companies. Further research will be
required to test the robustness of these preliminary conclusions. This would test
further the extent to which micro-generation might be disruptive for the UK
electricity system by capturing the views of key electricity system actors. It could
also broaden the analysis beyond the UK to explore how this disruptiveness
might vary across different national contexts.
Notes
1 In the UK a household is defined as being in fuel poverty where it would need to
spend more than 10 per cent of its income on energy to maintain a satisfactorily
warm harm (Ofgem, 2005). Although fuel poor households in the UK fell from
5.5 million in 1996 to 2.25 million in 2002 due to improved incomes and falling
energy costs, fuel poverty might rise again with recent energy price increases.
2 For more information about an example of a ‘virtual power plant’ in this context,
see the EU-funded project ‘The Virtual Fuel Cell Power Plant’ at:
http://www.cogen.org/projects/vfcpp.htm.
3 The function to dispatch (start-stop) the micro-generator depends on the technol-
ogy: while micro CHP linked to sufficient hot water storage has a certain
operational flexibility within the domestic heat demand, PV and micro wind
depend on the weather conditions.
4 The meaning of ‘significant numbers’ is open to interpretation. For this paper, it
has been assumed that the mid-range scenario set out by the DTI System Impacts
of Additional Micro-generation (SIAM) study has been followed (Mott
MacDonald, 2004). This suggests that 8 million micro-generation units are
installed by 2020.
References
Abernathy, W. J. and Clark, K. B. (1985) ‘Innovation: Mapping the winds of creative
destruction’, Research Policy, vol 14, pp3–22
Adner, R. (2002) ‘When are technologies disruptive? A demand-based view of the
emergence of competition’, Strategic Management Journal, issue 23, pp667–688
Braun, I. and Joerges, B. (1994) ‘How to recombine large technical systems: The case of
European organ transplantation’, in Summerton, J. (ed) Changing Large Technical
Systems, Westview Press, Boulder, pp25–51
Chappells, H., Klintman, M., Linden, A. L., Shove, E., Spaargaren, G. and van Vliet, B.
(2000) ‘Domestic consumption, utility services and the environment’, Final Report
of the DOMUS Project, funded by the European Commission DG XII, February
Chesshire, J. (2003) ‘Energy efficiency projects and policies for step changes in the
energy system: Developing an agenda for social science research’, ESRC Seminar,
March, Policy Studies Institute, London.
Christensen, C. M. (1997) The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause
Great Firms to Fail, Harvard Business School Press, Boston
126 Technology and Sustainability: Contextualized Accounts
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 126
Christensen, C. M. and Overdorf, M. (2000) ‘Meeting the challenge of disruptive
change’, Harvard Business Review, March–April, pp66–76
Collingridge, D. (1992) The Management of Scale: Big Organizations, Big Decisions,
Big Mistakes, Routledge, London
Collins, J. (2004) A Micro-Generation Manifesto, Green Alliance, London
Coutard, O. (ed) (1999) The Governance of Large Technical Systems, Routledge,
London
Crozier-Cole, T. and Gareth, J. (2002) ‘The potential market for micro CHP in the UK’,
Report to the Energy Saving Trust
Dahlin, K. B. and Behrens, D. M. (2005) ‘When is an invention really radical? Defining
and measuring technological radicalness’, Research Policy, vol 34, pp717–737
Davies, P. A. (1996) ‘Innovation in large technical systems: The case of telecommunica-
tions’, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol 5, pp1143–1180
Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2004) The Government’s
Strategy for Combined Heat and Power to 2010, DEFRA, London
Devine-Wright, P. (2004) ‘Towards zero-carbon: Citizenship, responsibility and the
public acceptability of sustainable energy technologies’, in Buckle, C. (ed)
Proceedings of Conference C81 of the Solar Energy Society, UK section of the
International Solar Energy Society, 21 September, London, pp51–62
Dobbyn, J. and Thomas, G. (2005) ‘Seeing the light: The impact of micro-generation
on our use of energy’, Sustainable Consumption Roundtable, London, www.sd-
commission.org.uk/news/download_pdf.php?attach_id=281HF20-NHIXD0M-HGM
DMHZ-KSA3R0Z, 24/10/2005
Department of Trade and Industry (2003) Our Energy Future: Creating a Low Carbon
Economy, The Stationery Office, London
Department of Trade and Industry (2005) Microgeneration Strategy and Low Carbon
Buildings Programme: Consultation, DTI, London
Dunn, S. (2000) Micropower: The Next Electrical Era, Worldwatch Institute, Washington
Fleetwood, T. (2001) ‘An investigation into the disruptive capacity of distributed power
technologies’, MSc dissertation, Manchester School of Management, Manchester
Foster, R. and Kaplan, S. (2001) Creative Destruction: Why Companies that are Built
to Last Underperform the Market and How to Successfully Transform Them,
Doubleday, New York
Garcia, R. and Calantone, R. (2002) ‘A critical look at technological innovation typol-
ogy and innovativeness terminology: a literature review’, The Journal of Product
Innovation Management, vol 19, pp110–132
Geels, F. W., Elzen, B. and Green, K. (2004) ‘General introduction: System innovation
and transition to sustainability’, in Elzen, B., Geels, F. and Green, K. (eds) System
Innovation and the Transition to Sustainability: Theory, Evidence and Policy,
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp1–16
Geyer, A. and Davies, A. (2000) ‘Managing project-system interfaces: Case studies of
railway projects in restructured UK and German markets’, Research Policy, vol 29,
pp991–1013
Hall, J. and Kerr, R. (2003) ‘Innovation dynamics and environmental technologies: The
emergence of fuel cell technology’, Journal of Cleaner Production, vol 11,
pp459–471
Hecht, G. (1998) The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after
World War II, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Hofman, P. S. (2003) ‘Embedding radical innovations in society’, paper for the 11th
Greening of Industry Network Conference, San Francisco, October, 2003.
www.prosus.uio.no/english/business_industry/condecol/gin_peter.pdf
Micro-Generation 127
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 127
Hughes, T. P. (1983) Networks of Power Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930,
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
International Energy Agency (2002) Distributed Generation in Liberalised Electricity
Markets, IEA/OECD, Paris
Mayntz, R. (1993) Große technische Systeme und ihre gesellschaftstheoretische
Bedeutung, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, pp97–108
Mayntz, R. and Hughes, T. (eds) (1988) The Development of Large Technical Systems,
Westview Press, Boulder
Mayntz, R. and Scharpf, F. W. (1995) ‘Der Ansatz des akteurzentrierten
Institutionalismus’, in Mayntz, R. and Scharpf, F. W. (eds) Gesellschaftliche
Selbstregelung und Politische Steuerung, Campus, Frankfurt a.M., pp39–72
MacDonald, M. (2004) System Integration of Additional Micro-generation, DTI,
London
Patterson, W. (1999) Transforming Electricity, Earthscan, London
Pehnt, M., Cames, M., Fischer, C., Praetorius, B., Schneider, L., Schumacher, K. and
Vo‚, J. P. (eds) (2006) Micro Cogeneration: Towards Decentralized Energy Systems,
Springer, Heidelberg
Sauter, R., Watson, J. and Hughes, L. (2005) ‘Metering, communication and control
technologies for micro-generation’, STP, Working Paper 2005/1.
www.sustainabletechnologies.ac.uk/PDF/Working%20papers/109_1.pdf
Society of British Gas Industries (2003) Micro CHP - Delivering a Low Carbon Future,
SBGI, www.sbgi.org.uk/index.php?fuseaction=sbgi.articleDetail&con_id=8010453,
accessed 15 March 2006
Summerton, J. (ed) (1994a) Changing Large Technical Systems, Westview Press,
Boulder
Summerton, J. (1994b) ‘Introductory essay: The systems approach to technological
change’, in Summerton, J. (ed) Changing Large Technical Systems, Westview Press,
Boulder, pp1–21
The Economist (2000) ‘The dawn of micropower’, The Economist
Tushman, M. L. and Anderson, P. (1986) ‘Technological discontinuities and organiza-
tional environments’, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol 31, pp439–465
Unruh, G. C. (2000) ‘Understanding carbon lock-in’, Energy Policy, vol 28, pp817–830
Utterback, J. M. and Acee, H. J. (2003) ‘Disruptive technology’, presented at the Keith
Pavitt Conference, University of Sussex, UK, 14 November 2003,
www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/events/KP_Conf_03/documents/Utterback_Acee.pdf
van der Vleuten, E. (2004) ‘Infrastructures and societal change: A view from the large
technical systems field’, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, vol 16,
pp395–414
van Vliet, B. (2004) ‘Shifting scales of infrastructure provision’, in Southerton, D.,
Chappells, H. and van Vliet, B. (eds) Sustainable Consumption: The Implications of
Changing Infrastructures of Provision, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp67–80
Walker, W. (2000) ‘Entrapment in large technology systems: Institutional commitment
and power relations’, Research Policy, vol 29, pp833–846
Watson, J. (2004) ‘Co-provision in sustainable energy systems: The case of micro-
generation’, Energy Policy, vol 32, pp1981–1990
Winner, L. (1999) ‘Do artefacts have politics?’, in MacKenzie, D. and Wajcman, J. (eds)
The Social Shaping of Technology, Open University Press, Buckingham, pp28–40
Winskel, M. (2002) ‘The ‘Dash for Gas’ in the British electricity supply industry’, Social
Studies of Sciences, vol 32, no 4, pp565–599
128 Technology and Sustainability: Contextualized Accounts
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 128
Chapter 7
The Rationale for Policy Interventions




As discussed in the introductory chapter and in many of the other contributions
to this volume, a number of trends have come together in recent years leading
to a shift away from the traditional centralized, top-down, technocratic model
of how national governments function to a more fluid, decentralized and partic-
ipative model of governance. However, it is recognized that national
governments still have a key role to play within this new landscape, but face the
challenge of trying to shape the context and manage complexity and plurality
rather than being able to control other actors more directly. This raises the ques-
tion of the rationale for government interventions in this changed arena. This
chapter explores how ideas from innovation systems (IS) thinking have begun
to explore the idea of ‘systems failures’ as a rationale for public policy interven-
tion, which includes, but goes beyond, the traditional idea of ‘market failure’.
The market failure approach is based on mainstream neo-classical economic
thinking, and this language, and the ideas that it incorporates, are still largely
used by policy makers.
The next section provides a brief review of the innovation systems
approach, leading on to a discussion of the ‘systems failure’ argument. The
fourth section looks at the links to the governance and ‘social shaping of tech-
nologies’ literatures. In the fifth section I draw on initial lessons from the
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transition approach to innovation, now being applied to innovation in energy
policy by the Dutch government. The sixth section highlights some common
themes and argues for moves towards a co-evolutionary theoretical framework
and in the conclusion I discuss ways forward.1
Innovation systems approach
We begin by briefly reviewing the IS approach and its main theoretical findings
(for a longer review of this and other approaches to understanding innovation,
see Foxon, 2003).
The IS approach was developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s by a
group of scholars drawing on institutional and evolutionary economic thinking.
This approach emphasizes that innovation is a dynamic process, arising out of
the interactions between different actors, and involving knowledge flows as
well as market interactions. Rather than being categorised as a one-way, linear
flow from research and development (R&D) to new products, innovation is
seen as a process of matching technical possibilities to market opportunities,
involving multiple interactions and types of learning (Freeman and Soete, 1997).
This more systemic and dynamic picture of the innovation process emphasizes
the role of feedbacks, which either amplify or inhibit technology-push and
market-pull drivers, (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).
The concept of a (national) system of innovation was first developed by
Chris Freeman (1987), working at the Science and Technology Policy Research
Unit (SPRU), in a pioneering study of the then successful Japanese economy in
the late 1980s. Freeman stressed the positive role of government, working
closely with industry and the science base, to create a vision and provide long-
term support for the development and marketing of the most advanced
technologies; the integrated approach to R&D, design, procurement, produc-
tion and marketing within large firms; and the high level of general education
and scientific culture, combined with thorough practical training and frequent
up-dating in industry.
Two major studies in the early 1990s by Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993)
analysed national innovation systems in more detail. Lundvall (1992) defined a
national system of innovation as constituted by ‘the elements and relationships
which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically
useful, knowledge … either located within or rooted inside the borders of a
nation state’ (Lundvall, 1992, p2). He stressed the role of interactions between
users and producers, facilitating a flow of information and knowledge linking
technological capabilities to user needs, and relying on mutual trust and mutu-
ally respected codes of behaviour. Innovation is thus seen as a process which is
ubiquitous and cumulative, involving new combinations of knowledge,
produced through various forms of learning. These include: learning-by-doing –
increasing the efficiency of production operations through experience gained
(Arrow, 1962a); learning-by-using – increasing the efficiency of use of complex
systems through experience (Rosenberg, 1982); and learning-by-interacting –
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increasing efficiency of the system through user-producer interactions. Even
activities aimed specifically at contributing to innovation, such as R&D,
referred to as searching, generally look for alternatives (in terms of products,
processes, markets, etc) close to the ones already well known to the organiza-
tion, leading to the idea of technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982, 1988).
Nelson and collaborators (1993) conducted a major empirical study and
comparison of the national innovation systems of 15 countries. They concluded
that ‘to a considerable extent, differences in innovation systems reflect differ-
ences in economic and political circumstances and priorities between countries’.
These differences reflected the differences in the institutional set-ups between
the countries, including systems of university research and training and indus-
trial R&D, financial institutions, management skills, public infrastructure and
national monetary, fiscal and trade policies.
The IS approach was taken forward by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1999, 2002), who have undertaken
further empirical and comparative analyses of national and regional IS. They
characterize these systems in terms of the different actors and institutions (small
and large firms, users, governmental and regulatory bodies, universities,
research bodies), the interactions and flows of knowledge, funding and influ-
ence between them, and the incentives for innovation created by the
institutional set-up. The development of IS theory and its policy applications
have interacted and co-evolved over this period, though much remains to be
done (Mytelka and Smith, 2002). Recent work by the OECD on governance of
IS is discussed below.
In summary, IS approaches emphasize three aspects of innovation processes.
Firstly, that innovation occurs through systemic, dynamic and non-linear
processes, involving multiple interactions between a range of actors with differ-
ent roles within the system. Secondly, actors exhibit ‘bounded rationality’
(Simon, 1955, 1959); that is, they are limited in their ability to gather and
process information relevant to decision making. This implies that innovation
processes exhibit inherent uncertainties, and that expectations of future techno-
logical and market opportunities and policy and regulatory frameworks play an
important role in actors’ behaviour. Thirdly, institutions, in the sense of social
rule systems, are seen to play an important role in creating incentives or barri-
ers to the rate and direction of innovation.
The ‘systems failure’ argument
The IS approach thus presents a much more complex picture of the innovation
process than the old linear model of innovation. The linear model dovetailed
well with the dominant neoclassical economic framework to provide a rationale
for innovation policy, usually understood as public support for R&D. The
rationale for this is that, since new knowledge is often easy to copy, innovators
cannot always appropriate the full benefits of their investment in knowledge
creation, and so private firms may lack the incentives necessary to undertake
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socially efficient levels of innovative activity. In economic terms, the social
returns to innovation exceed the private returns (Arrow, 1962b), and so some
innovative activity has the characteristics of a public good, in that it is non-rival
and non-excludable. Innovation is generally non-rival in that, once created, its
use by one agent does not reduce the amount/quality available for use by others,
and hence it is not desirable to ration access to it. It is non-excludable since,
once supplied, it is hard to deny access to other users. This means that it will be
undersupplied by the market, which cannot exclude non-paying free riders.
These features provide a rationale for public support for innovation, particu-
larly at the early stages of R&D when new products or services are far from
market.
In contrast, environmental policy has largely dealt with addressing the
market failure of negative environmental externalities – environmental by-prod-
ucts of consuming or producing activities that affect third parties but are not
reflected in market transactions and prices (Pigou, 1932). This provides a
rationale for cost-effective environmental policy measures to ‘internalize’ these
externalities: via ‘the polluter pays’ principle, through the use of policy instru-
ments such as ‘market-based’ or ‘economic’ instruments (like taxes or emissions
trading schemes) and other instruments (like emission or technology standards,
voluntary agreements or assignments of property rights).
The IS approach presents a challenge for policy makers in formulating the
rationale for policy interventions, particularly relating to environmental
sustainability. Policy makers may be seen directly as actors within the innova-
tion system; for example, as providing funding for R&D, and as contributing
to the outcomes of policy-making processes, such as taxes, regulations and
incentives, which form part of the institutional framework for the innovation
system (van der Steen, 1999). Thus, in addition to policy outcomes providing
direct incentives or barriers to firms pursuing innovation towards sustainabil-
ity, government actions and rhetoric also influence firms, economic and
environmental regulators, consumers and other actors indirectly – for example,
by creating more or less positive expectations for sustainable innovation to be
worth pursuing. The systems approach also highlights that both innovation
and environmental market failures are complex and need to be addressed
together.
Thinking about how to formulate an alternative rationale for policy inter-
ventions has focused on the notion of ‘systems failure’ – particularly in the work
of Charles Edquist (1994, 2001) and Keith Smith (1992, 2000). This argues
that the current concept of ‘market failure’, understood as a comparison
between conditions in the real world and those of an ideal or optimal market
system, is no longer appropriate. Instead, the concept of ‘systems failure’ is
proposed as a rationale for policy interventions (Edquist, 1994, 2001; Smith,
2000). This advocates undertaking concrete empirical and comparative analy-
ses, using IS concepts, to identify systems failures that can be rectified. In this
approach, two conditions are identified that must be fulfilled for public inter-
vention to be justified in a market economy (Edquist, 2001):
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1. A problem must exist; that is, a situation in which market mechanisms and
firms fail to achieve objectives that have been socially-defined, through a
public policy process.
2. The state and its agencies must have the ability to solve or mitigate the
problem (i.e. the issue of potential government and bureaucratic failure
must be addressed).
In many cases, this concept of systems failure leads to similar or identical policy
prescriptions to the concept of market failure, for example the use of market-
based instruments to internalize negative environmental externalities. The
crucial difference, however, is that it does not presume that public policy inter-
ventions can recreate ideal market solutions, which are assumed to have
maximal economic efficiency. It is now recognized that markets are based on
sets of legal and institutional rules, such as those guaranteeing private property
and contractural arrangements (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). These rules
are often designed to provide incentives for socially-desirable types of behav-
iour which go beyond promoting pure economic efficiency. The task facing
policy makers is to design the rules so that they do not lead to excessive costs
on private firms and individuals, or create unnecessary levels of bureaucratic
intervention. The systems failure approach is designed to help policy makers
identify cases where changes to rule-systems could lead to more effective
achievement of social objectives without excessive costs or unnecessary bureau-
cracy. This approach is particularly relevant to the analysis of dynamic
socio-economic systems, such as those involving radical innovation, where it is
difficult or impossible to identify equilibria where optimal market solutions
would pertain. In such cases, systems failures may be identified through empiri-
cal analyses of the effectiveness of current systems and comparative analyses of
the effectiveness of systems operating under different legal and institutional
rules.
Smith (2000) identifies four areas of systems or systemic failure, which
could provide a rationale for specific policy interventions:
1. Failures in infrastructure provision and investment. Both physical infra-
structures, such as for energy and communications, and science-technology
infrastructures, such as universities, technical institutes and regulatory agen-
cies, are important parts of innovation systems. However, because of their
large scale, indivisibilities and very long time horizons of operation, they
are unlikely to be sufficiently provided by private investors, and so there is
a case for public support for infrastructure provision.
2. Transition failures. Because existing firms, especially small firms, are neces-
sarily quite limited in their technological capabilities and horizons, they are
likely to experience great difficulties in responding to technological changes
due to developments outside firms’ area of expertise, changes in technolog-
ical opportunities or patterns of demand which push the market into new
areas of technology, or major shifts in technological regimes or paradigms.
Public policies may be used to help firms to cope with such changes.
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3. Lock-in failures. Path dependence, due to system or network externalities,
combined with the fact that technologies are closely linked to their social
and economic environment, can lead to ‘lock-in’ of existing technologies,
creating barriers to the innovation and adoption of new technologies
(Arthur, 1989). New technologies must compete not only with an existing
dominant technology, but also challenge the overall technological and insti-
tutional system in which it is embedded. This requires public policies to
generate incentives for new technologies or technological systems, and to
overcome barriers created by the prevalence of incumbent technology or
system.
4. Institutional failures. The set of public and private institutions, regulatory
systems and the policy system creates a framework of opportunities and
barriers to innovation by firms. Hence, the performance of these institu-
tions and systems in regard to innovation should be monitored and assessed,
and if they are judged to be creating unnecessary barriers, this would
provide a rationale for policy changes or interventions.
Smith (1992) also stresses that policy making should take an adaptive approach,
and look for design and formulation of institutional arrangements that promote
business experiments and generate a greater connectedness between organiza-
tions generating knowledge (e.g. universities) and those applying such
knowledge (e.g. firms). As other aspects of technological and institutional
systems co-evolve, this also suggests that a continuous learning approach to
improving policy processes and measures may be needed to cope with continu-
ous dynamic change (Foxon, 2004).
This approach seems particularly relevant for the social and environmental
challenges of sustainability. Public policy actors have a key role in creating the
right incentive structures to address these challenges and facilitating the involve-
ment of stakeholders in developing and implementing such structures. However,
a systems approach should not be perceived as having an ‘anti-market’ bias
(OECD, 2002) and market mechanisms still play a key role in promoting inno-
vation, along with non-market interactions, such as knowledge networking.
The concept of systems failure was applied in our study of UK renewable
energy innovation systems and resulting policy implications. This study identi-
fied systems failures relating to technologies moving from the demonstration to
pre-commercial (e.g. for wave and tidal power) and pre-commercial to
supported commercial (e.g. offshore wind) stages of development (Imperial
College Centre for Energy Policy and Technology (ICEPT) and E4Tech, 2003;
Foxon et al, 2005b). We argued that these failures provide a case for more
specific policy interventions to support renewable technologies, for example
through providing revenue support to help create niche markets.
A broader policy challenge is raised by the techno-institutional lock-in of
current high carbon, fossil-fuel based energy systems (Unruh, 2000, 2002;
Neuhoff, 2005; Foxon, 2006). The need to promote innovation of more sustain-
able technologies, such as renewable energy technologies, through addressing
the systemic failures associated with the lock-in of unsustainable technologies,
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was addressed in our research (see note 1). We developed a set of guiding prin-
ciples for policy processes to promote sustainable innovation (Foxon et al,
2005a), which incorporates many of the above ideas:
• Stimulate the development of a sustainable innovation policy regime that
brings together appropriate strands of current innovation and environmen-
tal policy and regulatory regimes.
• Apply systems thinking and practice, engaging with the complexity and
systemic interactions of innovation systems and policy-making processes.
• Advance the procedural and institutional basis for the delivery of sustain-
able innovation policy.
• Develop an integrated mix of policy processes, measures and instruments
that cohere to promote sustainable innovation.
• Incorporate policy learning as an integral part of sustainable innovation
policy process.
Links to governance and ‘social shaping 
of technology’ literatures
In this section, we explore some of the links between the above ideas on IS,
resulting from research on the concept, with the literatures on governance and
‘social shaping of technology’, as outlined in the introductory chapter.
Understanding policy making processes
As described in Chapter 1, governance refers to the changing practices relating
to ‘an increasingly complex state-society relationship in which network actors
are prominent in policy making and the state’s primary role is policy coordina-
tion rather than direct policy control’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004). The
recognition and improved understanding of these changing practices creates the
potential to move beyond the old dichotomy of looking for either state or
market solutions to societal problems. We argue that the systems failure argu-
ment fits well with this new thinking.
The current conventional stated rationale for policy interventions is to
correct for ‘market failures’. For example, the UK treasury’s paper outlining
the argument for the use of economic instruments to internalize costs of envi-
ronmental damage into market prices states that ‘If the Government
intervenes to correct these market failures efficiently, it will achieve better
environmental outcomes, as well as greater overall economic efficiency’ (HM
Treasury, 2002, p1). It may be argued that this approach is fine as far as it
goes, but that it raises a number of difficulties, which may be traced back to
the implicit adherence to the principles of neoclassical economics. The
framing of the rationale typically suggests that, if the government can find the
right intervention, it can recreate the conditions for a perfect market solution.
These assumptions underlie the fundamental theorems of welfare economics
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(Arrow and Debreu, 1954), which state that, in perfectly competitive markets,
the equilibrium reached by trading between buyers and sellers at market prices
will be economically efficient, and that such an efficient equilibrium can
always be reached from a given starting allocation of resources. There are a
number of arguments that may be raised as to why these theorems fail to
describe accurately markets in the real world (e.g. Bowles, 2004, Chapter 6).
The point we want to make here is that government interventions are framed
in terms of trying to recreate a theoretical model of how markets deliver
economically efficient solutions.
One difficulty is that in problems relating to sustainability, particularly the
intersection of environment and innovation, governments are trying to correct
for multiple market failures. For example, Grubb and Ulph (2002) identify six
types of innovation market failure, which  interact in a complex way with each
other and with the market failure relating to the public-good nature of environ-
mental benefits. In these circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect
governments to recreate perfect market solutions, or even to come up with
‘second best’ solutions. If and when the resulting interventions fail to deliver
policy objectives, this may lead to a backlash against all government interven-
tions. Hence, neither markets nor governments can be expected to deliver
optimal solutions, but most observers agree that at least some government inter-
ventions can have positive social benefits. So, a clear rationale for such
interventions, or a framework for determining such a rationale, is needed.
One way of making progress, that is consistent with the systems approach,
would be to focus on policy-making processes, rather than individual policy
measures. This recognizes that policy making is an ongoing process of assess-
ment, debate, intervention and evaluation, which may be guided by economic
insights, but should not be dominated by such insights.
In our research, we investigated the implications of the understanding of IS
for sustainable innovation policy processes. In developing our analytical frame-
work, we examined how this understanding relates to theoretical and empirical
conceptions of policy-making processes (Foxon et al, 2004). These seek to
explain variation between policy sectors and between countries, relative stabil-
ity or change in policy making and hence effectiveness and causes of policy
success and failure.
John (1998) identified five broad theoretical approaches to explaining
policy variation, change and effectiveness: 
1. Institutional approaches - which emphasize the structures and constraints
imposed by the formal and informal institutions that together form the
‘social rules’ of a system (e.g. March and Olsen, 1989; North, 1990).
2. Network approaches - which emphasize how interactions between actors
and institutions influence policy outputs and outcomes (e.g. Marsh and
Rhodes, 1992).
3. Socio-economic approaches - which emphasize how socio-economic factors
influence the decisions of public actors and affect policy outputs and
outcomes (e.g. Ham and Hill, 1984).
136 Technology and Sustainability: Contextualized Accounts
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 136
4. Rational choice theory - which emphasizes individual actors acting in their
own rational self-interest, with collective decisions arising out of bargaining
between actors, which can be analysed using game theory (e.g. Ward, 1995).
5. Ideas-based approaches - which emphasize the importance of ideas and
advocacy in political debate, and the actors, such as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), think tanks and academics, that are involved in the
development and promotion of ideas (e.g. Majone, 1989).
Each of these approaches has been criticized for presenting a limited view. A
more complete theoretical picture would synthesize elements from them. For
example, it would view policy-making processes as influenced both by the devel-
opment of ideas and arguments and by power struggles between different
interest groups, in which actors act both to maximize their interests within
current institutional rule systems and, where possible, to change rules and insti-
tutions to their benefit. Kingdon (1995) has developed a useful partial synthesis,
based on a concept of adaptive policy making. He argues that in the policy
process there are three parallel ‘streams’ of activity – the ‘problem’ stream, the
‘policy proposal’ stream and the ‘political’ stream – and two key steps: getting
problems on to the policy agenda, a step which is dominated by political activ-
ity; and generating a set of alternative solutions to be considered, a step which
is dominated by civil servants and analysts/researchers. He argues that the sepa-
rate streams of problems, policies and politics come together at certain critical
times: when policy windows are open. Items reach the policy agenda because a
problem comes to the fore, either through normal political events, such as
annual budgets, or through focusing events, such as a crisis or disaster; or
because a change in the political stream, such as a new administration, leads to
a change in priorities. The set of alternatives is generated by attaching propos-
als, previously formulated in the policy stream, to the problem that has now
reached the agenda via the window opened by the problem event or political
event. 
A further criticism of many theoretical approaches to the policy-making
process is that they tend to concentrate on policy formation and neglect the
issue of policy implementation, which is arguably as important in influencing
the effectiveness of policies in practice (Hill, 1997). Implementation is also
crucial to the question of the extent to which success or failure of policies feed
back into further policy making, a vital element in policies that seek to promote
sustainability.
Some of these ideas are starting to be discussed in policy-making circles,
even if they have not yet reached a more general public discourse. For example,
a recent OECD project built on the organization’s earlier work on IS to produce
a report on Governance of Innovation Systems (OECD, 2005). This recognizes
that governance is an ‘interactive process involving various forms of partner-
ships, collaboration, competition and negotiation’ and that these are shaped by
the institutional settings in which they occur. This implies that individual policy
domains, such as economic policy, innovation policy and environmental policy,
may have their own communities with specific preferences, ideologies and back-
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grounds, leading to distinct imperatives and rationales for action. Hence, policy
for sustainable development may have different or even opposing objectives
and imperatives to the fundamental economic growth imperative which usually
underlies innovation policy. This leads the OECD report to posit a more evolu-
tionary view of policy making (OECD, 2005, p25). We explore such
evolutionary views in the following sections.
Evolutionary economic and sociological explanations 
of technological change
As suggested in the first section, the IS approach arose out of institutional and
evolutionary economic thinking. A key text in this thinking is Nelson and
Winter’s (1982) Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. This developed an
understanding of economic actions, particularly relating to technological
change, based on Herbert Simon’s (1955, 1959) insight that economic actors
display ‘bounded rationality’, that is, they are limited in their ability to access
and process information, and hence look for satisfactory or ‘satisficing’ solu-
tions. From this, Nelson and Winter (1982) introduced the fundamental notion
of the ‘routine’, which could be any technical, procedural, organizational or
strategic process used by a firm as part of its normal business activities, for
example, its R&D strategy or a particular production profile. They argued that
routines change in an evolutionary process of firms searching for better tech-
niques or processes that satisfy their chosen criteria, such that successful
routines, and the firms that employ them, are selected by the process of market
competition. Since profit making may be only one of a number of criteria used
in the search process, alongside, for example, developing innovative solutions
or building market share, and the fact that the market and knowledge environ-
ment is dynamic, it can not be assumed that firms are profit-maximizing entities.
Furthermore, it can not be assumed that markets involving actors with bounded
rationality will reach optimal equilibria. Hence, in an evolutionary economic
approach, the standard assumptions of the neoclassical picture underlying the
‘market failure’ argument no longer hold, and so something like the ‘systems
failure’ rationale for intervention is needed.
In an interesting paper, MacKenzie (1992) has suggested that evolutionary
economic approaches could form a bridge between economic and sociological
understanding of technological change processes. He highlights the analogies
between the process of searching for and selecting satisficing routines, and the
sociological notions of ‘closure’ and creation of stable networks. Both
approaches emphasize the importance of expectations in influencing which tech-
nological areas are explored, leading to persistent patterns or trajectories of
technological change, which could be understood as self-fulfilling prophecies,
or social institutions. An example of this is provided by Moore’s Law, devel-
oped in the late 1960’s by semiconductor pioneer Gordon Moore, who
proposed that the computing power of microchips would double roughly every
18 months. This law subsequently helped to guide the rate of development of
microchips by the computing industry. In the next section, we discuss a practi-
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cal example of a government trying to apply an evolutionary and systems-based
approach in practice.
The role of policy in the Dutch 
transition approach
An evolutionary based approach to policy making, known as ‘transition
management’ or the ‘transition approach’, is now being undertaken by the
Dutch government, following ideas developed by Dutch academics for the 4th
Netherlands Environmental Policy Plan, published in 2000. Jan Rotmans, Rene
Kemp and colleagues (Rotmans et al, 2000, 2001; Kemp and Rotmans, 2001)
argued that persistent environmental problems, such as climate change, require
a systems approach to policy making, in order to stimulate transitions towards
more sustainable systems. This approach is designed to be shaping or modulat-
ing, rather than controlling, to be oriented towards long-term sustainability
goals and visions, and to be iterative and flexible, and so to have a steering
philosophy of goal-oriented incrementalism (Kemp and Loorbach, 2005).
This approach is now being applied to innovation in energy policy by the
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004). Five
transition paths have been formulated and developed using a participatory
approach, coordinated and facilitated by the ministry. This involves stakehold-
ers working in public-private project teams, led by industry. For each area,
visions for the future and medium-term (20 year) strategic goals were devel-
oped (Where do we want to go?), ‘transition paths’ were formulated (How are
we going to get there?) and ‘transition experiments’ proposed (How are we
going to travel the paths?). This is based on a ‘learning by doing’ approach –
undertake experiments, design learning goals into experiments, feed back
lessons into subsequent measures. This builds on earlier ideas by these authors
of promoting change through the support of niches in which new technologies
have the space to develop, at least partially protected from the dominant socio-
technical regime (Kemp et al, 1998).
The Ministry of Economic Affairs (2004) sees the transition approach as a
way of dealing with uncertainties and avoiding apparent certainties. The
government is not ‘choosing’ specific options, but organizing its policy around
a cluster of options: the transition paths. These enable the government to give
direction to the market, whilst giving market players the opportunity to develop
their own products based on their own market analysis, ambitions and entre-
preneurship. It argues this requires a new form of concerted action between
market and government (‘policy renewal’) involving:
• Relationships built on mutual trust – Stakeholders want to be able to rely
on a policy line not being changed unexpectedly once adopted, through
commitment to the direction taken, the approach and the main roads
formulated. The government places trust in market players by offering them
‘experimentation space’.
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• Partnership – Government, market and society are partners in the process
of setting policy aims, creating opportunities and undertaking transition
experiments, for example through ministries setting up ‘one stop shops’ for
advice and problem solving.
• Brokerage – The government facilitates the building of networks and coali-
tions between actors in transition paths.
• Leadership – Stakeholders require the government to declare itself clearly in
favour of a long-term agenda of sustainability and innovation that is set for
a long time, and to tailor current policy to it.
As described by Kemp and Loorbach (2005), the transition management
approach was informed largely by insights from the innovation literature and
evaluation studies of innovation policy and environmental policy instruments,
and developed somewhat independently from the literature on governance.
However, they argue that there are clear links to different governance
approaches, as follows:
• Soft planning instead of comprehensive planning – Transition management
consists of government acting to secure circumstances that will enhance the
potential for achieving societal goals by promoting innovation and mitigat-
ing negative effects.
• An exercise in incrementalism – Transition management is an incremental-
ist strategy for changing functional systems. This has the advantages that it
appears less disruptive to existing special interests, the costs of taking a
wrong step are kept low, it reduces the danger of lock-in to unwanted paths,
and it allows lessons learned to inform further steps. These benefits from
incrementalism have long been advocated in economic policy debates, in
terms of the idea of ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1960, 1979). It also fits
well with an evolutionary understanding of change happening through a
long series of ‘trial and error’ steps.
• Adaptive governance – Transition management closely relates to ideas of
adaptive management, policy or governance (Lee, 1993; March and Olsen,
1995), as a strategy for political institutions to cope with the problems of
ignorance, conflict and ambiguity facing attempts at intelligent change.
However, it emphasizes that learning and adaptation needs to occur at a
system level, as well as at an individual level.
• Interactive governance – Transition management seeks to move from an
older model of participation by different groups to a more genuinely inter-
active model of actors working together and mutually adapting towards a
set of collectively chosen long-term goals through a common process.
• Multi-level governance – Transition management can be seen as a form of
multi-level governance, comparable to the wider concept of decision making
being shared by governments and other actors, organized at different terri-
torial levels and interacting through trans-boundary and trans-national
networks (Hooghe and Marks, 2001).
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These ideas have close links to those of multi-level and meta-governance,
discussed in Chapter 1. As with transition management, metagovernance recog-
nizes that, due to a number of converging trends including market liberalization,
individualism and globalization, the state often no longer has the ability to
deliver particular outcomes, but may still be able to influence the conditions
whereby desired outcomes may occur, through the use of incentives and creat-
ing common spaces. As described by Jessop (1998, 2004), this involves ‘the
design of institutions and generation of visions which can facilitate not only
self-organisation in different fields but also the relative coherence of the diverse
objectives, spatial and temporal horizons, actions, and outcomes of various
self-organizing arrangements’.
Towards a co-evolutionary approach
This paper has argued that the idea of systems failure as a rationale for public
policy intervention, coming from IS theory, avoids some of the problems associ-
ated with the notion of market failure, and resonates with ideas from the
governance and social shaping of technology approaches. We argue that there
are some key themes, which all these approaches share, and that further devel-
opment of these themes could be fruitful.
The first theme is the idea of systems or networks. The starting point for
the IS approach is that innovation arises not just from the actors and institu-
tions that make up the system, but through their interactions. The systems
concept arose originally in the context of engineering and information sciences,
whereas network is the equivalent social science concept. The governance liter-
ature sees policy making through complex networks of interacting actors and
institutions as a third type of decision-making process, alongside state hierar-
chies and markets (Bache and Flinders, 2004). Importantly, systems or networks
are seen as dynamic entities, evolving over time. Recent thinking in complex
systems theory emphasizes that, though the exact behaviour of complex systems
over time is uncertain, it makes sense to examine properties of the system, such
as robustness under perturbations, and resilience and adaptability to changing
environmental conditions (Forrest et al, 2005).
The second theme is that of adaptability or learning. As suggested by some
of the proponents of the systems failure argument, and exemplified by the tran-
sition approach, policy making should take an adaptive approach in this new
arena. It is possible for policy makers and stakeholders to agree on certain long-
term policy objectives but not on exactly how these will be reached. Lack of
perfect foresight on the part of governments, markets or actors means that the
future is fundamentally uncertain, and this requires actors to learn or adapt to
changing conditions, whilst pursuing their goals. Applied to governments, this
implies the need for policy learning, that is, the recognition that there is a need
for feedback from the implementation of policies to future policy development,
and to establish clear processes by which this can occur (Foxon et al, 2005a). In
this context, governance processes are seen as an endogenous part of innova-
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tion systems (van der Steen, 1999).
The third theme, we argue, is that of evolutionary theorizing. As we
discussed above, evolutionary economic thinking is the implicit basis for the IS
approach and, it was argued, could form the bridge to the social shaping of
technology approach. Recent work by Richard Nelson, one of the pioneers of
evolutionary economics, has begun to explore the co-evolution of technologies
and institutions as a fruitful way of developing this bridge (Nelson and Sampat,
2001; Nelson, 2005). Nelson identifies institutions as ‘social technologies’ –
standardized patterns of behaviour that have evolved as useful and productive
ways of undertaking particular social or economic tasks. They evolve in the
context of a range of factors, including organizational and governance struc-
tures, and the broad system of norms, beliefs, and rules of the game, that
constitute the institutional environment. Of course, institutions, considered
from a number of perspectives, are central to debates on governance (North,
1990; Jessop, 2001; Acemoglu, 2004; Parto, 2005). Physical technologies can
also be seen as evolving in this context, through improved understanding and
adaptation to user needs. Furthermore, technologies and institutions co-evolve,
so that the evolution of technologies influences that of institutions, and vice
versa. The theoretical basis for the co-evolution of technologies and institu-
tions, and the idea that IS forms the setting for this co-evolution, have begun to
be investigated (Nelson, 2002; Foxon, 2004).
The first two themes of systems and adaptability arise naturally in evolu-
tionary approaches and, though they do not necessarily require an evolutionary
theoretical basis, we argue that these approaches are worthy of further investi-
gation.
Conclusions and ways forward
This paper has discussed a number of theoretical ideas: innovation systems,
systems failure, approaches to understanding policy-making processes, evolu-
tionary economic and sociological explanations of technological change, and
the transition approach, and argued for systems failure as a rationale for public
policy interventions. We conclude by looking at both analytical and practical
ways of taking these ideas forward.
The analytical challenge relates to the need to develop a stronger theoretical
grounding for these ideas, linking systems change, new forms of governance
and sustainability transitions. This will also need to engage with a range of
heterodox economic thinking, from ecological, evolutionary and institutional
economics, which has the potential to link these ideas to important questions of
costs and allocation of resources, in a richer way than the mainstream neoclas-
sical economic picture. We suggest that the approach of analysing ‘co-evolution
of technologies and institutions’ could provide a way forward towards a richer
theoretical and analytical picture. This has the potential to incorporate ideas
from systems and complexity theory, as well as to see the role of governments
as endogenous to IS.
142 Technology and Sustainability: Contextualized Accounts
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 142
The practical challenge relates to the need to engage with real-world policy
processes. Despite the move towards governance described in this and other
chapters, the dominant framing of government interventions to promote
sustainability is still the language of correcting for market failure. As we have
argued, this framing is based on outdated concepts from neoclassical economic
theory, which assume that markets can deliver optimal welfare solutions, if only
imperfections in the market can be corrected for. The systems failure idea
presented here could form a framing for government actions which is more
compatible with the new ideas of governance, innovation systems and sustain-
ability.
As described above, the development of IS theory and its policy applica-
tions have interacted and co-evolved. The application of the systems failure
rationale for policy intervention, not least in the context of promoting sustain-
able innovation, could represent a further fruitful step in this co-evolution.
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Notes
1 This Chapter is based on ideas developed in the course of a research project under
the ESRC Sustainable Technologies Programme on ‘Policy drivers and barriers for
sustainable innovation’. This project engaged with policy makers and other stake-
holders through a series of workshops and case studies, and produced guidance
for improving sustainable innovation policy processes (Foxon et al, 2005a). The
project findings are reported in various papers (Foxon et al, 2004, 2005a, b, 2006)
and in the final monograph (Foxon et al, 2005c).
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Chapter 8
Local Governance of Public Services:




The planning and delivery of UK public services is changing. A desire to make
services more responsive and appropriate to individual and local needs is driving
government reforms (Blair, 2004). The centralized, top-down, ‘one size fits all’
approach is being criticized and bottom-up reform enabled by the centre is seen
as the alternative (Blair, 2004). Local governance is a key objective. This
involves devolving power and making services more locally accountable, thus
forging a modern relationship between the state, citizens and services (Miliband,
2006). Partnership working between public, private and community actors is
being offered as a key mechanism. This chapter explores the nature of the waste
management in this context.
Sustainable waste management is one of the greatest environmental chal-
lenges facing the UK (Strategy Unit, 2002). In broad terms it requires a shift
away from waste disposal and landfill to minimization, re-use and recycling.
The management of household waste has an important part to play. It is a key
public service and often the subject of much public interest; this is particularly
the case with respect to the location of processing or treatment facilities, because
of associated environmental and health issues. A highly visible, front-line
service, waste and recycling collections are among the few public services that
households receive automatically. Although council tax revenue is spent on
many services, the public often perceive waste management to be the main one.
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This chapter draws on case-study research that explored the role of part-
nerships between local authorities and the companies or organizations that
provide waste and recycling collection services and run the treatment facilities
(service providers). In particular this research focused on the implications of
partnership working for policy development and delivery of more sustainable
waste and resource management. The chapter explores different types of part-
nership, including partnerships between authorities responsible for waste
disposal and those that deal with waste collection, and partnerships between
local authorities and private waste companies and/or organizations in the
community waste sector (CWS).
Local governance implies devolution of power to the local level and disper-
sal of power away from local government. Through partnerships and wider
stakeholder participation, local governance might lead to more sustainable
processes and technologies. Using two empirical case-studies, this chapter
assesses what is happening in practice. It shows that membership of partner-
ships focusing on waste strategy is limited to local authorities, whereas
membership is expanded to include non-state actors in the area of service provi-
sion. It also shows that waste partnerships can have their own life cycle with
different dynamics, motivations and objectives at different stages. These influ-
ence the organizational arrangement of partnerships, and their processes and
outcomes.
Context and background
Partnerships as modes of local governance
Governance and local communities
Over recent decades the provision of public services to local communities has
been associated with centralized policies and top-down decision making, with
central government having the balance of power over local government. With
the ‘modernization’ agenda of the current Labour government, however, there
is a shift of emphasis from government to governance (Newman, 2001). This
includes moves to devolve power to local government and this is justified using
ideas of freedom and flexibility. According to Rhodes (1997), this shift has lead
to a ‘hollowing-out’ of the state, with a loss of functions downwards to special
purpose bodies and outwards to agencies, as well as upwards to the European
Union (EU).
Government is associated with making and enforcing decisions through
centralized control and hierarchical structures. Governance, on the other hand,
is associated with networks, less centralized power and non-governmental
actors becoming involved in public policy. According to Stoker (1998), the
objectives of governance and government are the same but different processes
are involved. Under governance the role of the state shifts from control to coor-
dination, and new mechanisms are used to guide a plurality of network actors.
The boundary between public and private becomes blurred (Stoker, 1998;
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Richards and Smith, 2002; Bache and Flinders, 2004). At the local level, this
implies power devolved to communities, with public authorities playing a coor-
dinating and enabling role. 
In analysing the shift from government to governance at the local level,
Sullivan (2001) discusses community government, local governance and citizen
governance. In community government, elected local authorities are central and
their elected status underpins their legitimacy and the delivery of local services.
Local governance involves local authorities establishing the framework for
delivery whilst working with local organizations and communities. In this
model all stakeholders are seen as equal. Citizen governance privileges commu-
nities and citizens and hence focuses on the very local level. This chapter argues
that in the area of waste management, although characteristics from other
models are starting to emerge, the community government model still domi-
nates. 
Partnerships and governance
There is a strong consensus amongst local authorities that partnership working
is increasing and inevitable (Wilkinson and Craig, 2002). There are a number
of reasons for this. Partnerships are seen as a way of renewing the role of civil
society and promoting social inclusion. By re-engaging with the local, partner-
ships might also help to develop and deliver services that address the needs of
the local community. The collaborative nature of partnerships as a type of
network is seen as a way of overcoming the problems of inefficiency associated
with bureaucratic hierarchies, and the problems of inequality and exclusion
arsing from competitive markets (Giddens, 2000).
From a theoretical perspective, hierarchies, markets and networks can be
understood as alternative paradigms linked to particular ideologies and eras
(Hartley, 2005). However, because they demonstrate characteristics of all three
modes of governance, this view has limited analytical value for partnerships in
practice. A promising approach is Lowndes and Skelcher’s (1998, p314) argu-
ment that ‘partnership as an organisational structure is analytically distinct
from network as a mode of governance’. This argument suggests that partner-
ships might have a life cycle that encompasses hierarchical, market and network
arrangements, which are important at different moments.
On a similar theme, Hartley (2005) argues that governance through hierar-
chies, markets and networks may be paradigms linked to different ideologies,
but in practice ‘they co-exist as layered realities for politicians and managers,
with particular circumstances or contexts calling forth behaviours and deci-
sions related to one or the other conception of governance and service delivery’
(Hartley, 2005, p29). Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) conclude that partnerships
might involve hierarchical and market relationships but they have a particular
affinity with network governance. This may be true but overall we can say that
the failure to distinguish between modes of social coordination and organiza-
tional structures like partnerships has constrained theory and research.
Clarke and Glendinning (2002) develop this argument further and suggest
that rather than focusing on modes of governance the challenge is to under-
Local Governance of Public Services 153
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 153
stand partnerships as contingent and potentially contradictory sites of power.
They highlight apparent contradictions such as the promotion of partnerships
whilst strengthening the power of central government. Mandating partnership
working does not fit easily with concepts like ‘self-regulating’, ‘evolving’ and
‘co-steering’, which are associated with networks and partnerships as a mode of
governance. In addition, greater social inclusion and improved democracy
through local governance sit uncomfortably with central direction and control.
The motivation for partnerships
Understanding the motivations or driving forces behind partnerships is impor-
tant because they influence their nature, including the type and number of
partners, processes employed and agreed objectives. Drawing on the partner-
ship literature, we can briefly consider the motivations of legitimacy and
accountability, and synergy and efficiency (adapted from Lowndes and Sullivan,
2004).
In a context of renewed government concern about participation and inclu-
sion, it has been argued that local governance involving a diverse range of social
actors is more legitimate and accountable. The development of partnerships can
therefore be seen as a response to concerns about the lack of accountability of
local public spending bodies (House of Commons, 1999, para. 64). However,
critics argue that partnerships do not necessarily improve participation. Often
they involve non-elected bodies and self-selected representatives and they can
fail to inform and engage the public. Such partnerships can replicate the prob-
lems of accountability and exclusion (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Bennington,
2001).
In principal, partnership working offers a number of synergy and efficiency
benefits. A framework introduced by Mackintosh (1992) and developed by
Hastings (1996) (see Table 8.1), identifies these and is useful for exploring
related motivations. Whilst partnerships that rely on resource synergy may
deliver economic efficiencies and added value, they risk excluding or marginal-
izing potential partners who are not able to contribute similar resources. An
approach based on policy synergy, however, can bring about a more equal and
influential role for partners who are financially marginalized but able to
contribute different and valuable perspectives.
Considering this framework in the context of local governance, a partner-
ship based on policy synergy seems more likely to deliver local governance
through the inclusion of a wider range of partners. It might also deliver more
innovative and locally appropriate services. In contrast, partnerships that focus
on resource synergy might restrain local governance and the potential for inno-
vative and locally appropriate services by excluding financially marginalized
stakeholders and focusing on the perspectives of dominant partners. The case
studies in the following section show how these different motivations shape
partnerships and influence technology choices in the waste sector. 
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The waste issue
In this chapter I focus on municipal waste, a term used to describe wastes that
come under the control of local authorities. The vast majority of this is from
households. Municipal waste accounts for a small proportion of all waste, but
it presents particular challenges as it tends to be more heterogeneous and subject
to greater regulatory control compared to other types. From a governance
perspective, the management of municipal waste is an important and interesting
case because it brings together a wider array of actors, including from all levels
of government, local communities, householders and commercial service
providers.
The UK has a long and established history of sending waste to landfills.
This has traditionally been the cheapest option. Recycling and composting are
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Table 8.1 Concepts of synergy, transformation and budgets in 
the partnership process
Concept Process Outcome
Resource synergy Cooperation and Added value from resources 
coordination over spending spent: increased effectiveness 
of resources or efficiency
Policy synergy Joint approach developed New perspectives/innovative 
through combining the solutions. Original difference 
different perspectives of in culture and objectives 
each partner between partners maintained
Uni-directional Partner/s who struggle to Partners change their 
transformation modify or change another organizational culture or 
partner in their own image, objectives to become similar 
and do not see the need for to those of another partner. 
them to change (teaching The partnership takes on the 
not learning) style of the transforming 
partnership
Mutual Reciprocal challenges for All partners change to some 
transformation change (pre-existing culture extent. New sets of 
and objectives), partners operational styles are 
seek to teach and learn developed. Differences 
between partners are reduced
Budget juggling Partners negotiate to shift Financial risk is shared / 
financial commitment, or shifted. May marginalize the 
extract additional funds partners not financially 
from other partners dominant
Budget Partners secure additional Conditions and outcomes may 
enlargement funding from a third party be imposed by third party that 
are against the interests of 
one or more of the partners
Source: Adapted from Hastings (1996)
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increasing, and regulation and fewer landfill sites are pushing up costs, but
landfill continues to dominate – 72 per cent of municipal waste collected in
2003/04 (Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA),
2005). Landfill will decline in the future, however, as European and national
legislation requires a shift to waste minimization, re-use, recycling and compost-
ing. The EU Landfill Directive (99/31) is one of the most significant pieces of
recent legislation. It sets out measures intended to improve the management of
landfills and to restrict the types of wastes accepted (see Slater and Frederickson,
2001).
One of the most challenging measures for the UK is the progressive reduc-
tion of the amount of biodegradable municipal waste that can be sent to landfill.
Failure to meet the target carries a penalty of £500,000 per day. To implement
this reduction the UK government launched the landfill allowance trading
scheme in 2005, the first trading scheme to involve waste. Landfill allowances
have been allocated to individual authorities who can meet targets by banking,
borrowing or trading. Failure to comply with their allowances will result in
local authorities receiving prohibitive fines for every additional tonne landfilled.
Waste services were delivered in-house by local authorities until the Local
Government Act of 1988 opened up the service to the private sector. It also
introduced compulsory competitive tendering, with service allocation based on
cost. This was superseded in 2000 by ‘best value’, which required consideration
to be given to quality and value factors, although cost continues to be a domi-
nant factor when contracts are awarded. In Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland local authorities are unitary with responsibility for both the collection
and disposal functions. England has some unitary authorities but in other (two-
tier) cases waste collection and waste disposal authorities are separate.
Over recent years central government has linked partnership working and
sustainable waste management. They are driving the agenda using guidance,
regulations and funding. The two-tier structure of many English local authori-
ties has been criticized for fragmenting collection and treatment/disposal. Calls
for greater cohesion (Strategy Unit, 2002) have been translated through the
Waste and Emissions Trading (WET) Act (2003) which includes a statutory
requirement for waste collection and waste disposal authorities to produce a
joint waste strategy. Many county and district authorities are now working in
partnership to deliver this. In the two-tier authorities, the landfill allowance
trading schemes applies to the disposal authority and they will be responsible
for any fines incurred.
Partnerships are also being galvanized through funding structures. DEFRA’s
Waste Minimisation and Recycling Fund, for example, had a strong partnership
element, and in 2003 it awarded £62.5 million to 14 different local authority
partnerships. In addition, public services are increasingly delivered through
partnerships between local authorities and the private sector, using the Private
Finance Initiative (PFI). In the case of waste management, this involves the
public sector agreeing outcome-based contracts focused on proven technolo-
gies. The private sector designs, builds, finances and operates the assets over a
fixed period for annual payments.
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In parallel with the push for public-private partnerships, local authorities
are also being encouraged to work in partnership with the CWS. Authorities
have a statutory obligation to produce a Community Strategy setting out how
local decision making will ‘engage and involve local communities…and be
based on a proper assessment of needs and the availability of resources’
(Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), 2000, p3).
One of the key objectives of the strategy is to coordinate the actions of local
authorities and of the public, private, community and voluntary organizations
that operate locally, and to foster and shape the activity of these organizations
so that they meet community needs. In the area of waste, guidance encourages
working with the CWS to deliver re-use, recycling and composting (DETR,
2001). 
Waste management partnerships in practice
Although guidance, regulation and funding promote partnership working in
waste services, there is little published research on such partnerships in practice.
The following section focuses on two case studies but it is informed by wider
research that examined partnership working in the sector. The cases illustrate
contrasting models of partnership working with different notions of sustainable
technologies. One represents a ‘single authority’ approach, integrating the two-
tier collection and disposal structure, and relying on one main contractor for
service delivery. The other illustrates a ‘multi-resource’ approach, which seeks
to harness a range of specialist and local providers. After outlining the cases I
examine the different motivations underpinning the partnership models.
Somerset Waste Partnership 
Somerset is a rural county in the south west of England. It has wealthy commu-
nities and small pockets of deprivation. The population is just under 500,000
and there are 214,000 households. Unemployment is below the national average
(1.9 per cent in Somerset, 3.2 per cent national average) and so is the popula-
tion of black and minority communities (0.5 per cent in Somerset, 5.5 per cent
national average) (Office of National Statistics (ONS), 2001; Audit
Commission, 2002). Tourism is an important industry, and in some areas popu-
lation doubles in the summer. The Somerset Waste Partnership (SWP) is between
the two tiers of the local authority responsible for waste collection, treatment
and disposal across the county (five district councils responsible for collections
and the county council responsible for treatment and disposal). 
Over the last decade SWP has evolved from an informal network into a
semi-formal partnership. Partners have agreed to develop it further to establish
a single Somerset Waste Board in the future. This will have executive responsi-
bility for all waste collection, disposal and recycling services across Somerset.
The first working form of the partnership was a Joint Advisory Committee
established in 1992. This involved council officers and members sharing knowl-
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edge, experience and good practice. At this stage SWP was somewhat like a
network (McCabe et al, 1997) or community of practice (Wenger, 2002).
In 1997 SWP signed a Memorandum of Understanding to work together in
developing and implementing a Household Waste Management Strategy. In
2000 SWP was the first in England to undertake a Joint Best Value Review.
According to the Audit Commission (2002), the process of the review benefited
and cemented partnership working by creating ownership of the findings. It
also moved the partnership from a talking shop to effective partnership
working. It is hoped that the single Somerset Waste Board will formalize part-
nership working and deliver integration of services. This is likely to result in
more standardized collection services across the county.
SWP has adopted a source-separation strategy as the principal means of
improving recycling and composting performance (separation takes place
before collection). Households are required to keep various recyclables sepa-
rate from remaining general (‘residual’) waste. The collector then puts the
mixed recyclables through a further stage of separation on the collection
vehicle at the kerbside. SWP’s source separation targets a large number of dry
recyclable materials (paper, glass, plastics, cans and textiles), food waste and
garden waste. This approach is combined with reduced collection of residual
waste, from weekly to fortnightly, thus providing an incentive for households
to participate.
Three of the five collection districts have adopted the weekly collection of
dry recyclables and food waste, with a charged fortnightly collection for garden
waste, and a fortnightly collection of residual waste. Although established in
some areas in Europe, this is the first time a system including separate food-
waste collection from low-rise housing has been introduced on a large scale in
the UK. Although it will take some time for the scheme to be fully implemented,
SWP claims that early indications show an increase in recycling rates to over 50
per cent.
Understanding the interaction between recycling and residual waste is
important in this case. For instance, some treatment facilities (such as energy
from waste plants) require large quantities of residual waste to operate effec-
tively. The risk is that this will discourage the development of alternatives such
as recycling and composting. SWP understands this and stresses the importance
of appropriate residual facilities to prevent technology ‘lock in’ and to give
them flexibility in adapting to legislation and policy developments.
Hackney Waste Partnership 
Hackney is an inner-city borough in north east London. The population of
210,000 lives in 90,500 households. It is one of the most ethnically diverse and
socially deprived areas in England; unemployment is over 6 per cent, and 56
per cent of the population is from black or minority ethnic communities. Street
crime is six times the national average and burglary and vehicle crime is double
the national average (Audit Commission, 2004). Over half the housing stock is
high-rise purpose-built multi-occupancy and around one-quarter is non-
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purpose-built multi-occupancy. Neither of these suits traditional kerbside recy-
cling services.
During the 1990s and early 2000s Hackney had one of the lowest recy-
cling rates in the country (around 1 to 2 per cent). Following significant service
improvements Hackney now records a rate of 12 per cent and aims to achieve
18 per cent by 2005/06. It has achieved this increase largely through a source
separation and collection strategy. Hackney’s residual waste collection and
street cleansing are carried out by its own in-house Direct Service
Organization. The collection of municipal material for recycling and compost-
ing, however, is carried out by two community waste sector organizations,
Ealing Community Transport (ECT) and East London Community Recycling
Partnership (ELCRP).
ECT provides a number of public services and it is the largest not-for-profit
integrated waste management company in the UK. They provide weekly multi-
material kerbside recycling services to low-rise properties across the borough
and a fortnightly garden-waste collection service. Where the kerbside service is
unworkable, such as in high-rise estates, they provide a near-entry collection
system for dry recyclables. This comprises a number of containers where resi-
dents can deposit recyclables. ECT is also trialling a separate food-waste
collection service for low-rise properties.
ELCRP is a small community sector organisation specializing in door-to-
door services on estates, including collection of recyclables and compostables. It
is managed and run largely by people from the community. They successfully
undertook a ‘closed loop’ pilot project of estates-based door-to-door collection
and composting of separated food waste, and in partnership with the council
are rolling this out across a number of other estates in the borough. The serv-
ices provided by ELCRP include a couple of ‘firsts’ in the UK: the first
estates-based (high-rise) door-to-door collection of food waste; and the first
fully enclosed and controlled (i.e. in-vessel) community-based composting
process to be approved under the Animal By-Products Regulations.
ELCRP also works with ECT to collect estates-based dry recyclables door-
to-door for deposit in near-entry systems for collection by ECT.
Analysis
In exploring these two cases it is important to bear in mind key differences.
SWP brings together collection and disposal authorities whereas the Hackney
Waste Partnership (HWP) links the collection authority and service providers.
Also, population and environmental conditions are different in each case. This
section presents an analysis focusing on two themes: the different motivations
for partnership working using the concepts of resource synergy and policy
synergy; and the links between partnerships, local sovereignty and local service
delivery. 
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Motivations and partnerships
Partnerships for resource synergy
Resource synergy was a strong driver in both cases. Delivering resource effi-
ciencies was frequently cited as the primary motivation for partnership working
by the full range of actors. For local authority partnerships, efficiencies are
understood to be deliverable through: integration of collection, treatment and
disposal; increased standardization of collection systems; management, admin-
istrative and operational efficiencies; economies of scale and/or limiting rising
costs; avoidance of duplication through sharing expertise, best practice, research
and data, and communication strategies.
In two-tier authority structures the different priorities of collection and
disposal can lead to tensions. For SWP, greater cohesion and delivery of a more
efficient service are primary motivations. Officers within the partnership spoke
of a shift in focus to saving money for the council-taxpayer in Somerset, rather
than focusing on savings for individual districts or the county. Greater stan-
dardization of services facilitates contract integration, and this is a driving force
behind SWP plans to establish a partnership waste board. This board would
procure standard services across the whole county.
SWP believes that such developments will deliver administrative and
management benefits. Duplication in procurement, for example, will be reduced
with decisions being taken by the board rather than districts. There will also be
operational efficiencies through economies of scale and the removal of artificial
administrative boundaries and rationalizing of service depots. Somerset County
Council also believes that the waste board will offer a more defined career path
and better opportunities than the present structure. In moving towards a single
waste board, SWP is effectively emphasizing the centralization of services.
Such vertical integration, however, places local sovereignty, participation
and innovation at risk. Generally speaking, for example, most recycling collec-
tion schemes develop within autonomous local districts and there can be a huge
variety of types across a county. SWP acknowledges the tension between central-
ization and local knowledge, engagement and accountability. According to one
senior SWP officer:
… [with]integration there’s a danger of becoming an anonymous
body, and I think that’s a real concern that we need to make sure
we address. There are clearly economies that we can attain for the
benefit of all the councils and we can probably end up with a more
co-ordinated high performing service, but if they are inaccessible
for the customer they have failed. (6 May 2005)
SWP also acknowledges that standardized services across the county may not
be timely or appropriate for all districts. What may be required is a service that
allows for differences between districts but if districts want variations they may
incur greater costs.
For HWP, delivering efficiency gains was also an important factor; cost-
effectiveness of services is a statutory obligation. Beyond their local partnerships
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with service providers, the collection authority is working with neighbouring
authorities to improve efficiency. This includes specific initiatives to share
resources, such as a green waste collection service and an awareness raising
programme. However, unlike SWP, HWP stressed the importance of ‘added
social value’ from the locally embedded schemes, which can help address social
problems and improve local environments. According to one HWP officer:
Obviously percentage targets are the most important factor but
here the other factors are always important. Trying to improve the
quality of life for those who live in areas that are deprived and
recycling facilities help in that which is precisely why we have
adopted the ways that we have of getting local groups involved.
(11 January 2005)
Partnerships for policy synergy
Policy synergy was important in both partnerships but SWP seemed to empha-
size it less than resource efficiencies. This can be illustrated by exploring
innovation as an alternative to efficiency. Bringing together different perspec-
tives and sharing experiences can foster innovative approaches. Drawing on
experience from other authorities, and the private and community waste sectors,
SWP initially developed a range of alternative models and projections for collec-
tion systems over the long term. The districts were divided over their favoured
model. Mendip favoured separate food-waste collections whilst South Somerset
and Taunton Deane favoured combining garden and food waste. Initially it was
thought that SWP would adopt both. In the end, however, due to a number of
factors, including Mendip’s positive experience from the separate food-waste
trials, both South Somerset and Taunton Deane chose the separate food-waste
system. According to a senior waste officer in Taunton Deane:
Initially it wasn’t the way I would have chosen to have gone, but I
guess when you deal with innovation you don’t know the
answers…it’s difficult to really know what the reaction to this will
be until we actually do it, but I am guided by Mendip and South
Somerset who have done it before. (5 May 2005)
Other authority partners within SWP also had a positive regard for partnership
working in developing new approaches, but were fearful that a move to a single
waste partnership board may constrain that capacity. According to a senior
officer at Sedgemoor District Council:
Partnerships are a good way of approaching innovation because it
gives you more confidence, more heads are better than one, there
are opportunities for more debating, to develop ideas and do more
trials. If we become a formal partnership working together in one
place there won’t be partners on this sort of level [district authori-
ties]… and it may mean losing some of the innovative stuff… 
(5 May 2005)
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In bringing together different perspectives SWP relied predominantly on core
partners, namely the waste disposal authority and waste collection authorities.
In contrast, HWP brings together the waste collection authority and service
providers like ECT and ELCRP. These bring different types of knowledge and
experience to the partnership. Hackney Council is keen to engage with the CWS
and to use niche service providers to address the areas diversity. Given their
mixed housing stock and ethnically diverse population, the council recognize
that a homogenous system is not viable and policy synergy underpins the idea
of developing multiple systems for collection. In the words of one officer:
We have got high rise and low rise and different
communities…you can’t have a one size fits all approach, it means
you need specialists for different areas. For instance East London
Community Recycling Partnership are specialists in high-rise and
Ealing Community Transport more low-rise, so between them we
can cover both aspects… They have so many ideas … it’s not just
the council saying this is what you have got to do, it’s us saying
well what do you think? (11 January 2005)
Both ECT and ELCRP take a proactive problem solving approach. They are
keen to be flexible to meet the council’s objectives. Both supported the council’s
view on the need to incorporate their experience and expertise in developing
services. According to ECT:
Working in partnership with Hackney Council means we have
common aims and we bring our respective resources and skills to
bear to achieve those aims. The primary aim is to hit the statutory
recycling target and to provide a level of service that the Council
wants residents to get, so the quality is important. We share those
aims. Now we don’t always share the same ideas about how to
achieve them so that will come up for discussion and we will work
that through. We talk about what things might work, and they
will say ‘you guys have a lot of experience in this field, what do
you think we should do?’ (22 February 2005)
Partnerships as a business strategy
In both SWP and HWP, key service providers see partnership as an important
business strategy. Cleanaway Ltd is a large private waste management company.
They collect residual and garden waste for four of the five districts in the SWP.
ECT is a large social-enterprise providing kerbside recycling services for both
SWP and HWP. Although contracts are involved, both organizations stressed
differences in partnership working compared with traditional client-contractor
relationships. Authorities are increasingly negotiating with industry, and service
providers help to define key performance indicators. 
In providing services in partnership with authorities, service providers need
to share the aims of the authority, particularly statutory targets and a quality
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service to the householder. They increasingly need a flexible, problem-solving
approach that requires a more consensual-based mindset, in contrast to a
contract-led approach, which was often termed by case-study participants as
confrontational or adversarial. Nevertheless, service providers for both SWP
and HWP acknowledge that partnership working is a business strategy:
It’s about growing the business, doing a good job and getting a
good reputation and being seen as the choice partner for the
future. (ECT, 22 February 2005)
We are happy to work in partnership in any way with any author-
ity … it’s a very competitive business and we are there to try and
cement long-term relationships. (Cleanaway, 7 June 2005)
Partnership, sovereignty and serving local communities
Having considered motivations and organizational structures, this section looks
at the relationship between different structures and local sovereignty and service
delivery. Waste and recycling is a highly visible, front-line public service deliv-
ered to households. Local knowledge and expertise are important in designing
schemes and communication strategies between the collection authority and
households are necessary, especially with respect to separation and participa-
tion. Normalizing recycling provides scope for increasing awareness of waste
and wider environmental and citizenship issues. Both Somerset and Hackney
acknowledged the importance of accountability and responsiveness, but how
they address these issues is influenced by partnership structures. 
Increasingly, two-tier waste disposal and collection authorities are adopting
a model similar to the SWP plan: greater centralization and standardization of
services delivered through a single waste authority. Such changes imply more
distance from communities. According to districts, SWP centralization is likely
to result in a loss of sovereignty for individual waste collection authorities.
Without careful implementation to maintain local links this could reduce
responsiveness and accountability locally. It might also be more difficult for
district council members to access officer expertise, and this could limit the
capacity for policy synergy. According to one senior officer:
One of the things that our members are concerned about is that
they will lose people of my level of expertise. So when they go to
the board they won’t have that expertise to inform them, they
won’t have the skills and knowledge to challenge what’s being put
to them, and I think that is really important. (5 May 2005)
In contrast, the council involved in HWP believe that a larger number of smaller
contracts allow them to respond to local conditions (they acknowledge that
there might be greater management and administrative costs). Poor perform-
ance in some service areas in the past has led to public mistrust of the council
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and they think that community based recycling might go some way to address-
ing this. With this in mind ELCRP is particularly interesting. It is a small-scale
organization, committed to being embedded in the communities it serves and to
bringing them social and environmental benefits. Residents are engaged in the
planning and implementation process via tenants and residents associations,
and they seek to recruit locally.
This scheme has led to a number of benefits that were not anticipated at the
outset. Collecting separated food waste door-to-door has removed food waste
from the residual waste collection, which uses chutes and communal contain-
ment. This has reduced blockages of chutes, and vermin. In addition, collection
teams work in uniformed pairs and feedback suggests they have reduced the
fear of crime on the estate. According to ELCRP, embedding the service in the
local community encourages participation and they claim take-up rates as high
as 80+ per cent in some of the high-rise blocks. Hackney Council recognizes the
social benefits and ‘added value’ delivered by such schemes, although it is diffi-
cult to quantify and cost such ‘soft’ benefits.
Discussion and conclusions
There is a spectrum of partnerships in municipal waste management from infor-
mal to formal. The evidence suggests that in some cases, such as SWP, there is a
life cycle that involves progress across this spectrum. Informal beginnings help
to build relationships and trust and these facilitate more formal commitments.
In addition, this research supports the argument that partnerships in practice
include aspects of hierarchies, markets and networks (Lowndes and Skelcher,
1998; Hartley, 2005). During the procurement of services, for example, the
market can be invoked in tendering and contracts, but afterwards the public
authority and service providers can work collaboratively.
Partnerships to bring different parts of the state together, such as SWP, can
be both strategic and operational. Waste partnerships that include non-state
actors, however, tend to focus on service implementation rather than strategy
(e.g. HWP). This supports Pearson (2001) and Taylor (2001), who found that
public service strategy continues to be primarily driven by local government,
and partnership working is constrained to the delivery of specific initiatives. In
addition, although partnership working between two-tier authorities aims to
integrate collection and disposal, a hierarchy can remain because the disposal
authority has power to stipulate the material type and collection format.
The dominant motivation for partnership in the case of SWP is efficiency.
Greater cohesion between two-tier authorities is seen as being able to deliver
resource synergy benefits. Authorities are increasingly looking to integrated
contracts with service providers to realize these. Such contracts are often large-
scale, long-term and with one service provider. Thus they can favour larger and
well established incumbent organizations. There is a risk that such contracts
will lock public authorities into particular technologies and processes and, in so
doing, stifle innovation.
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Developments along these lines appear to accompany the tendency to
centralize service provision, for example the creation of a single centralized
waste management board. This is also, however, a response to greater hierar-
chical control from central government. Although proponents of single waste
authorities claim they are still based on partnerships, efficiencies associated
with streamlining decision making need to be balanced against loss of sover-
eignty at the local level and related benefits. Centralization appears to conflict
with localism by distancing decision making and service delivery further from
communities. 
Although HWP is also motivated by efficiency, it does not believe a stan-
dardized collection approach is suitable, and it has adopted a multiple service
provider model. In this way it hopes to link diverse specialisms with mixed
communities and settings. The multiple-service provider approach encourages
innovation. It also creates space to ‘embed’ certain initiatives and technologies
within the communities they serve. The close proximity of provider and user
facilitates engagement and service feedback. As well as contributing to waste
targets, it is these initiatives that often deliver additional social and environ-
mental benefits. The public authority acknowledges that this approach may
require greater management and administrative resources.
Integrated contracts that marginalize small and specialist organizations risk
losing the innovative potential of the CWS more broadly. ELCRP argues that its
community base increases participation in its schemes. This is supported by
evidence from other CWS schemes (Luckin and Sharp, 2004). Engagement with
residents also facilitates understanding of the needs of user and service provider.
In many ways HWP demonstrates localism in service delivery. That said,
although HWP’s CWS service providers can make a valuable contribution to
policy, they do not necessarily represent the community, making this local rather
than citizen governance.
There is some evidence to suggest that successful partnerships develop from
small informal projects that give rise to equity, efficiency and trust (Ring and
Van den Van, 1994). For established waste partnerships that developed organi-
cally, relatively slow evolution through shared experience was an important
element in developing consensus and allowing the partnership to become more
formal. However, there is an increasing trend for the creation of waste partner-
ships to be driven externally, either by policy or funding. This raises the question
whether ‘imposed’ partnerships will be able to work successfully without a
shared history that has developed understanding and trust.
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Chapter 9




This chapter discusses the influence of governance systems on wind power
policy and implementation outcomes. Studying how wind power policy
outcomes occur, in particular the volume and rate of deployment of wind power,
is important for two reasons. First, so that we can engage in analysis of an area
of great public interest, and second, so that we are in a better position to assess
how policies can best be shaped to achieve desirable outcomes in this policy
field.
Various factors influence wind power planning outcomes, including the
financial procurement regime, population density, landscape value, the degree
and nature of grass roots energy initiatives and the planning framework (Toke,
2005a). We cannot directly influence population density, or even the general
population’s attitude to landscape value, by manipulating governance struc-
tures dealing with wind power. However, it may be possible to develop these
governance structures to fit around these influences, for instance by deploying
wind power in ways that may be more acceptable to the local population. Local
people have been identified as the chief influence on planning outcomes in
places like the UK where population density is high and where landscape issues
loom large (Toke, 2005b).
Discussion of wind power governance structures has so far been mainly
limited to a discussion of the relative merits and de-merits of so-called fixed
price regimes for funding wind power (REFIT systems) and so-called market
based systems such as the UK’s Renewables Obligation (RO). This debate is
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important because conventional political wisdom poses a relationship between
different types of financial procurement regime and wind power outcomes. In
particular, market based systems are said to be cost effective but are thought to
favour the electricity industry establishment, whereas fixed price ‘feed-in’ tariffs
are said to favour more grass-roots initiatives at the cost of giving some people
windfall profits (Lauber, 2004; Toke, 2005c; Mitchell et al, 2006). However,
less attention has been given to the different networks that exist in different
countries, and the knowledge systems that underpin these networks. We can
describe financial procurement mechanisms and also the planning systems that
make up the governance systems. We can compare these arrangements in differ-
ent country case studies. This, however, is a ‘realist’ approach since we are
assuming that the actors in the different countries have the same notion of
reality and the same notions of what is right and wrong and how to develop
wind power.
It is important to study the networks and the knowledge systems with which
they are associated. This is because these networks and knowledge systems may
say a lot about wind power deployment that is not necessarily related to
whether the financial procurement system is fixed price or market based. We
can study this area by utilizing the distinction between ontology and epistemol-
ogy.
As an article in a philosophy journal puts it:
Ontological concepts are those of object, process, particular, indi-
vidual, whole, part, property, and quality. Epistemological
concepts are those of belief, knowledge and uncertain or wrong
knowledge. (Poli, 2001, p2)
It could also be added, as far as ontology is concerned, that it involves relation-
ships, a point made by Gruber (2005) who says (in the context of a discussion
about artificial intelligence) that:
an ontology is a description (like a formal specification of a
program) of the concepts and relationships that can exist for an
agent or a community of agents. (Gruber, 2005)
The nature of the networks is an ontological issue since it involves the shape
and quality of the wind power industry and its relationships. These are the
nature of the networks that constitute the wind power industry, the relation-
ships between developers and the rest of the electricity and wind power industry,
the relationships to particular localities, and the financial linkages in terms of
investment patterns. In different countries, there is, as we shall see, a different
‘reality’ as far as the structure and relationships of the wind power industry is
concerned.
The nature of the knowledge systems associated with the networks is an
epistemological issue. The epistemologies are what, in different countries, is
thought to be the right or most practical way of developing wind power (e.g.
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through corporate or cooperative or local investment), and the way that knowl-
edge about wind power is collected and disseminated.
The UK has what is arguably the largest relatively pure market based
system, and also a rapidly developing wind power sector. We can compare this
with the three countries with the highest proportion of electricity from wind
power to date, namely Denmark (21 per cent), Germany (5 per cent) and Spain
(7 per cent). I also include the Netherlands, since this country has also had a
longstanding renewable energy procurement programme.
I shall begin in a conventional way by describing the deployment outcomes
(e.g. quantities of wind power capacity, types of schemes) and the nature of the
financial procurement systems. In the rest of the chapter I go on to study the
non-governmental networks involved, using the concepts associated with ontol-
ogy and epistemology.
Financial governance
Renewable energy feed-in tariffs have been associated with the bulk of wind
power deployment in Europe, as can be seen in Figure 9.1 for Germany,
Denmark and Spain. Feed-in tariffs involve paying renewable energy generators
guaranteed set prices for each unit of electricity produced.
The UK and, until recently, the Netherlands, have been associated with
market based systems. These involve the creation of ‘green electricity certifi-
cates’, which electricity suppliers have to buy from renewable electricity
generators in order to satisfy their targets for renewable electricity supply.
There are some stereotypical notions about the relative performance of feed-
in tariffs and market based systems:  
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Note: ‘ROW’ means ‘rest of world’.
Source: Wind Power Monthly (January, 2005)
Figure 9.1 World Wind Power Capacity by Nation for 2004
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 170
• Market based systems are more cost-effective than feed-in tariffs. This
opinion is supported by Eurelectric, the peak organization representing the
European electricity industry (Eurelectric, 2004). 
• Feed-in tariffs are necessarily better for grass roots ownership. This notion
is supported by left-of-centre and anti-nuclear activists (Wind-works, 2004).
However, these are not borne out by the evidence.
First, let us compare the returns per MW (megawatt) from the different
systems, the Spanish and German being feed-in tariffs and the UK system being
market based. The UK figure is based on an average return likely for typical
contracts with electricity suppliers, and the German figure is based on 2004
payments to electricity suppliers in the first year of 5.9p/kwh (pence/kilowatt
hour) but reducing this to 5.5p/kwh to take some account of the fact that the
payments decline in later years. Even the starting point is being reduced by 2
per cent each year in nominal terms (never mind real terms because the
payments are not inflation indexed).
It can be seen from the figures in Table 9.1 that once different capacity
factors are taken into account, the UK’s market based RO is not necessarily
more cost-effective in delivering wind power. Indeed on these figures the British
system seems to be the most expensive, and the German system the cheapest, in
terms of expected rates of return per MW.
The point about the RO is simply that it is not very competitive. Although
there may be a market in incentives, that is green electricity certificates, which
the electricity suppliers need to buy in order to demonstrate that they are
meeting the targets, this market does not help developers, who need long term
contracts. There is no long term market in the green electricity certificates.
Hence the developers are beholden to the electricity suppliers, who are needed
to give them contracts to supply electricity. Even so, the value of the renewable
obligation certificates (ROCs) becomes higher the more the RO target is unful-
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Table 9.1 Cost-effectiveness of the UK ‘renewable obligation’ 
in delivering wind power
Country Tariff in p/KWh Average capacity Annual return per
factor (%) installed MW (£)
Germany 5.5 (declining) 18 87,000
United 5.0 (15 yr contract) 28 123,000
Kingdom 7.0 (annual contract) 172,000
Spain 4.5 28 110,000
Note: German and UK capacity factor figures are based on analysis of operating data for years
2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. The Spanish capacity factor figure is based on interviews with wind
power development representatives of Iberdrola (electricity utility) and EVE (Basque Energy
Agency). UK tariff figure is based on interviews with developers about contractual terms with
electricity suppliers, and German and Spanish tariff figures are based on rates set by government.
(Interview with Gonzalo Saenz de Miera (Iberdrola) 9 December 2004 and Enrique Monasterio and
Javier Marques (EVE) 10 December 2004. Also see Toke (2005c)).
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filled. In addition, renewable generators can sell their electricity for baseload
prices. The oligopolistic electricity suppliers who dominate electricity markets
have a vested interest in maintaining the value of their investments (and not
seeing the price of ROCs crash), so the targets will remain unfulfilled, hence
keeping up the value of the ROCs (Toke, 2005c). Hence, in practice, there are
very good terms available for renewable generators from electricity suppliers (in
terms of British wind conditions), whether they want long term guarantees (15-
year contracts) or are willing to take short term contracts in return for much
higher payments for renewable electricity.
The ‘neo-liberal’ stereotype of market solutions delivering cost-effectiveness
may be misplaced in this case. However, a ‘left wing’ stereotype may also be
misplaced, namely the notion that fixed tariffs help farmer and cooperative
schemes whilst market based approaches help the schemes planned by big
companies.
We can see this in Figure 9.2 below, which shows proportions of capacity
owned by cooperatives, farmers and corporate concerns. In fact, in Germany
most of the financing of even the ‘corporate’ sector is raised through popular
share offers. In the ‘corporate’ cases, however, the shareholders are high income
earners who do not necessarily live anywhere near the schemes, but who can
benefit by offsetting high marginal tax rates against their investments in wind
power. In Denmark the cooperatives largely pioneered the early deployment of
wind power, although in later years of expansion it was farmer ownership that
predominated.
However, whilst it may be the case that decentralized wind power coexists
with feed-in tariffs in Germany and Denmark, this is not the case in Spain,
where practically no wind power is owned by local people. Moreover, in the
Netherlands, a big farmer-owned sector and some cooperatives were built up in
a market based system that was changed only in 2005.
It does seem from this discussion that the nature of the financial procure-
ment system may not be the biggest factor influencing the patterns of ownership
of the wind power industry. This, of course, assumes that incentives offered to
wind power developers are good enough to offer the possibility of widespread
economic viability for wind power schemes. 
Even within the UK it seems plausible that the relative lack of farmer owned
and cooperative owned wind power schemes is related to cultural differences
with Germany and Denmark. This includes the lack of a militant anti-nuclear
movement. In any event there have been very few initiatives in the UK to create
locally owned wind power schemes.
On the other hand, it is even plausible to argue that the RO actually offers
more financial possibilities for cooperative schemes compared to conventional
ones. This is because cooperatives, such as the ones organized by Baywind Co-
operative and Energy4All, can dispense with the long term contracts with
electricity suppliers that allow these electricity suppliers to take a lot of the
value of the ROCs. They can reclaim more or less their full value, so earning
around £70 per MWh (assuming the RO is two-thirds fulfilled) compared to
only £50 to £55 per MWh if they agree to a 15-year contract.
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Indeed, at the time of writing, a farmer in Oxfordshire is in the process of
setting up a community wind farm using precisely these terms. Adam Twine, of
Watchmill, Oxfordshire has won planning consent for a 6.5 MW project, which
will be financed by a cooperative share offer aimed principally at the local popu-
lation. The share offer is being organized by Energy4All – an offshoot of the
Baywind Energy Co-operative, which runs the UK’s first commercial scale wind
power cooperative in Cumbria, north west England. There could be a lot more
like him. The slowness to develop locally owned wind power in the UK seems
to be connected with a shortage of numbers of determined individuals rather
than a lack of financial possibilities.
There is also a farmer-owned project at Moel Maelogen in Conwy, Wales.
This began with a 3.9MW project, but in November 2004 this gained planning
permission for an extension to around 15MW. This is the sort of size adopted
by conventional developers, yet it is being developed by a cooperative of three
farmers who have acted as their own developers. The financial advantage for
the farmers is that they receive the profits in respect of their share holdings, as
opposed merely to the 2 per cent royalty that accrues to farmers who merely
rent their land to corporate developers. The point here is that these farmers are
succeeding in developing wind power themselves and have secured the neces-
sary contracts and bank loan to do this. The fact that there is a paucity of others
following suit seems to be because there is a lack of suitably motivated volun-
teers, not because the RO prevents them from doing so.
It should also be noted that any supposed preference for ‘larger’ schemes
under market based arrangements is also very dubious. Again, the Spanish wind
power scene is dominated by large schemes. On the other hand, in Germany,
there are some quite large farmer-owned wind farms and even large coopera-
tives (interview, Hans Detlef Feddersen, 2 September 2004). In Denmark,
farmer owned schemes have been much smaller, since each farmer has been
limited, by law, to owning just one machine. We can see here that there is
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Source: Data collated from interviews with representatives of wind industry associations in the
different states.
Figure 9.2 Patterns of Ownership of Wind Power
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evidence that the different financial linkages involved in the feed-in tariffs do
not necessarily produce different networks in the wind industry itself since the
incentive structures for local/small/large/corporate concerns remain largely the
same. The only major exception, albeit a significant exception, to this pattern
may have been the exclusion of the German utilities from being able to develop
wind farms using the feed-in tariff until the year 2000. This reduced the incen-
tives for the utilities to invest in their own wind power schemes and may also
have made the utilities more hostile to the wind power programme than they
might otherwise have been.
Governance and planning
The UK is marked out by having the most conflictual system of wind power
planning. This does not just reflect opposition to wind power, for planning
consent for wind power is not necessarily easier to obtain in the Netherlands
than in the UK. In the Netherlands, the large bulk of decisions appear to take
place before the schemes are formally proposed. In the UK, however, the large
majority of cases will be decided through formal application and voting by local
councillors on development and control committees. It may appear that the UK
planning system presents more problems for developers than other systems, but
this appearance is deceptive. If anything, many of the rules actually favour wind
power developers in the UK (compared to other countries) since developers who
are refused planning consent at a local authority levels can appeal, often success-
fully, to government inspectors. Indeed this facility was strengthened by the
revised planning guidance note on renewable energy (PPG22) that came into
effect in November 2004.
Spain is distinguishable from other European states in that its planning is
centred on the regions, and some of the regional governments take a strong
proactive stance in planning wind farm development. The local municipalities
are involved in the process, but they rarely stop projects going ahead. Although
there are sometimes campaigns organized by local wildlife conservation groups
to protect particular hills, there is no organized landscape protection body as
such in Spain. This may explain the relatively greater ease with which wind
power schemes gain planning consent in Spain compared to say, the UK, rather
than the nature of the planning framework itself. However, the differences
between planning outcomes and ownership patterns in other western European
cases are not explained purely by differences in attitude to landscape value.
Hence, we are posed a question. How can we explain such differences?
In the UK, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (in contrast to Spain),
public authorities take a passive stance in that they merely react to proposals
when they arise. Regional targets are indicative rather than prescriptive.
Nevertheless, in Germany and Denmark laws enacted in the 1990s have placed
responsibilities on local authorities for identifying areas within their localities
where wind power developments should be placed.
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It does not seem from this evidence that particular governmental planning
structures are associated with either relatively strong or weak deployment of
wind power capacity. It also seems to be the case from the earlier discussion
that there is no clear link between the type of financial governance and the
networks of ownership and the type of relationships that help constitute the
wind industry. Hence we need to investigate the nature of the networks them-
selves and the understandings that surround them if we are to understand the
shape of the wind power industries in different countries.
Different ontologies of networks
The organization of the wind industries in Germany and Denmark can be
contrasted with the dominant networks in the UK and Spain. In Germany and
Denmark the relationship between, on the one hand, the individual investor
and/or owner and, on the other hand, the wind farm itself, has been an impor-
tant part of the network making up the wind industry (Toke and Elliot, 2000).
By contrast, local/individual investor/owners are of marginal or no importance
in the UK and Spain.
The Danish and German wind industries have relied heavily on local
networks of agents of wind generator manufacturers, low-cost local consultants
who have often doubled as political enthusiasts, farmer-owners and local organ-
izers of cooperatives. The farmers and cooperatives have very often been the
developers themselves, and have negotiated their relationships with local
authorities, banks and wind generator manufacturers. The role of ‘developers’
in this model is limited largely to final construction of the projects after the
details have been tied up by the local actors. In Denmark the large bulk of the
onshore wind power capacity has been organized in this way, with only a small
proportion of the onshore developments being organized by the electricity utili-
ties. The intensity of this ‘localist’ ontology was built up on the basis of the
Danish grass roots ‘bottom upwards’ development of wind power technology
itself. This developed almost as a rural enterprise, mixing a unique blend of
agricultural and engineering technology (Karnoe, 1990).
On the other hand, in Germany, half the market has been organized by
corporate developers. However, these are not like the corporate entities in states
such as the UK and Spain since the investment comes from individual high
income earners through public share offers. The high income earners have been
able to use Germany’s tax laws, which enable the high German marginal tax
rates for high income earners (over 50 per cent) to be offset taxes against invest-
ments in wind power. However, as the level of the feed-in tariff has fallen these
companies’ offers have been perceived as much less attractive, and the financial
position of these companies has been weakened by recent low wind-yield years.
Moreover, it is expected that changes will be made in regulations, so reducing
the scope for tax concessions. Given these changes, it is not surprising that rates
of deployment of German wind power are declining.
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In Germany the utilities were (until 2000) denied access to the feed-in tariff,
which has deterred them from developing wind power and encouraged them to
construct wind power as competing for market share with their own invest-
ments in conventional generation. This situation has been associated with
utilities opposing the feed-in tariff. Interestingly, while companies like E.ON
and RWE have opposed subsidies to wind power in Germany, they have at least
tolerated the British RO. E.ON and RWE together control around a third of the
UK electricity supply market. In the case of the UK the electricity oligopolies
have more control over the wind power investments and more ability to make
money out of them than is the case in Germany. In Denmark individual and
cooperative development of wind power has stopped (apart from repowering
and offshore programmes) following the cut-off of subsidies at the end of 2001.
This followed from a combination of events. As in Germany, Danish utilities
were critical of the costs of supporting the wind power programme, and also,
since November 2001, Denmark has for the first time in many decades been
governed by a solely right wing coalition that excludes even centre parties. In
Denmark wind power has been most favoured by the centre and left wing
parties.
The developing offshore wind power industry in Denmark and Germany is
more corporate-oriented. However, even here there has been a substantial coop-
erative input. Half of the equity of Denmark’s first offshore installation
(Middlegunden) is owned by a cooperative, and what is projected to be the
second German offshore project, a very large scheme at 240 MW, will be owned
entirely by a cooperative (Budentiek, 2005). 
By contrast, in Spain, and mostly in the UK, the notion of developers is
synonymous with large electricity companies, or developers that are backed by
large electricity or engineering concerns. No farmer-owned or cooperative-
owned wind farms exist in Spain, and very few locally owned projects exist in
the UK. Indeed, developers are implicitly accepted as being necessary for the
planning and financing of schemes. Wind power is a highly professionalized
type of activity in Spain and the UK, and there is a close relationship between
developers, merchant banks and venture capitalist outfits. The big difference in
networks between the UK and Spain is the significance, in the UK, of anti-wind
power networks. These exist at local and national levels. Indeed, it is ironic that
there are also strong local wind power networks in Denmark and Germany, but
these are mostly pro-wind power networks consisting of activists and local
owners/investors, whereas in the UK practically the only voluntary local
activists are opposed to wind power. In the UK local anti-wind power networks
are serviced by an organization known popularly as the Country Guardians. In
Spain there is no national anti-wind power organization.
Wind power developments tend, on average, to be much less controversial
in Spain than in the UK. There are differences in local wind power networks, in
that in the UK anti-wind power networks are much more common than in
Spain. A minority of wind power developments in Spain do become items of
dispute on account of objections from local nature conservation groups
(although not on landscape grounds). However, such difficulties tend to be
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resolved by additional sums of money being earmarked for local purposes
(interview, Alfonso Cano, 9 December 2004).
However, in the case of the wind power industry itself, the ontology of the
wind power industry in the UK is much closer to that existing in Spain, rather
than Germany and Denmark. In the UK most wind power is owned by corpo-
rate-backed developers. These corporate players are sometimes theoretically
independent, but most are at least funded by one of the five or six big electricity
suppliers. They are non-local developers and their networks are non-local in
nature. Usually the only significant network link with the locality is that they
give royalties to the farmer whose land is needed for the wind farm. Some devel-
opers also offer income streams to the local parish council. There is usually no
local ownership, the schemes are inspired and piloted through the planning
process by the outside developer, not local people.
This has important implications for planning outcomes. As Loring (2004)
suggests, the existence of active local networks supporting wind power propos-
als boosts their chances of gaining planning consent. The point about local
ownership of wind power in its effects on the planning systems is that if a
scheme is locally inspired then the local proponents can utilize their social
networks to increase the chances of gaining planning consent compared to
schemes organized by outside developers with few local contacts. In Spain it
does not matter so much that wind power is dominated by outside developers
because there is much less concern for landscape impact in Spain compared to
the UK, and also the population density is much lower in Spain. If population
density is lower then there are likely to be fewer local people to object to wind
farm planning applications.
It should also be pointed out that there is, in practice, little concrete
evidence for the popular view that somehow small wind farms are more accept-
able per se in planning terms than large wind farms. In a statistical analysis of
51 wind farm planning cases Toke (2005b) found that there was no association
between the size of a scheme and its chances of being given planning consent.
Danish experience does indeed suggest that the small farmer-owned and coop-
erative wind power schemes proved to be much more acceptable in planning
terms than larger schemes proposed by the utilities. As one report issued by the
Danish government puts it:
The local environmental disadvantages of wind power can lead to
a lack of public acceptance of wind farms. Local ownership of
wind turbines (local farmers, co-operatives or companies) can
ensure local acceptance of projects. (Andersen, 1998, p7)
Hence we can see that the tendency for smaller schemes to be accepted by the
planning system can be explained by different patterns of ownership, rather
than size itself. It happens that the cooperatives and the farmer-owned schemes
in Denmark were small. Indeed, under Danish law each farmer is permitted to
own only one wind turbine. By contrast the schemes proposed by the utilities
were much larger, and generally had much more difficulty in gaining planning
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approval. However, it is the local ownership that gave them the edge in the
planning system, as discussed earlier, not their size.
Different epistemologies of networks
When I talk about epistemologies in this context I mean those epistemologies
associated with the wind power networks themselves. This is to be distinguished
from the type of ‘discourse coalition’ talked about by Hajer (1995) or other
types of interest group alliance concerned with mobilizing pressure on policy
issues. Of course, many involved in the networks do engage in policy pressure
work, but this is a different matter to the beliefs and modes of knowledge accu-
mulation concerned with the business of the wind power industry in particular
countries. It is this latter notion of which I speak.
In Denmark people earning large profits from wind power was thought to
be very wrong – and, indeed, each owner could have only one machine. Only
the utilities were allowed to own more than one machine. In Germany it was
thought wrong for the electricity utilities to gain the benefit of the feed-in tariff
for wind power. On the other hand the electricity utilities were strongly opposed
to the feed-in tariff. In Denmark there has been a strong cooperative tradition
since the quasi-religious cooperative movement promoted by Gruntveg in the
19th century. This has provided a cultural justification for cooperative wind
power. This was buttressed by the bottom-up path of development of Danish
wind power to which I referred earlier. This grass roots tradition has entrenched
the notion that energy schemes can and should be organized on decentralized
lines. Indeed, a large proportion of fossil fuel generation is conducted through
decentralized gas-fired combined heat and power schemes that were started by
local cooperatives.
As the 1990s wore on, the bulk of wind power schemes were organized by
farmers. Farmer confidence in the ability to make a lot of money grew, and
they, rather than the cooperatives, tended to dominate the market. However, it
is important to note that the basis of wind power deployment remained local in
nature, as were the networks of agents and consultants who serviced this devel-
opment. These local networks were legitimized and provided with a big stream
of activists by an active anti-nuclear movement in Denmark, including the OVE
(Organisation for Renewable Energy), which was closely associated with the
anti-nuclear movement.
Although there is not quite the same intensity of cooperative tradition in
Germany, there were other political trends that generated a powerful pressure
for locally organized wind power developments. The citizens’ initiative move-
ment, which grew up in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, provided the political
basis for the emergence of the German Green Party in the 1980s. This move-
ment also became associated with a very militant (indeed still militant)
anti-nuclear movement. As in the case of Denmark, this provided a stream of
activists interested in organizing local energy initiatives. This movement also
legitimized a general trend towards supporting alternative energy activities, the
178 Governance and Sustainability: Consensus and Conflict
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 178
influence of which spread throughout society and included more traditionally
conservative sectors such as farmers.
In addition, in Denmark and Germany, finding and evaluating sites has itself
been a low-cost exercise. Charges for site and project evaluation and assistance
in bringing projects to development are low compared to the UK and Spain.
Local networks of wind generator agents and consultants provide these low
cost services, including achieving access to financial support from local banks.
There has been limited use of wind monitoring compared to countries like Spain
and the UK. The frequent existence of flat topography has helped this low-cost
way of discovering knowledge about wind speeds. Another aspect of differing
ways of finding and generating knowledge is the general disposition to share
data among operators and developers. However, this disposition of cooperation
rather than competition is the hallmark of the cooperative, (or at least not-as-
corporate) approach that is much in evidence in Denmark, Germany and the
Netherlands (which also has a tradition of local energy activism). Such cooper-
ation is avoided in the corporate-dominated wind industries in Spain and the
UK.
These epistemologies are interpreted differently in Spain and the UK. The
dominant piece of knowledge is that wind power is the business of big compa-
nies, and that local people can play little or no role in ownership of wind power
developments. This culture is especially strong in Spain, where it is unheard of
for farmers or cooperatives to engage in wind power development. On the other
hand, it is a very strong view in Britain and Spain that wind power represents a
very profitable exercise for institutional investors and generally people with
money to invest. Consultancy services are remote from the locality of the site
and expensive in nature. Indeed the whole of the industry in Spain and the UK
is highly professionalized and the need to buy-in expensive consultancy advice
is emphasized as the price that needs to be paid for site and project evaluation
and also for project financing. Knowledge about wind speeds is always gained
through very extensive wind speed monitoring. People are wary of sharing
information, and a disposition towards competition between developers is
dominant.
Certainly, the environmentalist movement was relatively weak in Spain in
the 1970s and 1980s, and provided very little basis for decentralized initiatives.
On the other hand, the trend towards rural depopulation has militated against
a widespread feeling that wind power is encroaching on a valuable landscape
asset. By contrast, in other European countries much of the countryside has
been suburbanized, or at least assumed a considerable amenity value because of
the desire by middle class people to live in the countryside rather than the city.
The environmentalist movement has been much stronger in the UK, yet the anti-
nuclear movement was relatively restrained compared to some continental
counterparts, and much of the strength of British environmentalism resides in
landscape and wildlife protection – which is sometimes not wind power’s
strongest suit. 
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Conclusion
It would seem that there is no clear relationship between financial governance
structures or planning systems and, in particular, the nature of the networks
and epistemologies that dominate in different wind power cases. Indeed, it may
be that there is a case for arguing that the influence is more the other way
around. That is, a localist tradition is likely to restrict the financial incentives
open to major electricity companies to deploy wind power, as happened in
Germany.
However, by tracing the ontological and epistemological natures of the
different wind power regimes in the different countries that have been discussed
we can see some possible relationships between epistemologies and the ontolo-
gies of the non-government networks themselves. Local pro-wind power
networks are strong in Denmark and Germany, in Spain they are not needed
because of a lack of opposition to wind power (on landscape impact grounds at
least), and in the UK the local wind power networks are most usually concerned
with opposing the technology. However, Spain and the UK have in common
both a lack of local pro-wind power networks and the domination of the wind
energy industry by a network of corporate developers and centrally organized
professionalized infrastructure. In Germany and Denmark, and to a great extent
in the Netherlands, this wind power industrial infrastructure is more localized.
Belief systems concerning the ‘truth’ about wind power mirror these different
configurations. In Spain, for example, wind power is something that big compa-
nies, not local people, organize, and this is also broadly the case in the UK. In
Denmark, and to a great extent in Germany, this knowledge is different in that
local ownership and organization of wind power is thought to be not only prac-
tical, but also preferable in the eyes of many parts of the wind industry. Methods
of collecting data necessary for implementation of wind power schemes are also
different, with German and Danish local developers relying on less expensive
locally based sources of expertise. 
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Chapter 10
Multi-Level Governance and Energy




Recent policy studies research has introduced a number of concepts to analyse
the widely observed trend toward the fragmentation of national government
powers. Among other themes (see Joseph Murphy’s introductory chapter for a
fuller account), contributions here have included the ‘hollowing out of the state’
(Rhodes, 1999), the shift from ‘government to governance’ (Pierre and Peters,
2000), and the emergence of ‘multi-level governance’ (Bache and Flinders,
2004a; Lyall and Tait, 2004, 2005). The latter is particularly relevant for the
concern here with the impact of devolution on policy making.
As Bache and Flinders (2004b) point out, multi-level governance (MLG)
attempts to capture both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ dimensions of the dispersal
of state powers. Horizontally, this refers to distributed responsibilities between
national government departments, statutory bodies and other non-government
groups.1 Vertically, this spans international, national, regional and local policy
makers. Bache and Flinders go on to note that the term has particular reso-
nance in contemporary UK politics following the devolving of powers to
executives and parliaments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland at the end
of the 1990s, and that this process of quasi-federalism marked a significant
departure from the highly centralized Westminster model. At the same time, UK
devolution is part of a wider domestic and international pattern toward the
dispersal of national state powers. Domestically, for example, regional develop-
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ment authorities in the UK have recently assumed greater powers for energy
policy implementation, while international policy agreements, such as European
Union (EU) directives, exert an increasingly powerful influence on domestic
energy policy.
Following the recommendation of Bache and Flinders (2004b), this chapter
considers the working out of MLG in a particular setting: recent developments
in UK energy policy. More specifically, the focus here is on policy contributions
and initiatives aimed at promoting renewable energy innovation, which are part
of a wider remaking of policy in response to climate change. As will be
discussed, this case reflects pervasive issues in contemporary politics: the adap-
tation of established industrial systems to become more environmentally
sustainable, and the alignment of economic and environmental policy agendas
in attempting this change.2
Alongside MLG, a second analytical theme here is innovation studies
accounts of the relationship between technological change and sustainable
development, and especially the innovation systems (IS) framework (Edquist,
1997, Edquist and McKelvey, 2000; Carlsson et al, 2002). The IS framework
offers an integrated way of looking at emergence and spread of new technolo-
gies, and the role of policy in enabling (or inhibiting) change. Among other
insights, IS research draws attention to the distinctive phases of technological
development (such as research and development (R&D), demonstration and
pre-commercial stages), and the importance of interaction and feedbacks
between different parts of the system, such as technology developers, users,
financiers and regulators. These insights imply the need for appropriate policy
interventions at different development stages, for promoting networking across
the system, and for coherence of policy support between stages and over time
(Foxon et al, 2005).
Recent innovation studies research has recognized the particular challenges
involved in building sustainable IS (Elzen et al, 2004; Weber and
Hemmelskamp, 2005). Sustainable technologies are typically ‘disruptive’ to
established systems, and so requiring of particular policy interventions to
encourage their development, such as the creation of temporary protected
spaces – referred to as ‘strategic niche management’ (SNM) (Kemp et al, 1998).
Disruptive innovation within niches tends to be carried out by small outsider
firms, rather than larger established groups (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2002;
Garud and Karnøe, 2003). (As Sauter and Watson explore in their contribution
to this collection, however, this disruptiveness should not be taken for granted,
as it depends on the specific forms and contexts of deployment.)
Innovation studies has also recognized a recent trend toward the regional-
ization of IS – an increased influence for regional factors in innovation success,
alongside national and international forces (Cooke et al, 2000; Cooke et al,
2004). Clearly, this is related to political devolution. In the present case, for
example, devolution encouraged a heightened focus on specifically Scottish IS.
At the same time, this also reflects greater recognition of the role of local and
informal relationships and dynamics in technological change – an influence
often referred to as ‘social capital’ (Saxenian, 1994; Lundvall et al, 2002; Cooke
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2004). As will be argued below, IS-based insights on technological change –
stressing the role of networking, policy integration and social capital – fed into
the UK energy policy review process. Given the greater experience in renewable
energy innovation outside the UK, these references often drew on international
experiences. This added a dimension of international policy transfer to the
national-regional MLG mix (Mytelka and Smith, 2002). 
Energy systems present particular characteristics for policy and governance.
Rather than being easily responsive to policy and regulatory interventions, they
reflect long term historical forces and crisis events, and tend to inertia and lock-
in rather than novelty or change (Unruh, 2000). As is discussed below, the
policy changes associated with devolution were played out on a UK energy
system with an embedded orientation to ‘financial capital’ – concentrated
commercial interests, and an emphasis on market competition. However, devo-
lution also coincided with a number of significant ongoing changes in the UK
energy system, including a growing import dependency on oil and gas supplies
as North Sea reserves were depleted, the prospect of a shortfall in generation
capacity as ageing nuclear power plants were retired, and domestic and interna-
tional pressures for stronger climate change mitigation policies.
The chapter proceeds by outlining the historical context for the emergence
of MLG in the UK energy system. The interaction between devolution and the
recent policy review is then considered in more detail by looking at specific
contributions, debates and initiatives in UK and Scottish policy arenas. The
final section reflects on the case in the context of the wider themes outlined
above.
Political and technological heritage
Long before political devolution (a process which started only after the election
of a reform-minded Labour government in 1997) the UK energy system was
transformed under successive Conservative governments in the 1980s and
1990s. The privatization of the UK electricity supply industry (ESI) at the end
of the 1980s was a notably disruptive process. ESI privatization took place
shortly after gas industry privatization, and in response to criticism of the priva-
tized monopoly created by the former the government imposed significant
restructuring on the ESI, including the break-up of the monopoly generator
company (Roberts et al, 1991).3
Liberalization ended the ‘technocratic corporatism’ that had governed the
ESI since its reorganization around nuclear power in the 1950s (Winskel,
2002a). After privatization, the UK energy system – although still steered by the
UK Department of Industry (DTI) and a powerful new regulatory body, the
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)4 – was shaped by multiple
commercial interests. Other than continued protection for nuclear power
(always a special case for energy policy), technology choice in the 1990s ESI
was driven primarily by market forces – liberalization meant that only those
technologies able to secure international loans and guarantees were deployed
on significant scale. This was embodied by the ‘dash for gas’, a huge programme
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of investment in combined cycle gas turbines, a technology that had been over-
looked in the nationalized ESI (Winskel 2002b; Watson, 2004). The dash for
gas further eroded established authority in the industry, and remains a powerful
symbol of its opening-up to international capital and engineering. 
Liberalization also resulted in the running-down of most of the UK’s energy
research, development and demonstration programmes (MacKerron, 1994).
While these had been dominated by nuclear power, this rationalization also
affected clean coal and renewables R&D, as well as the loss of much of the
industry’s testing and research support infrastructure. Rather than technologi-
cal innovation, the main intellectual and strategic effort was now focused on
‘commoditizing’ electricity – constructing and exploiting a competitive market
in power generation, trading and supply. A series of policy and regulatory inter-
ventions were made in this cause during the 1990s (Helm, 2003).
A limited set of more technology-specific interventions were incorporated
within this ‘economic liberalism’ policy regime. The main support mechanism
for renewable energy in the first decade after privatization was the non-fossil
fuel obligation (NFFO). Although devised primarily to subsidise nuclear power,
NFFO also required power supply companies to contract for a small amount of
renewable generation.5 The obligation was fulfilled by renewables projects,
selected under a competitive bidding process, which were offered technology-
specific supply contracts. While deployed renewable generation capacity in the
1990s remained insignificant under NFFO, the scheme at least enabled the
limited public funds on offer to be distributed across a range of different tech-
nologies (Mitchell and Connor, 2004).
After the fragmentation of the ESI at privatization, the 1990s saw a signifi-
cant degree of horizontal and vertical reintegration, typically involving
international power companies buying-up domestic generators and suppliers.
By the late 1990s, the UK energy system had been transformed by a decade-
long shaping by international capital and engineering under the economic
liberalism policy regime. While these changes reflected a global trend to energy
sector liberalization (Jacquier-Roux and Bourgeois, 2002), the UK case went
much further than most in the scope of its reforms – and the degree of their
consequences.
Reform before the Review
In the late 1990s, at the same time as it began the process of political devolu-
tion, the newly elected Labour government undertook reform of the regulatory
framework of the ESI established at privatization. This involved two main
changes: a new set of rules for wholesale power trading between generators and
suppliers, and a new support mechanism for renewable energy. While both
carried significant implications for overall energy policy, the changes were
devised and implemented ahead of the wider policy review in the early 2000s.
In carrying out the reforms, the government worked within the economic liber-
alism policy regime established by its Conservative predecessors, and which
was closely associated with the industry regulator, Ofgem. This meant a contin-
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ued focus on market competition, and the use of predominantly technology-
blind market interventions.6
In an effort to promote greater market transparency in wholesale power
trading, a set of new electricity trading arrangements (NETA) were introduced
to regulate deals between generators and suppliers.7 At the same time, a new
Renewables Obligation (RO) was devised to replace the NFFO scheme. Under
the RO, supplier companies are obliged to contract for a designated proportion
of their supply from renewable sources. The RO targets increase annually in
line with government targets for renewable generation, and suppliers demon-
strate compliance by presenting Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) to
Ofgem. Rather than contracting directly from renewable generators, suppliers
may satisfy their obligation by buying certificates on the ROC trading market.
Both NETA and RO reforms were largely successful on their own terms –
NETA was associated with a significant drop in wholesale power prices in the
early 2000s, and the RO led to much greater deployment of renewable energy
than under NFFO. At the same time, both introduced additional market risks –
which tended to strengthen the position of large integrated power companies,
while weakening independent project developers (Carbon Trust, 2003b).
According to Helm (2003, p311), NETA encouraged the emergence of a ‘verti-
cally integrated oligopoly’ in the ESI. The RO, by concentrating state support
for renewables on the cheapest technologies (in practice, onshore wind power
and landfill gas), offers no direct incentive for the development of less commer-
cially mature renewables (Mitchell and Connor, 2004). As such, the reforms
represented an extension of 1990s economic liberalism into the early 2000s.
Devolution and policy review
Introduction
The devolution settlement of the 1998 Scotland Act involved the sharing of
powers between UK and Scottish executives across a range of policy areas
(Lyall, 2004). This was exemplified by the arrangements for energy policy:
although overall energy policy and regulation remained a reserved power for
the UK DTI and Ofgem, responsibilities for the promotion of renewable energy
and energy efficiency were devolved to the new Scottish executive. While a
narrow reading of these arrangements may have offered little scope for devolved
policy making, in practice, the Scottish executive and parliament interpreted
their powers widely enough to encourage the development of a distinctive policy
arena in energy. As this section considers, the UK-wide policy review of the
early 2000s developed an unexpected momentum in Scotland, characterized by
a strong interest among Scottish policy actors in promoting local industry build-
ing in renewable energy technologies, especially marine energy (wave and tidal
stream power).8
Renewable energy has a long history of marginalization in the UK energy
system, under both technocratic corporatism and economic liberalism policy
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regimes. The absence of any powerful champions for renewables in the national-
ized ESI meant that their development was left to organizations for which they
were secondary (and disruptive) concerns (Russell, 1993). Reflecting this, the
dominant policy response to the 1970s energy crisis was retrenchment around
existing technologies and interests, especially nuclear power and the domestic
coal industry. Given this position, renewable energy interests were essentially
unrepresented in the institutional remaking of the ESI at privatization – a process
which was dominated by the Conservative government’s determination to secure
the future of nuclear power (Eikeland, 1998; Winskel, 2002a).9 As described
above, in the decade after privatization, energy policy reflected and enacted a
view of electricity as a commodity good, competing on price.
Nevertheless, renewable energy has a significant history at the edges of the
UK energy system (see, for example, Adrian Smith’s contribution to this
volume). Renewable technologies attracted some policy and financial support
in the 1970s, and although this proved to be a limited and temporary effort, it
can be seen, retrospectively, as building an important base for the re-emergence
of interest and activity in the 2000s. This is exemplified by marine energy. As
part of wider interest in renewables in the wake of the energy crisis, the UK
Department of Energy established a Wave Energy Programme to identify a
device capable of rapid economic upscaling. Given the embryonic stage of wave
power technology at the time, this was unrealistically ambitious, and the
programme was scaled-down in the early 1980s under escalating cost estimates
and organizational and political hostility (Thorpe, 1992, 1999; Ross, 1995,
2002). Under the market liberalism of the 1990s, marine energy attracted no
significant policy interest or research support – a pattern repeated internation-
ally among the handful of countries that had experimented with the technology
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Nevertheless, the programme left a significant
legacy of interests and skills among a small number of university-based
researchers.
By the early 2000s, the UK energy system faced growing tensions between
economic and environmental policy agendas. While these tensions had been
resolved within the economic liberalism policy regime of the 1990s, the envi-
ronmental benefits of the dash for gas (as coal-fired plants were replaced by
gas-fired plants) were now largely played out. The UK energy system looked
increasingly ill-equipped to meet national and international policy targets for
reduced carbon emissions. 
Under shifting policy drivers, renewable energy began a gradual revival – a
process initially unrelated to devolution. In its report on Energy – The Changing
Climate, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) called for
a long-term remaking of the UK energy system, to enable a 60 per cent reduc-
tion in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 (RCEP, 2000). At the same time, a
number of reports encouraged a revival of interest in marine energy, including a
positive review of the technology’s potential from a UK foresight panel (Office
of Science and Technology (OST), 1999), and a detailed inquiry on marine
energy carried out by the House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee (HCSTC, 2001). The Committee’s report expressed regret at the
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lack of support for marine energy in the past, and called for a long-term policy
commitment to attract private investors; the potential social and economic
returns, it concluded, were huge: 
the UK could … create a new multi-billion pound domestic and
export industry, employing thousands of people. The UK has the
resource, the technology and the skills base; we have a unique
opportunity to seize the lead and develop a world-class industry.
We can no longer afford to neglect the potential of wave and tidal
energy. (HCSTC, 2001, pvi) 
In the early 2000s, the UK government initiated a wide-ranging energy policy
review – the first such exercise to be carried out since the 1970s. While the
review centred on a 2003 white paper, it included numerous parliamentary
inquiries, expert reports and wider contributions to the debate. A series of
specific policy initiatives were also made in the course of the review. The next
two sections consider, in turn, the review process within UK and Scottish policy
arenas, with a focus on those contributions and initiatives most closely related
to renewables innovation and marine energy.
UK policy arena
For many contributors to the policy review, emerging tensions in the UK energy
system highlighted the need to reinvigorate public funding of energy research,
especially for renewable energy technologies. Major investigations carried out
by the Royal Commission and the Cabinet Office ahead of the DTI white paper
both recommended expanded support for renewables, including marine tech-
nology (RCEP, 2000; Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), 2002). The white
paper itself (DTI, 2003) marked a repositioning of renewable energy from the
policy margins to centre stage. For the first time, a UK government established
specific targets for renewable generation.10 The white paper identified marine
energy research as a priority area, where enhanced support had the potential to
lead to a ‘step change’ breakthrough, contributing significantly to carbon emis-
sion reductions.
Recognizing this potential, a series of UK-wide policy initiatives aimed at
accelerating marine renewables innovation were introduced in the course of the
review. As well as expanded capital grant support for device R&D under the
DTI’s Technology Programme, a number of dedicated research programmes
were established. These included the Carbon Trust’s Marine Energy Challenge,
which partnered together small-firm wave power device developers with estab-
lished engineering firms, and the Engineering and Physical Science Research
Council’s SuperGen Marine consortium of academics and industrialists, brought
together to collaborate on a series of generic R&D themes. A number of UK
and Scottish public funding agencies sponsored the setting-up of the European
Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) in northern Scotland, with the aim of creating a
focal point for device testing, and internationally accepted standards and
accreditation procedures. 
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A number of contributors to the policy review argued that while these initia-
tives were encouraging, stronger interventions and institutional reforms were
needed for the acceleration of marine energy innovation, and delivery of the
wider policy targets for renewables. These views were reflected, for example, in
UK parliamentary inquiries carried out in the course of the review. A report by
the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (HCEAC) argued that
overall spending on renewables in the UK remained inadequate – compared to
Denmark or Germany, the UK had ‘reaped the reward of its parsimony’
(HCEAC, 2002, p23). The committee criticized a lack of policy coherence, with
specific initiatives often being made in isolation by one of many different bodies
involved. The committee suggested a Sustainable Energy Policy Agency be estab-
lished to improve policy coordination. For marine energy, it argued that a
structured support programme be devised to enable gradual learning, cost
reductions and market growth, aimed at the commercial-scale deployment of
the technology by 2020. In another report, the HCSTC was also critical of what
it saw as inadequately resourced and poorly focused renewable energy R&D,
and the fragmentation of activity across multiple groups (HCSTC, 2003). The
committee called for the setting-up of a Renewable Energy Authority, with
strong ministerial direction, to oversee delivery of the white paper policy targets;
without such reform, it concluded, there was no prospect of achieving the
targets.
A number of wider contributions to the review highlighted the industrial
development potential presented by marine energy – and pointed to specific
policy changes needed to realize the opportunity. The Carbon Trust suggested
that UK firms had the chance to dominate marine energy device design, manu-
facture, installation and operation (Carbon Trust, 2003a). Mott MacDonald
noted the ‘very significant national opportunity’ presented by marine energy –
with wave power offering the biggest job creation potential per unit output of
all renewables – but warned that without stronger policy intervention, develop-
ment of the technology could migrate to more supportive policy environments
abroad (DTI, 2004). Climate Change Capital (CCC) stated that securing domes-
tic industrial growth in marine energy required the setting-up of a
technology-specific premium tariff for marine generation (so called ‘feed-in’
support), to be set at a level equivalent to a recently introduced Portuguese
scheme (British Wind Energy Association (BWEA)/CCC, 2004).
After setting out the broad redirection of energy policy in its white paper,
the DTI commissioned a series of more detailed research exercises as part of a
Renewables Innovation Review (RIR). These included a detailed analysis of the
UK innovation system for different renewables technologies, which found that
marine energy development was being driven by a handful of small firms, with
only limited links to suppliers and universities, and significant competition and
intellectual property (IP) barriers to further networking (Imperial College
Centre for Energy Policy and Technology (ICEPT) /E4tech Consulting, 2003).
The report added that more policy support was needed to bridge a post-R&D
funding gap Another contribution contrasted the piecemeal innovation system
for renewables in the UK with more integrated approaches elsewhere, and also
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suggested that a technology-specific feed-in tariff was needed to bridge the
funding gap (ICEPT (Foxon et al), 2003). In its conclusions to the RIR, the DTI
acknowledged the long-term potential of marine energy, but made clear that it
remained unpersuaded by the case for dedicated feed-in support (DTI/Carbon
Trust, 2004).
Wider contributions to the review identified systematic barriers to marine
energy development in the UK. A survey of investor attitudes found that imma-
ture technologies such as wave and tidal stream struggled to attract interest
from the most powerful commercial organizations in the industry, including the
utility companies, oil and gas majors and independent financiers (Carbon Trust,
2003b). Marine energy was seen by some investors as a high-risk technology
with a mixed track record of prototype device performance (House of Lords
Science and Technology Committee (HLSTC), 2004). Potential investors also
expressed concern about the inconsistent track record of UK policy interven-
tions in the energy sector – other European countries were seen as presenting
less ‘political risk’ (Carbon Trust, 2003b). At the same time, utility and invest-
ment groups cautioned against any efforts to replicate more interventionist
overseas support policies for renewables, such as feed-in tariffs (HLSTC, 2004).
From this perspective, Danish and German renewable systems, although they
had led to local economic development and sizeable industrial exports, had
been built at huge public expense – and so didn’t represent appropriate role
models for the UK.
Several contributors identified the RO as a particular barrier to renewable
energy industry building. The HCEAC noted the difficulties the RO presented
for innovation in anything other than the most commercially developed tech-
nologies (HCEAC, 2002). The HCSTC called for the RO’s replacement by a
carbon tax, able to distinguish between technologies at different stages of devel-
opment (HCSTC, 2003). In evidence to a House of Lords inquiry, a leading
wave energy device developer called for policy learning from the Danish wind
power case, where long-term feed-in support had encouraged gradual upscal-
ing, production optimization and supply chain building (HLSTC, 2004, Q439,
p460). In response, the UK energy minister pointed out that the RO had been
deliberately devised as an ‘explicitly market-led mechanism’ to favour the most
commercial renewables, and that more targeted technology-specific support,
such as that provided by NFFO, was considered inconsistent with market liber-
alization (HLSTC, 2004, Q363).
Nevertheless, a range of contributors continued to press the case for more
targeted support for marine energy, particularly at the post-R&D stage. In early
2005, after a period of further consultation, the DTI announced the setting up
of a marine energy demonstration scheme, which would offer dedicated feed-in
support to a small number of selected wave and tidal stream devices (DTI,
2005a). While welcoming the scheme as a significant step forwards, potential
device developers noted the scheme’s limitations, especially its capping of the
total amount and time-span of revenue support awarded to any one developer.
Renewables proponents and others continued to make the case for more gener-
ous and longer-term support.
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Scottish policy arena
The energy policy review of the early 2000s developed a distinctive flavour in
the devolved policy arena. This reflected the widely held perception of a partic-
ular Scottish opportunity in renewable energy industry building, especially
marine energy – a perception which sprung from an abundant marine energy
resource, an established heavy and offshore engineering skills base, and a long-
standing interest in marine energy among a handful of Scottish universities and
device developers. These interests sought to exert influence in the new Scottish
policy arena – and at the same time they themselves became a focus of attention
for the devolved executive, parliament and other policy actors.
An early indicator of this interest was the awarding of supply contracts to
three marine energy prototype devices under the Scottish version of the NFFO
scheme in the late 1990s, shortly before its replacement by the RO (HCSTC,
2001). At the outset of the review process, a number of consultants’ reports
highlighted the industrial development potential of marine energy in Scotland.
In a detailed assessment of different renewables technologies commissioned by
the Scottish executive, Garrad Hassan identified a window of opportunity for
Scotland to become a ‘world-leading industrial base’ for marine energy (Scottish
Executive/Garrad Hassan, 2001). Future Energy Solutions (FES) suggested that
marine energy could act as a diversification pathway for the Scottish shipbuild-
ing industry, provided that technology-specific feed-in support was introduced
to stimulate domestic market growth, technology transfer and cost reductions
(FES, 2002).
In parallel with the publication of the DTI’s energy policy white paper, the
Scottish executive issued a policy statement laying out ambitious plans for
exploiting Scotland’s renewable energy resources, including the setting of sepa-
rate Scottish targets for renewable generation that went well beyond the UK
targets (Scottish Executive, 2003).11 At the same time, the executive announced
specific institutional reforms to help meet the targets. It established an expert
advisory group, the Forum for Renewable Energy Development in Scotland
(FREDS), to monitor delivery of the policy targets, and funded the setting-up
an Intermediary Technology Institute for Energy (ITI Energy) to sponsor inno-
vation across the energy sector. During this period Scottish universities secured
significant roles in UK-wide marine energy research networks, including the UK
Centre for Marine Renewable Energy, a network of four organizations (three
Scottish-based, including the EMEC marine energy test centre described above)
aimed at offering marine device developers an integrated research, develop-
ment, testing and certification infrastructure.
Before publishing its policy statement, the Scottish executive had invited
contributions from across the new Scottish policy arena. The consultation exer-
cise revealed a significant body of criticism of existing UK energy policy and
calls for greater support of renewables. For example, the industry-sponsored
Scottish Renewables Forum (SRF) argued that UK renewables support lacked a
coherent system to pass projects between different development stages toward
commercialization (SRF, 2003). SRF called for a policy focus on indigenous
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business development, in the style of energy policy making elsewhere in Europe.
SRF also suggested specific additional financial support for marine energy,
through the issuing of ‘top-up’ ROCs. In a later statement, after publication of
the DTI white paper, SRF criticized what it saw as the UK government’s self-
fulfilling policy cautiousness, as lack of ambition for marine energy starved the
technology of resources (SRF, 2004). It also identified an emerging danger of
fractured regional support for renewables in the UK.
Following the executive’s policy statement, the Scottish Parliament
Enterprise and Culture Committee (SPECC) carried out a detailed inquiry on
renewable energy in Scotland (SPECC, 2004). The committee’s report stated
that Scotland had an opportunity to ‘become to wave and tidal power what
Denmark is to wind power’ (SPECC, 2004, p47). However, the building of a
strong domestic market – which had been critical in Danish and German wind
power success – was being frustrated by the technology-blind RO, and the
committee argued that reform of the mechanism was essential to incentivize
non-wind renewables. In their evidence to the committee, however, the two
Scottish utility companies, Scottish Power (SP) and Scottish and Southern
Energy (SSE), cautioned against any such reform, and warned of the destabiliz-
ing impact of such changes on the ROC trading market. SP argued that capital
grants were the appropriate support mechanism for non-wind technologies
(SPECC, 2004, c433). SSE stated that RO modifications to offer more technol-
ogy-specific support played ‘the game of trying to pick the winners’ (SPECC,
2004, c438). The committee concluded, nevertheless, that recent policy initia-
tives to promote marine innovation, though significant, were inadequate – as
well as RO reform, greater resourcing of the EMEC test centre was needed to
give it equivalent stature to the Danish wind power test centre (SPECC, 2004,
c653). A subsequent report from the Scottish executive’s FREDS expert group
also called for greater support of EMEC, better integration of marine energy
research initiatives, and a stronger policy lead from the executive and DTI
(Scottish Executive/FREDS, 2004).
By early 2005, a statutory review of RO was underway. The review process
revealed, for the first time, a clear difference of policy intent for marine energy
between the DTI and Scottish executive. At the outset, the DTI declared that
the RO was working well, and added that any proposed changes would be
assessed against their impact on investor confidence (DTI, 2005b). In a parallel
document, the executive highlighted additional ‘Scottish-specific’ issues, includ-
ing RO reform, to support the development of non-wind renewables (Scottish
Executive, 2005a). After a period of preliminary consultation, the executive
declared its intention to award additional ROCs to marine energy (Scottish
Executive, 2005b). The statement was immediately criticized by a utility
company as damaging for investor confidence (Scotsman, 2005), and the DTI
subsequently restated its position that additional support for non-wind renew-
ables should be provided outside the RO (DTI, 2005c). The executive responded
that while investor confidence was vital, existing levels of support were insuffi-
cient to match its ambitions for wave and tidal energy, and went on to confirm
its intention to offer additional ROCs to marine energy (albeit now after the
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statutory review had been completed, and following an analysis of the impact
of multiple ROCs on marine innovation and the wider market; Scottish
Executive, 2005c). Marine developers welcomed the executive’s initiative as an
essential step for encouraging industry take-off and bridging the post-R&D
funding gap (SRF, 2005).
Conclusions
MLG of the UK energy system has emerged (and continues to emerge) in an
exploratory and unpredictable manner, conditioned by underlying long-term
trends and more immediate circumstances and opportunities. At the start of the
devolution process in the late1990s, the UK energy system reflected a decade-
long influence of economic liberalism, manifested in concentrated ownership,
financing and stakeholding, and a policy orientation to short-term market effi-
ciency and technology-blind intervention. Within this, emerging environmental
policy imperatives ran secondary – even in the early 2000s, regulatory reforms
continued to prioritize economic liberalism. The emergence of MLG was in part
a reaction to this institutional and policy heritage.
The early 2000s saw increased tensions between environmental and
economic imperatives in energy policy, and more insistent challenges to market
liberalism. The subsequent launch of a major UK-wide policy review meant
that the Scottish policy arena faced a relatively fluid and contested energy poli-
tics. This turbulence presented a ‘window of opportunity’ for fledgling policy
actors in the devolved arena to test their unclearly defined set of powers.
Broadly similar evidence, arguments and interests were represented in policy
review contributions in UK and Scottish arenas, and the review provoked a
revival of interest in renewable energy across the UK. While both UK and
Scottish policy executives saw this revival as opening up opportunities for indus-
try building, this was an especially powerful driver in Scotland. The Scottish
executive’s setting of highly ambitious targets for renewable generation
suggested a rather different set of policy priorities, and marine energy – a tech-
nology with a notable Scottish heritage and potential – was a particular focus
of interest and action in the devolved arena.
Many contributors to the review drew on the experiences of countries with
longer-standing support for renewable energy development and deployment. As
Smith (2004) noted, efforts to transfer policies from abroad are deeply inter-
twined with domestic politics, and the drawing of international lessons in the
review were strongly shaped by local interests. For example, the Danish wind
power experience – an especially powerful reference case for Scotland – was
seen as both good and bad exemplar by, respectively, renewables advocates on
the one hand, and incumbent utility and financial groups on the other. While
many of the references to overseas experience went no further than superficial
analogies, a number of contributions were informed by more considered IS
comparisons. These highlighted the significant role, in renewables industry
building, of technology-specific support (especially feed-in tariffs) and social
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capital (such as inter-organizational research networks and testing centres). By
doing so, these contributions challenged the established market liberalism policy
regime, and this challenge was made particularly strongly in Scotland. At the
same time, the presence of powerful voices of resistance to importing renew-
ables policies within both UK and Scottish policy arenas highlighted the barriers
to transfer between different institutional settings.
The review process highlighted a number of policy tensions and contradic-
tions in the UK energy system. For example, although a number of policy
initiatives in the course of the review sought to encourage small developer firms
(those most likely to initiate renewables innovation), they were introduced into
a wider system that was reinforcing the position of large established firms. At
the same time, repeated calls for policy and institutional reforms in response to
emerging system barriers (such as the post-R&D funding gap) were met with
utility and financier insistence on the stability and predictability of policy frame-
works. Scottish policy actors showed a greater willingness to confront
objections to change than those in the UK, and the executive’s proposed reform
of the main renewables support mechanism to ‘match its ambitions’ for marine
energy was a notable departure from established UK policy. These tensions and
divergences can be seen as a battle between different styles of innovation system
– based on either financial or social capital (Cooke et al, 2000). 
Many contributors to the review also demanded a more coherent and
integrated system of policy and institutional support for renewable energy
innovation (and indeed, the review coincided with increased UK-wide regu-
latory integration). However, devolution opened up a new arena for policy
experimentation, and a divergence away from the established policy regime
associated with the DTI and Ofgem. Given the wider trend toward MLG,
this suggests that policy integration may be something of a chimera, and
some degree of diversity may be inevitable, and perhaps even useful (Murphy
and Chataway, 2005; Tait and Lyall, 2005). From this viewpoint, the rather
unexpected emergence of a distinctive Scottish energy policy arena may be
seen as an incubation space for a transition away from a dominant policy
regime increasingly ill-suited to contemporary challenges. MLG presents an
opportunity to bypass lock-in, and develop more sustainable innovation
systems. 
Acknowledgement
This chapter is based on research carried out under the UK Economic and Social
Research Council’s Sustainable Technologies Programme. The author wishes to
thank STP colleagues and others for their comments. He assumes full responsi-
bility for the views expressed here.
194 Governance and Sustainability: Consensus and Conflict
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 194
Notes
1 While the concern here is the UK and Scottish energy policy arenas – the vertical
axis of MLG – the sustainable development policy agenda also cuts across embed-
ded horizontal demarcations in government, and has tended to be marginalized.
Policy structures have traditionally reflected and reinforced producer interests in
the energy system (Hertin and Berkhout, 2005).
2 From an ‘ecologically modern’ perspective (Spaargaren and Mol, 1992) this can be
addressed by technological innovation, while retaining a commitment to economic
growth. For others, such as many within the alternative technology movement, the
sustainability challenge requires a much more fundamental reassessment of socio-
economic trends and aspirations (see Smith in this volume).
3 This applies only in England and Wales. The two Scottish public electricity boards
were privatized as unrestructured vertically-integrated companies (now known as
Scottish Power and Scottish and Southern Energy).
4 Before its incorporation within Ofgem, the ESI’s regulatory body was known as
the Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer).
5 The NFFO equivalent mechanism in Scotland was known as the Scottish
Renewables Obligation (SRO). Reference to NFFO here also includes the SRO.
6 While the continuity of policy regimes between different administrations reflected
particular local circumstances, it can also be seen as an example of the durability
of ‘policy framings’. Once established, basic assumptions about policy problems
and solutions tend to endure and resist reformulation; Unruh (2000) referred to
the ‘lock-in’ of policy systems.
7 The NETA reforms applied only to England and Wales. Trading between the gener-
ator and supplier arms of the two Scottish power companies continued to take
place through less formal ‘regulated arrangements’. More transparent NETA-type
arrangements were introduced by Ofgem in 2005 under the British Electricity
Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA), which created a unified British-
wide market for power trading. In response to Ofgem’s desire to establish
‘cost-reflective’ rules for generation and transmission, BETTA imposes higher
charges on more remote projects – with potentially significant effects on the
economics of renewable energy in northern Scotland (Ofgem, 2005; SRF, 2005).
8 For an introduction to marine energy devices, see IEA-OES, 2003; Duckers, 2004.
9 Elsewhere in Europe, more established renewable interests sought to secure
enhanced support prior to liberalization (Jørgensen and Strunge, 2002; Jacobsson
et al, 2004).
10 Rising from 3 per cent in 2003, to 10 per cent in 2010, and an ‘aspirational’ 20
per cent by 2020 (DTI, 2003).
11 Renewable generation in Scotland was targeted to rise from 11 per cent in 2003,
to 18 per cent by 2010, towards an ‘aspirational’ target of 40 per cent by 2020.
Scotland has a relatively high installed renewables capacity, mainly from
hydropower plant; it also has a high wind and marine resource base.
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Sustainable development is a formidable challenge for the 21st century. The
concept implies a balance between environmental protection and economic
development that is unlikely to be reached until society is reorganized along
different lines. The list of environmental problems that we currently face
includes climate change, biodiversity loss, collapsing fish stocks and persistent
organic pollutants. It is likely that more problems like these will emerge in the
future. Famine and poverty, and health challenges such as malaria and HIV-
AIDs, are amongst the most pressing development problems. Economic growth
and higher standards of living are part of the solution but many developing
countries are being left behind as others get richer.
In the years ahead it seems likely that environmental protection and
economic development will collide even more forcefully than they are doing
today, and this may lead us to revisit ‘limits to growth’ arguments of the 1970s
(Meadows et al, 1972). The newly industrialized countries, including China
and India, are growing rapidly, and their populations are increasingly urban.
Through complex processes they are beginning to adopt western consumer
lifestyles. These two countries have a combined population of 2.365 billion,
compared to 760 million in the US and EU, and the ecological implications of
their development trajectories are staggering. They can, however, argue that
they have a right to enjoy the high standards of living found elsewhere.
In this book we have made a contribution to the ongoing debate over
sustainable development by focusing on the richest countries - particularly the
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UK and Europe. Two assumptions have underpinned the discussion: that
production-consumption systems in the richest countries must be reorganized
in profound ways to address ecological problems and to create ecological space
for poorer countries; that the challenge for the richest countries is also a social
one because sustainable development implies progress on such things as rein-
vigorating citizenship and participation in decision-making, equitable
distribution of wealth, and social and environmental justice. In the first section
of this chapter I argue that these ecological and social challenges and opportu-
nities are linked.
Earlier sections focused on people, technology and governance. The contrib-
utors to this collection share the view that technology has an important role to
play in the transition to sustainability but they have argued that it cannot be
separated from people and governance. I develop this argument further in the
second part of this chapter where I argue that there is a sustainability nexus
which links people, technology and governance. In the third part I argue that
this nexus should become the focus for interdisciplinary research and policy.
Throughout this chapter I refer to earlier ones to highlight specific points and
to draw out the contributions they have made.
What is a sustainable development?
The concept of sustainable development began to attract attention in the late
1980s (WCED, 1987, p43), and meetings of the UN in 1992 and 2002 added
further momentum to academic, policy and public debates. The success of the
concept, at least in part, can be explained by its vagueness, and the way it is
linked to a wide range of policy agendas. In the 1990s, for example, ‘sustain-
able production’, ‘sustainable business’ and ‘sustainable waste management’
began to be discussed. More recently ‘sustainable consumption’, ‘sustainable
cities’ and ‘sustainable communities’ have attracted attention. Despite its flexi-
bility, however, it has analytical and practical value because it helps us to link
ecological-material and social-cultural problems and opportunities.
Ecological and material concerns
The undermining of ecosystems is a core issue for sustainable development. As
Chapter 1 showed, however, this process is understood in different ways. Most
authors worry about the integrity of ecosystems over the long term and many
draw attention to society’s relentless consumption of resources and production
of wastes. A good example is research in the industrial ecology tradition (e.g.
Socolow et al, 1997). Other scholars, however, focus on the ecological implica-
tions of unpredictable technological risks. Such risks can threaten ecology and
human health in insidious or explosive ways. They can also reveal how little we
know about ecological processes; for an example, see Murphy et al (2006) on
the environmental risks of genetically modified Bt maize.
Climate change is perhaps the most obvious and important ecological
problem explored in this book. By focusing on energy production and consump-
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tion, Chapters 3, 6, 9 and 10 in particular engaged with the climate change
debate. In Chapter 10, for example, Mark Winskel examined innovation in
marine energy technology in Scotland – wave and tidal flow devices. Because of
its Atlantic coastline, Scotland has a large marine energy resource, and knowl-
edge and skills in marine technology are valuable legacies of the North Sea oil
industry. Not surprisingly, some policy makers have linked these and identified
marine energy technology as a source of future economic growth, in addition to
the contribution it might make to addressing climate change.
The ecological perspective on sustainable development can be extended by
adding a material dimension. Buttel (2000, p22) argues that materialism focuses
our attention on ‘the material substratum of human life’. Materialism, there-
fore, is more anthropocentric than ecology. It is important in this discussion
because many of our most vital needs are material ones, for example, food,
water and shelter (Jackson, 1996). Technologies play a central role in helping
us to cater for these needs because they transform the material world in relation
to the production and reproduction of our lives. Materialism, therefore, is the
social scientific equivalent of the ecological perspective (which is scientific in
origin), and the concept of sustainable development benefits from both.
Various contributions to this collection have examined material aspects of
sustainable development. Rachel Slater (Chapter 8), for example, discussed the
very material problem of waste management. In Chapter 3 Robin Roy and his
colleagues made a valuable contribution by exploring the adoption and use of
low and zero carbon products and systems – for example, compact fluorescent
lamps (CFLs), condensing boilers, solar water heaters, micro wind turbines and
domestic photovoltaic (PV) systems. These technologies are associated with
basic material concerns like heating and washing. In this case, however, the
material perspective was extended to explore how people interact with material
objects in addition to the role they play in sustaining their lives.
Sustainable development requires us to think about the relationship between
ecological and material imperatives over the long term. Chapter 5 by Adrian
Smith is useful here because it explored this relationship through housing.
Smith’s chapter focused on eco-homes, including examples built by the alterna-
tive technology (AT) movement, and more recent developments like BedZED
(Beddington Zero Emission Development). A large number of ecological
concerns are implicit in such developments. The use of water conservation tech-
nologies, for example, is an effort to address hydrological problems. The homes
discussed, however, are also places where people reproduce their lives materi-
ally and these are linked. Active water management, for example, is more likely
if people understand hydrological problems in relation to the material repro-
duction of their lives.
Social and cultural commitments
In addition to ecological-material concerns, the concept of sustainable develop-
ment raises profound social and cultural questions. As discussed in Chapter 1,
for example, sustainable consumption research critically examines increasing
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levels of consumption in the richest countries (Murphy and Cohen, 2001;
Princen et al, 2002). Consumption is usually defended using ideas of freedom
and rights, or as a source of welfare and happiness, but in the richest countries
such arguments are being challenged. A second example comes from the envi-
ronmental justice debate. Scholars have argued that before any society can be
called developed it must also be just (Agyeman et al, 2002). Justice, therefore,
becomes an aspect of sustainable development. This argument can apply to
distribution of wealth and risks, within and between countries, and perhaps
across generations.
Various contributions have unpacked social and cultural issues like these.
In Chapters 4 and 10, for example, Patrick Devine-Wright and Mark Winskel
discussed the energy supply system in the UK. Devine-Wright argued that
increasing participation in decision making is an integral part of sustainable
development. He also pointed out, however, that in relation to the energy system
people are understood as poorly equipped to participate. In practice they are
cast as disinterested consumers of energy produced elsewhere. Drawing on
Winskel’s chapter we can see that the framing of people along these lines has
been a feature of the UK energy supply system for many decades. The introduc-
tion of market forces in the 1980s and 1990s led to existing hierarchical and
technocratic decision-making structures being replaced but a limited view of
public participation remained.
A related example of social and cultural commitments is local or devolved
versus centralized and hierarchical models of development. In Chapter 9, for
example, Dave Toke discussed the deployment of wind power across Europe.
One of the interesting aspects of his discussion is the contrast between the ‘local-
ist’, ‘grass roots’ and ‘bottom up’ development and deployment of wind power
in Demark and the more centralized approach in places like Spain and the UK.
In Chapter 6 Raphael Sauter and Jim Watson argued that micro-generation
technology will decentralize and the electricity infrastructure because power
will be generated in peoples’ homes. They also argued, however, that there are
different and competing models of deployment. The technologies might be
owned and controlled by utility companies or local cooperatives, for example.
These examples show how sustainable development raises questions about how
society is or should be organized.
The concept of sustainable development, then, is an opportunity to engage
with underpinning social-cultural assumptions and commitments. This takes us
well beyond the relatively narrow focus on ecological-material issues. It is
important to take this challenge seriously because the imperative of sustainable
development can be used to further embed social and cultural commitments
and tendencies that are unsustainable from this perspective. It might be argued,
for example, that we must consume our way to a sustainable society by buying
more and more ‘green’ products, thus entrenching existing consumption-related
problems. Similarly, the imperative of sustainable development might be used
to justify centralized technocratic decision making, which erodes democracy
and undermines participation and active engagement by people as knowledge-
able and concerned citizens.
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Linking ecological-material and social-cultural aspects
Building on these observations, the imperative of sustainable development
appears to involve solving the problems and answering the questions that
emerge at each level – ecological-material and social-cultural – as if they are
separate. In practice, however, the challenge is more subtle and difficult. Beyond
problems at each level, sustainable development draws attention to a dysfunc-
tional relationship between the ecological-material and social-cultural levels.
This means that many social-cultural commitments we have made are impli-
cated in ecological-material problems, and addressing them will involve
recasting the social-cultural level along different lines.
All of the contributions to this book link ecological-material and social-
cultural concerns, drawing attention to tensions in the relationship. In Chapter
2, for example, Seonaidh MacDonald and her colleagues focused on consump-
tion. The research targeted people who want to make their consumption more
sustainable because they are concerned about its environmental and social
implications. The authors highlight the numerous difficulties that they face.
One of the most perplexing is how to reconcile different ecological-material
challenges, such as water consumption versus energy efficiency, and how to
express ecological and social concerns simultaneously. The sustainable develop-
ment debate places a great deal of emphasis on consumers but this contribution
draws attention to the profound difficulties they face in practice.
Tim Foxon and Rachel Slater provide two further examples of how the
ecological-material and social-cultural levels of sustainable development are
linked. In Chapter 7 Foxon discussed the Dutch government’s interest in the
transition management approach to sustainable development. The theory and
practice of transition management engages with the link between environmen-
tally unsustainable practices and related social and cultural conditions. This
leads to a better understanding of what a transition to sustainability might
involve. In Chapter 8 Rachel Slater contrasts two approaches to waste manage-
ment at the local level. One of these, managed by the Somerset Waste
Partnership (SWP), divorces ecological-material from social-cultural concerns.
The other, managed by Hackney Waste Partnership (HWP), links them by
taking a more local and participatory approach. As a result these partnerships
operationalize different models of sustainable waste management.
The discussion in this section has shown that sustainable development is a
valuable and challenging concept. It draws attention to ecological-material and
social-cultural dimensions of society and the fact that these are linked and
constantly shaping each other. The challenge of sustainable development
involves replacing a dysfunctional relationship between these levels with a
harmonious and perhaps positive one. This process will involve rethinking the
relationship between people, technology and governance. In fact, understand-
ing and recasting the people-technology-governance nexus might be two of the
most important challenges associated with sustainable development.
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Sustainability and the people-technology-
governance nexus
I have argued that technology mediates the relationship between environment
and society because it transforms the world in relation to the production and
reproduction of our lives. For this reason technology is a central concern for
sustainability. It does not, however, operate in a vacuum. People use technology
and both are changed as a result. Technology is also governed in complex ways.
People, technology and governance, therefore, are bound together in a web of
relations. In this section I establish a baseline understanding of each one and
how they link with the imperative of sustainability.
People and sustainability: Appreciating 
multiple identities
The people who populate the sustainable development debate in the richest coun-
tries tend to be consumers. If they buy the right products they are understood to
be knowledgeable, otherwise they are understood as lacking the information
they need. It is relatively easy to account for this translation of people into
consumers and the way they are understood. It reflects, amongst other things,
the fact that we have basic physiological needs that we satisfy by consuming, the
recasting of the richest countries as consumer societies, and the dominance of
the market and related forms of knowledge (e.g. neoclassical economics).
In Chapter 2 Seonaidh MacDonald and her colleagues engaged directly with
the stereotypical view of the consumer and showed that in practice things are
much more complex. For example:
… the same consumers who regularly seek out information about
working conditions for the production of the food and clothing
products that they buy are apt to ignore the production processes,
distribution networks and retailers of their white good purchases.
This observation is interesting because it undermines the idea that consumers
have a relatively stable set of preferences that they express in all purchases. This
is just one of many examples of consumption in practice diverging from prevail-
ing models.
In addition to being consumers, of course, people have many other identi-
ties. In fact, even in a consumer society, other identities are at least as important
and perhaps more so. People are also activists with a causes, members of
communities, citizens of countries, sufferers of injustice and carriers of knowl-
edge, to name just a few of their multiple identities. In different ways all of
these are important for sustainable development and for this reason we must
reach beyond the consumer perspective. As I argued in Chapter 1, one of the
main risks associated with the sustainable consumption debate is that it rein-
forces the view that people are only consumers, even as it tries to give a more
sophisticated account.
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In Chapter 3 Robin Roy and his colleagues focused on people as users of
sustainable technologies. This is a subtle but important shift because it draws
attention to technology that is not designed with people in mind. This can lead
to products being purchased and installed, only to be used at less than optimum
levels or rejected entirely. When this happens the dominant model of the
consumer suggests that he/she purchased the wrong product, probably because
of a price or information problem, or the product was the right one but his/her
behaviour is wrong. Such arguments imply certain policies, for example price
manipulation, subsidies and education. As Roy et al point out, however, a more
important problem might be that the technology does not take sufficient
account of people and this implies that a more people-centred and participatory
approach to design is required.
This discussion suggests that one of the key challenges for sustainable devel-
opment is to acknowledge and engage with the multiple identities of people and
to avoid radical and distorting simplifications. In Chapter 4 Patrick Devine-
Wright made the following point in relation to the energy system:
… the centralized energy system is embedded within, and has
helped produce, a social representation of the ‘energy public’ that
is overwhelmingly characterized by deficits: of interest, knowl-
edge, rationality and environmental and social responsibility.
Moreover, it is argued that this is a self-fulfilling prophesy – the
more the representation is assumed to be common sense by deci-
sion makers, the more it is likely to lead to ‘out of sight, out of
mind’ energy policies, institutions and technologies that foster its
continuity, creating a context with limited scope for public engage-
ment with the energy system.
In this passage Devine-Wright draws attention to the actual work that is done
by partial or inaccurate representations of people in policy debates.
Technology and sustainability: Contextualized accounts
Scholars in technology studies and innovation studies define technology in over-
lapping ways. Researchers in both traditions agree, for example, that a
technology includes the artefact itself and the things that surround it that make
it useful, such as knowledge and social practices. In Chapter 1, drawing on the
technology studies tradition, I quoted Bijker (1995) who argues that technology
includes the artefact itself and related activities, knowledge and traditions. In
innovation studies, and following Freeman (1982), Kemp (1997, p7) has
observed that technology ‘… is frequently used to encompass both the knowl-
edge itself and the tangible embodiment of that knowledge’. Both of these
traditions, therefore, give contextualized accounts of technology.
Such contextualized accounts are important for a discussion of technology
and sustainability because technology is regularly discussed in decontextualized
ways. Perhaps most importantly, contextualized accounts undermine the idea of
plug-in ‘technological solutions’ to environmental and social problems – tech-
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nologies that will deliver sustainability without changing the context or being
changed by it. The possibility of such technological solutions is an attractive
one because it implies that technologies are interchangeable and that more
sustainable (and profitable) ones can be inserted in ways that are predictable
and uncontroversial. This perspective also suggests that politically difficult chal-
lenges like changes in lifestyle and behaviour can be bypassed.
Adrian Smith explored the relationship between technology and context in
Chapter 5. He focused on eco-housing and the transfer of technologies from the
AT context into mainstream house building. Smith argued that technology
includes the artefact and its context and history, and that this has implications
for the transfer of more sustainable technologies between settings. He showed
that the AT socio-technical context is very different to mainstream volume
house-building. It involves a large number of unique beliefs and practices and it
is important not to forget the circumstances that led to the creation of a partic-
ular artefact. As Smith says:
… socio-technical lessons relate not only to the narrow technical
and economic aspects of green housing, such as water systems, but
also to the kinds of social practices and meanings upon which
those technologies are predicated, such as active management of
water use.
This analysis focuses attention on the search for technologies that are flexible
enough to be transferred between contexts and ways of facilitating this transfer,
such as ‘intermediary developments’ like BedZED.
In Chapter 6 Raphael Sauter and Jim Watson discussed micro-generation
technology in a contextualized way. In this case the context is provided by the
existing energy system, which these authors understand as a large technical
system (LTS). LTSs include technologies, institutions, regulations and actors
and they resist radical change. This chapter examined how micro-generation
technology will disrupt the existing LTS of energy generation and supply,
depending on how it is deployed. The authors argue that the technology will
change the existing system, particularly by localizing energy production, but
the extent of its impacts on the existing context – incremental or radical and
disruptive – will depend on the model of adoption, including arrangements for
ownership, financing, operation and technological integration.
In Chapter 7 Tim Foxon argued explicitly for a contextualized view of tech-
nology and innovation, particularly as a basis on which to build policies that
aim to encourage innovation for sustainability. His systems perspective leads
him to argue that unsustainable development should be viewed as a ‘systems
failure’, and not, as is often the case, as a failure of technology or the market.
This argument acknowledges the complex processes and relationships that
surround technology. The innovation policies that are consistent with it are
different from those that emerge from conventional policy analysis, even if the
objective, such as the promotion of more sustainable technologies, is the same.
In part this is explained by the fact that policy makers must understand them-
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selves as an endogenous part of the system and not as an exogenous influence
on it.
Governance and sustainability: Consensus and conflict
As discussed in Chapter 1, governance has been defined as ‘policy making
through complex networks’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, p4). In disciplines like
political science and policy studies, the concept has emerged as a way of under-
standing the contemporary relationship between state and society and
policy-making processes, particularly as an alternative to hierarchy and markets.
In these debates ‘hierarchy’ describes the state making policy in relative isola-
tion, based on its authority to do so, whereas ‘the market’ refers to policy being
made by the forces of supply and demand. Governance, in contrast, involves a
wide range of policy actors, making and implementing policy together.
Rachel Slater makes a valuable contribution to this debate in Chapter 8 by
questioning the extent to which politics has actually been recast along these
lines. Her analysis of ‘partnerships’ in sustainable waste management at the
local level reveals a wide range of actors working together in conventional and
novel ways. Partnerships might be based on contracts, for example, and in this
way the market is invoked. They might also be driven to achieve targets that
are handed down to them, and in this way a more centralized and authoritative
model of the state-society relationship is involved. These are important obser-
vations, which warn us against embracing the idea of a wholesale shift to
governance in relation to sustainability.
As I discussed in Chapter 1, many parts of the governance analysis intersect
with the challenge of sustainability. Some scholars, for example, draw attention
to the role that new problems and controversies, such as climate change and
genetically modified crops, have played in bringing about the rise of gover-
nance. As Hajer and Wagenaar (2003, p3) note: ‘It is probably no coincidence
that these [governance] practices are more developed in ‘new’ spheres of poli-
tics such as the environment and the ‘life politics’ of food and technology.’
Problems and controversies such as these have reinvigorated civil society groups
and created new opportunities for them. At the same time they have raised
doubts about the state’s authority and its ability to solve problems and make
progress towards sustainability.
Observations like this take us to the distinction between functional and crit-
ical accounts of governance (Murphy and Levidow, 2006). Functional accounts
suggest that governance involves cooperation to deal with problems that policy
actors are unable to solve on their own. From this perspective governments
allow power to move vertically and horizontally away from them because doing
so is more likely to lead to solutions. A critical perspective, however, suggests
that governance is a way of managing conflicts such as those associated with
(un)sustainable development. Many problems, with climate change being the
most obvious, create legitimacy problems for the state as it fails to address them.
Participation in policy design and implementation, therefore, helps to manage
conflict by drawing some critics into a relationship with it.
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Contributions to this collection have explored functional and critical
accounts of governance. These have often been explored together. In Chapter 9,
for example, Dave Toke analysed governance networks associated with wind
power in five European countries. He drew attention to the different ways that
wind power is understood and the implications that this has for conflict or
consensus around deployment of the technology. There is, for example, much
more controversy around wind power in the UK than there is in Denmark. In
the former it is synonymous with corporations, investment companies and
centralized utilities, whereas in the latter it is associated with locally owned and
managed installations. Inevitably, therefore, governance involves conflicts
around the meaning of the new technology and efforts to manage these.
In Chapter 10 Mark Winskel examined innovation in marine energy tech-
nology against the backdrop of reforms in the electricity sector and government
authority in the UK. He observed that liberalization of the electricity sector in
the 1980s and 1990s led to a pluralizing of authority. It also overthrew the tech-
nocratic corporatism synonymous with the industry since its reorganization
around nuclear power in the 1950s. More recently, various developments have
led to the transfer of power away from central government to higher and lower
political levels: the devolution agenda, developments within the EU and at the
international level in relation to the Kyoto Protocol. For marine energy technol-
ogy innovators in Scotland, this has created a highly complex governance
context with new problems and opportunities.
Drawing on existing research I have discussed the multiple identities of
people, contextual accounts of technology and the tension between consensus
and conflict views of governance. These themes were distilled from the litera-
ture I discussed in Chapter 1 and the contributions of the other authors in
Chapters 2 to10. Although they were discussed in turn, it is also clear that
people, technology and governance are linked in ways that have important
implications for sustainability. Governance, for example, can involve framing
technology and people so that certain policies appear logical and necessary.
People, on the other hand, can challenge and resist governance processes and
technologies in unpredictable ways. This directs out attention to the people-
technology-governance nexus.
Sustainability: Understanding the people-
technology-governance nexus
People, technology and governance are often treated separately in relation to
sustainable development. Behaviour, for example, is understood as something
that must change but little thought is given to how it is shaped by technology.
When this link is made, few researchers or policy makers think carefully about
how to govern changes in both of these simultaneously. One explanation for
this impasse is the interdisciplinary nature of the people-technology-governance
nexus. In this section I illustrate how this barrier might be overcome by linking
analytical resources from different disciplines.
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Meta-governance, transition management and 
social representations
In Chapter 1, and earlier in this chapter, I argued that the shift from govern-
ment to governance involves power moving horizontally and vertically away
from central governments. As this happens, non-state actors, and lower and
higher levels of government, become more important in policy design and imple-
mentation. Such multi-actor and multi-level governance, however, leaves central
governments in a difficult position. They lose power and authority but retain
the responsibility for achieving specific objectives. Indeed, to a significant
extent, their legitimacy depends on them doing so. If the governance analysis is
accepted, sustainable development is a profound challenge; governments are
expected to make progress on related issues, but they have less power.
Jessop’s (1998, 2004) concept of meta-governance might help us to under-
stand how central governments (should) act in such complex multi-actor and
multi-level contexts. This involves efforts to manage complexity and interac-
tions, possibly by creating visions and agreeing targets in more deliberative
ways, whilst at the same time choosing when implementation should be pursued
through market, hierarchical and more participatory or novel mechanisms. In
this mode policy implementation involves subtle steering as much as command-
and-control. As Walls et al (2005) have argued, rather than simply witnessing a
shift from government to governance, we might be witnessing a shift to gover-
nance and the state’s response to this, the governance of governance –
metagovernance.
The concept of metagovernance links well with the transition to sustain-
ability debate which is ongoing in innovation studies. As discussed in various
chapters (1, 5 and 7 in particular), transition management involves the wider
adoption of new technologies and practices that have emerged in niches (Geels,
2004a and b). The metagovernance concept is useful because it helps us to
understand the state’s role in promoting the transition from one socio-technical
regime to another. Governments should avoid trying to impose specific tech-
nologies or transition paths, but through metagovernance mechanisms they
might create the conditions under which they are agreed and pursued. In
Chapter 7 Tim Foxon discusses an iterative and flexible approach as ‘goal-
oriented incrementalism’.
The metagovernance of a transition to sustainability will involve recasting
socio-technical systems along different lines. This raises questions about the
way we understand key elements and roles they play. In Chapter 4 Patrick
Devine-Wright drew on the social-psychology tradition to analyse models and
assumptions in policy using social representations theory. Social representa-
tions, he argues, are powerful shared ways of thinking, which exist in particular
social contexts, and which come to be understood as common sense. For
example, understanding the public only as consumers, with deficits of interest,
knowledge, rationality and environmental and social responsibility, ‘suggests
that decision making about [energy] system evolution is best left to the experts
… already involved in managing the centralized system at the national level’. It
Governing Technology for Sustainability 213
ES_GTS_20-9  20/9/06  11:34  Page 213
also supports the view that strategies that focus on centralized energy produc-
tion technologies are preferable.
Such common sense representations or frames, therefore, may appear to be
relatively harmless but in practice they have profound implications and channel
power. This is a difficult challenge for a transition to sustainability. As Devine-
Wright makes clear, underneath representations there can be fundamental
conflicts over such things as the form that democracy should take (representa-
tive or participatory) and the models of technological change that should be
pursued (centralized or decentralized). The metagovernance of a transition to
sustainability must, therefore, involve efforts to question and if necessary recast
frames and representations, because of the strategic role they play in supporting
some policy agendas rather than others. To a large extent it is frames and repre-
sentations, rather than problems, solutions or technologies, that must be
(re)negotiated.
Dave Toke’s (Chapter 9) comparative perspective is useful here. He shows
that people understand and relate to wind turbines in different ways in different
contexts, and this underlines the importance of resisting efforts to simplify or
caricature people. They can, for example, be cast as NIMBYs because they use
energy but object to energy production facilities. Resistance to wind turbines,
however, might relate to ownership and management arrangements and not to
their aesthetic aspects, even if this is the way it is caricatured. If the metagover-
nance of a transition to sustainability does require concerted effort to overcome
and resist simplifying representations or framings of people and technology, it
seems likely that this will require new institutions designed with this in mind.
Institutional transformations, new social practices 
and interpretive flexibility
Formal and informal institutions are bound up with (un)sustainable develop-
ment (see Parto, 2005 on the difference). Commercial R&D institutes,
government planning departments and NGO campaign offices, are obvious
examples of the former. A large amount of sustainable development research
has examined these, often drawing attention to conflicts around technology.
From the discussion so far it is clear that governing a transition to sustainability
will involve profound transformations of institutions, including the relation-
ships between them, as well as the creation of entirely new ones (see Chapter 1
on ecological modernization and the transformation of institutions).
In Chapter 8 Rachel Slater discussed the governance of waste management
at the local level and in doing so drew attention to a wide range of formal insti-
tutions, including local government departments, waste management firms,
housing associations and residents groups. More specifically she explored the
transformation of institutional arrangements through the creation of partner-
ships – SWP and HWP. Both of these can be described as new formal institutions
but there are important differences between them. Interestingly, these partner-
ships make different assumptions about waste, technology and people, and the
relationships between them.
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The contributions to this book also draw attention to the importance of
informal institutions, including group norms and social practices. In Chapter 1,
for example, I discussed Elizabeth Shove’s work on group norms related to
cleanliness and warmth (Shove 1997, 2004). Shove emphasizes how norms and
technology co-shape each other, particularly in domestic settings, and how this
happens in relation to social practices like clothes washing and room heating.
She also argues that focusing on informal institutions in the domestic setting
involves overcoming a bias in policy debates in favour of supply-side analysis.
In this collection Robin Roy and his colleagues (Chapter 3) explored the
institutions that surround the adoption, use and, in some cases, rejection of a
range of more sustainable technologies. There are numerous examples in this
chapter of norms and practices linked to technologies. One of the examples
that extend Shove’s work on cleanliness is the potential adopter of a solar water
heating system who suggests that it offers a ‘spiritually pure’ experience of
bathing unmediated by geo-politics. Transforming formal and informal institu-
tions, then, is profoundly important for sustainability, in part because it is
bound up with new ways of understanding and doing.
The concept of interpretive flexibility from technology studies suggests that
such changes might be accompanied by changes in the meaning of technology.
Interpretive flexibility refers to the way that the same artefact can mean differ-
ent things to different social groups (Kline and Pinch, 1999, p113). GM crops
or nuclear power, for example, might be solutions to environmental problems
or serious threats to sustainability. This flexibility is linked to the way that
different social groups frame technology and it has implications for its adoption
and further development (Bijker, 1992, p98).
As discussed in Chapter 1, researchers in this area have identified a process
of closure through which the meaning of a technology becomes stable and
widely accepted. The car, for example, became synonymous with freedom and
autonomy. When this happens the technology is taken for granted and its
contested origin is forgotten. Interestingly, however, the interpretive flexibility
of a technology can return under some circumstances. Something that is taken
for granted can be recast as problematic. Transformations of formal and infor-
mal institutions in relation to sustainability might be accompanied by and
facilitated by the return of interpretive flexibility.
In Chapter 2 Seonaidh MacDonald and her colleagues drew attention to
the similarity between interpretive flexibility and the cultural studies concept of
decoding. She pointed out that both concepts suggest that artefacts are ‘read’
differently by different social groups. In Chapter 6 Raphael Sauter and Jim
Watson recognized the interpretive flexibility of technology and argued against
the labelling of micro-generation as ‘radical’ or ‘disruptive’ because this might
create (or express) unnecessary resistance in the existing energy supply system.
Drawing on this discussion we can say that the interpretive flexibility of tech-
nology will play an important role in the transformation institutions and that in
some cases change is unlikely unless interpretive flexibility returns.
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Novel policies, innovation niches and citizenship
In Chapter 10 Mark Winskel confirmed that new institutions often lead to new
policies. He showed how devolution allowed renewable energy policy in
Scotland to diverge from policy in England and Wales. When this happened a
new and unique context was created for marine energy technology innovators.
As Winskel points out, in examples like this we see how ideas of governance
intersect with the concept of innovation niches as developed in the transition
management literature. He refers to these as ‘temporary protected spaces’ where
innovation ‘tends to be carried out by small outsider firms, rather than larger
established groups’.
In Chapter 5 Adrian Smith also made a link between new institutions, poli-
cies and innovation niches in his analysis of the eco-housing. As he argues,
eco-housing is a particularly interesting case because the AT enthusiasts of the
green building movement did not set out to transfer individual technologies to
the mainstream. They wanted to transform society as a whole and their innova-
tions were an expression of a different vision of how it should be organized. In
the modern day context of climate change, however, governments and main-
stream house builders have become interested in some, but not all, of the
technologies developed in this niche. This has led to discussion of policies that
might help to transfer/translate between the niche and the mainstream.
There is, then, a close relationship between new institutions and policies,
innovation niches and transfer/translation between niche and mainstream.
Governance for sustainability will involve efforts to transfer/translate between
niche and mainstream but, as Adrian Smith points out, there are at least two
possibilities: adapting artefacts, lessons and practices from the niche for the
mainstream; or altering the socio-technical context so that it moves closer to
the niche. In the context of housing he argues:
Considered in this translation light existing policies, such as build-
ing regulations, can be understood differently. They seek to
transfer socio-technical practices that have sufficient flexibility to
translate easily between contexts. An additional, and more ambi-
tious, governance strategy would seek to try and transform the
mainstream socio-technical context itself. It would try and steer
that change closer to the values and guiding principles that exists
currently in green niches.
These options have different implications for policy and people. The first strat-
egy invokes people as consumers of technologies that are being translated out
of the niche and into the mainstream. The second strategy, however, involves
engaging with people more broadly as citizens as well as consumers. In Chapter
4 Patrick Devine-Wright discussed the idea of ‘energy citizenship’ and in
Chapter 8 Rachel Slater discussed ‘citizen governance’. In both cases these
authors suggest that policy should aim to involve people much more intimately
in adopting and managing new technologies for sustainability and that citizen-
ship should extend far beyond formal arrangements such as voting in elections
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every four or five years. It seems likely that policies that aim to change context
must build on such an understanding of the potential role of people.
Conclusion
This book has explored the imperative and opportunity of sustainable develop-
ment, focusing on people, technology and governance. With the help of the
contributing authors I have argued that a transition to sustainability is impossi-
ble unless we understand and recast the people-technology-governance nexus.
This nexus is a web of relationships, with each element constantly reproducing
or reshaping the other two. Governance, for example, leads to strategic deci-
sions about technology, based in part on assumptions about people. At the same
time, however, people can resist those assumptions and the way they are used
to justify some technologies and not others.
Drawing on the contributions to this book we can distinguish between the
governance of sustainability and governance for sustainability. Because there
are different ways of understanding (un)sustainable development, and the roles
that people and technology (might) play, the imperative of sustainability is
powerful but vulnerable. Perversely, it can be used to justify technologies that
are unsustainable or less sustainable than they might be. The governance of
sustainability, therefore, can be understood as a process of coopting the sustain-
ability agenda to other policy agendas. Caricatures and simplifications of
technology and people play an important role in this process.
Governance for sustainability, on the other hand, takes disagreements and
differences of opinion over (un)sustainable development as a starting point.
Because contemporary environmental and social problems can be understood
in different ways, and the meaning of sustainable development is not fixed,
deliberation and argument, and institutions that facilitate them, are important.
Drawing on this book it is clear that such arguments must engage with more
complex and accurate accounts of people and technology and how they are
linked. Most importantly, they must reflect on the way that technology and
people shape each other, and how this insight implies different policies and
policy-making processes.
It is important to note, therefore, that governance of sustainability and
governance for sustainability cast people passively and actively in different
ways. The governance of sustainability makes people passive in relation to deci-
sions about technology, often by emphasizing the knowledge of technical
experts. It also casts people passively in relation to technology they encounter
in their daily lives. Governance for sustainability, however, encourages people
to be active and engaged in decision making about technology, partly because it
views them as having useful knowledge, and partly because it anticipates an
active relationship with it in the future. The meaning of ‘governing technology
for sustainability’ starts to become clearer when it is explored in this way.
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